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A note on the transliteration of names 
 
Kazakhstan’s official language is Kazakh, a language of the 
Turkic family which adopts a Cyrillic alphabet. Russian is the 
second most spoken language in Kazakhstan, and has official 
status as ‚language of inter-ethnic communication‛. Official 
documents are published in Russian and Kazakh, and the use of 
Russian is still very widespread, especially among people who 
have been educated under the Soviet Union, as well as in the 
main cities.  
Russian names are spelled in this dissertation according to the 
Library of Congress system of transliteration, while  the spelling 
of Kazakh follows the transliteration system established by the 
United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN) and the 
Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British 
Official Use (PCGN).  
Some spellings are slightly altered, in order to accommodate 
common English spellings of well-known Russian names or to 
facilitate the reading. The Russian ‘ii’ ending was changed to a 
‘y’ in surnames (for example, Trotskii becomes Trotsky) but not 
in all first names or place names. The letter ‘ж’ is spelled ‘yo’ (as 
in Pyotr) to facilitate pronunciation. For the sake of clarity I have 
also dropped the Russian soft sign from all personal and place 
names (Gelman instead of Gel’man and oblast instead of oblast’). 
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Abstract 
Firmly guided by the strong leadership of the President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, the contemporary political system of 
Kazakhstan is characterized by the presence of a prominent 
political party.  Commonly labelled as a ‚party of power‛, Nur 
Otan dominates the national parliament, boasts an ever-
increasing membership and a capillary organizational structure.  
Nur Otan maintains a close relationship with the ruling elites 
who played a crucial role in its creation. These members 
continue to sustain it with a constant flow of resources, including 
the design of ad hoc institutional constraints, privileged access to 
the media, the adoption of a flexible ideology, and the 
association with the popular figure of the leader, the President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev.  
Secondly, the consolidation of Nur Otan’s dominant position 
coincided with the establishment of a ‚soft authoritarian‛ 
regime. I look at Nur Otan’s contribution to this process. It is 
argued that the ruling elites used the party, and enacted their 
party-supporting strategies, in order to face a series of regime-
threatening challenges, such as legislative rebellions and elite 
splits. Finally, drawing hypotheses from the literature on ‚new 
authoritarianism‛, I look at the specific ways Nur Otan 
contributes to regime stability: these authoritarian functions 
include managing elite competition, organizing youth activism 
and giving the regime an ‚invincible‛ image. 
A collateral question stems from the close relation of Kazakhstan 
with neighbouring Russia and from striking commonalities 
between their ruling parties. I investigate the possibility that the 
model of the ‚party of power‛ has been exported from Russia to 
the Central Asian state, together with ‚authoritarian values.
  
  
  
  
Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introducing Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan became an independent country only two decades 
ago, with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a sudden and 
unexpected process: in a way ‚Kazakhstan was born by default‛ 
(Cummings, 2005: 1).  
The country extends over a surface of 2.7 million square 
kilometres (approximately nine times the size of Italy, and larger 
than the whole Western Europe). It hosts a relatively small 
population, slightly above 16 millions, which, however, is 
increasing rapidly. 
 Its vast territory holds abundant and extremely valuable natural 
resources, including gold, uranium, copper, aluminium and, 
especially, oil and natural gas1. Revenues from the deployment 
of these resources are key to the country’s impressive economic 
growth2. The economic bonanza has brought increasing 
                                                 
1 Kazakhstan, an oil producer since 1911, has the second largest oil reserves as well as the 
second largest oil production among the former Soviet republics after Russia. (Energy 
Information Administration 2010). To give an indication of the richness and variety of 
Kazakhstan’s mineral resources, Brill Olcott (2010) reports a phrase by a Soviet geologist, 
who once boasted that ‚Kazakhstan was able to export the entire periodic table of 
elements‛ (Brill Olcott, 2010: 10). Kazakhstan’s proved oil reserves are of 30 billions of 
barrels, while proven reserves of natural gas are of 85 trillions of cubic feet. See: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=KZ  
2 Kazakhstan has maintained a sustained GDP growth since its exit from the severe crisis 
it went through in the early 1990s. Detailed data on GDP since 1992 are found in Brill 
Olcott (2010: 298). After the global economic crisis of 2008, where also Kazakhstan’s 
growth slowed down, the country has rebounded well and registered an estimated 7.1% 
growth for 2011. See http://www.worldbank.org.kz/en/country/kazakhstan/overview  
 2 
inequality between the middle class that has started emerging in 
the cities, and the marginalised communities which are not 
benefiting from this growth. It is possible to note a geographical 
and a urban/rural divide, the most deprived regions being the 
rural and extractive regions in the West and in the South of the 
country3.  
Particularly relevant is Kazakhstan’s geopolitical position. 
Kazakhstan is a landlocked country, largely endowed with 
resources: these circumstances put the country at the centre of an 
international competition for influence, where the main actors 
are the neighbouring powers, Russia and China, but also actors 
like the European Union are trying to find their space. In 
particular, European actors are interested in the development of 
newly discovered gas reserved on the Northern shore of the 
Caspian sea4. 
Although the situation is changing quickly, especially given the 
increasing role of China in the Central Asian energy market5, 
Kazakhstan is particularly close to Russia, which still maintains a 
                                                 
3 The unequal wealth distribution has created tensions, particularly in the West, when in 
December 2011 there were workers’ strikes and attacks then related to Islamic terrorism.  
4 For instance, the giant oil field of Kashagan, which will start delivering in 2013, is jointly 
controlled by state-run Kazmunaigas and six international oil companies. Kazmunaigas, 
Eni, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and France's Total own stakes of around 16.8 percent 
each, while ConocoPhillips owns 8.40 percent, and Japan's Inpex 7.56 percent. See: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/10/kazakhstan-oil-kashagan-
idUSL6E8J7CML20120810  
5 In the attempt of diversifying its resources provisions, China is increasingly importing 
crude oil from Central Asia and is acquiring equity shares from a number of countries, 
including Kazakhstan, Russia and Iran. Also, it is working on alternative energy 
corridors, investing in projects like the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, built in record time 
between 2006 and 2009, and the Central Asia Gas Pipeline (Energy Information 
Administration 2010). For details, see S. Shen (2011).  Qualitative Energy Diplomacy‛ in 
Central Asia: A comparative analysis of the policies of the United States, Russia, and 
China. Brookings Institution Research Paper. See also N. Swanstrom (2007). China’s Role in 
Central Asia: Soft and Hard Power. Global Dialogue 9, (1-2).   
 3 
fundamental position of intermediary with Western European 
buyers, as pipelines mostly pass on its territory6.  
Russia also maintains a privileged relation with Kazakhstan 
thanks the common past in the Soviet Union. This left a legacy of 
privileged relations between the political elites, the use of 
Russian language as regional lingua franca, and, especially, a 
large number of ethnic Russians, who still live on Kazakhstani 
territory7.  
Kazakhstan is, in fact, a multi-ethnic country: Kazakhs constitute 
about 60 percent of the population, while Russians, the first 
minority group, are 25 percent. Other minorities include 
Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Germans, Tatars and Uighurs (Brill Olcott, 
2010: 293). Kazakhs have actually only recently become a 
majority in their own country, as in Soviet times they were only 
40.1 percent of the total population (Cummings, 2005)8.  
Prevalently Muslim, Kazakhstan is also a multi-confessional 
country. Muslims, mostly belonging to the Sunni Hanafi school, 
constitute almost 70 percent of the population, although they are 
in large part ‚traditional Muslims‛, practising a sort of folk, 
‚ritualistic‛ Islam, largely influenced by pre-Islamic traditions 
                                                 
6 Russia is trying to maintain its strategic position in the Central Asian energy sector, 
making sure of not being bypassed in the development of energy relations between the 
European Union and Central Asia (Brill Olcott 2010).  It is trying to maintain control on 
the region’s resources also through an aggressive campaign of investments conducted by 
Gazprom (Kramer 2008). 
7 As it will be explained in the last chapter of this thesis, this relation extends to a close 
political cooperation and even to the possible exportation of political values.  
8 In order to give the right consideration to this multi-national nature, I will use the 
adjective ‚Kazakhstani‛ instead of ‚Kazakh‛, when referring to the whole country. 
‚Kazakh‛ will be used when referring to the Kazakh population only. 
 4 
present in the territory9. Orthodox Christians are the second 
religious group in the country. 
The presence of different ethnicities and religions is an important 
element of the contemporary public life of Kazakhstan: one of 
the country’s representative bodies is the Assembly of Nations, a 
consultative chamber which gathers the representatives of all the 
most important ethnic groups. Also, Kazakhstan is very active in 
promoting inter-religious dialogue10. Finally, although the 
official language is Kazakh, Russian is still used as the language 
‚of interethnic communication‛, and official documents are 
published in both languages.  
Another important element of Kazakhstan’s society is the 
traditional clan structure, which assumed a more relevant 
position in recent times also because of the recent attempt of the 
government to reinvigorate this identity as a component of 
statehood (Brill Olcott, 2010). The Kazakhs are traditionally 
divided in three hordes (zhuz), a Great, a Middle and a Small 
one, further divided in taip (tribes) and ru (clans). The 
knowledge of ancestors does not seem to be very widespread 
among Kazakhs (Brill Olcott, 2010). Nevertheless, a number of 
authors, including  Schatz (2004) and Collins (2006) underscored 
the important role played by these kinship divisions in both 
national and regional politics. 
The political life of the country has been dominated for two 
decades by the figure of the President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
who earlier had the chair of Secretary of the Kazakhstani 
                                                 
9 For these considerations I am indebted to Dr. Galina Yemelianova (CREES, 
Birmingham) and her excellent presentation on ‚The role of Islam in National 
Identification of Kazakhs‛ at the BASEES Conference, Cambridge, UK, March 31, 2012. 
10 For instance, it hosted the Third Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional  
Religions in the capital city Astana in July 2009. For reference, see: 
http://www.kazembassy.org.uk/the_third_congress_of_the_leaders_of_world_and_tradit
ional_religions_1.html  
 5 
Communist party. It was under his strong leadership that 
Kazakhstan acquired its independence, became a full-
functioning market economy, although with much initial 
sacrifice, and became more and more authoritarian, after a phase 
of relative pluralism in the early 1990s. 
 
 
1.2 The research question 
Along with a strong leader, the contemporary political system of 
Kazakhstan is characterized by the presence of a prominent 
political party.   
Commonly labelled as a ‚party of power‛ – partiya vlasti in 
Russian – Nur Otan (which loosely translates as Fatherland’s 
Light) dominates the national parliament, has a big and ever-
increasing membership, a capillary organizational structure, and 
enjoys a privileged position in the political system, as well as the 
support of the country leader. Party members occupy key 
positions in the government and its youth organization acts as an 
effective recruiting and mobilizing machine. 
At the same time, Nur Otan exists in a presidential, rather than a 
party-based political system. The President has wide 
Constitutional powers, and exercises them extensively, 
controlling directly the policy making process. In this highly 
personalized context, moreover, the role of informal politics is 
extremely relevant, and the party seems to have little power, 
resources and charisma of its own.  
The puzzle at the basis of this work regards the presence, at the 
same time, of these two elements: a strong, dominant-like party 
and a super-presidentialist regime. The questions arising from it 
regard the internal mechanisms that regulate this system. 
 6 
The first question regards the relation between Nur Otan and the 
political elites from which it originates. In particular, I focus on 
two aspects: (a) the role of ruling elites in establishing and 
supporting the party, and the asymmetric relation between party 
and power which follows from it; (b) and the strategies chosen 
by elites in order to keep the party of power in its prevailing 
position. In this respect, the party is considered as an 
organization (Panebianco, 1988), and analyzed on an meso-level, 
an intermediate level between micro approaches, focusing on the 
positions and choices of single party-men and the macro 
approach proposed by party system studies. 
Considering the party as an organization, it is possible to look at 
its internal features and functions, as well as at the relation with 
the entities which condition its existence, the restricted group of 
people which created the party and continue to support it.  
Nur Otan’s dominant position is in fact broken down and 
discussed in its different aspects, within and outside of the party 
system, finding that this party is only halfway dominant. 
Following the ‚genetic approach‛ (Panebianco, 1988), the key for 
understanding this partial dominance is found in Nur Otan’s 
origins, which established a long-lasting relation of dependence 
and weakness of the party respect to the elites which originated 
it.  
My other question regards the role of Nur Otan in contributing 
to the stability of Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime.  
A growing literature on ‚new authoritarianism‛ has proposed 
several hypotheses for the presence of political parties in non-
democratic regimes, finding a series of regime-supporting 
functions. In this work, I test some of these hypotheses, 
regarding the capacity of Nur Otan of coordinating elites and 
mobilizing the citizenship in favour of the regime (c).  
 7 
I also try to connect these two elements, by focusing on the 
reasons guiding the leadership in making their party-building 
choice (d). These choices are intimately connected with the 
party’s regime-supporting functions, although the two aspects 
should not be confused. In particular, it will be seen how the 
choice of establishing an executive-based party, as well as to 
support it using various strategies and resources, were 
connected to specific regime-threatening challenges. I argue that 
this process is a dynamic one: the elites’ behaviour and the party 
functions change according to varying conditions within the 
political system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis structure 
 
The relevance of this work resides in providing empirical 
evidence in support of theories about the role of parties for 
regime stability, although the case-study nature of this work 
 
Executive 
elites 
 
Party of 
power 
 
Regime 
Stability 
(a) Origins 
(c) Regime-
Supporting 
Functions 
(b) Resources 
(d) using the party to counteract 
regime-threatening challenges  
 8 
allows only limited generalizations outside of the Kazakhstani 
case. 
At the same time, the dissertation aims to contribute to the study 
of the internal dynamics of autocracy by looking also at the other 
side of the issue, which is why and how elites engage in party-
building and what they actually do in order to support their 
creatures. This perspective also allows creating distinctions 
between different types of dominant parties along the dimension 
of independence from the executive. 
A collateral research question stems from the similarities and the 
close relation of Kazakhstan with neighbouring Russia. The 
question regards the possibility that the model of the ‚party of 
power‛ has been exported to the Central Asian state, together 
with a series of ‚authoritarian values‛. In this respect, the thesis 
contributes also to the on-going debates on authoritarian 
diffusion. 
Obviously, given the empirical scope of this work, the 
conclusions that can be drawn from it are necessarily limited to 
the case. Nevertheless, the hypotheses presented for Kazakhstan 
can offer a starting point for further comparative research. 
 
 
1.3 Research design and methodology 
 
1.3.1 Methodological choices and justifications 
For this dissertation, a mixed-methods qualitative research 
design has been utilized on a single case-study: the methods 
used included elite and expert interviews, documentary data, 
content analysis, secondary sources and observation. 
 9 
The choice of research design and methodology is necessarily 
connected with the nature of the research enterprise. 
It was stated earlier that the goal of this dissertation is clarifying 
some of the internal dynamics in non-democratic regimes, 
namely those related with the formation, support and utilization 
of a political party in order to enhance regime stability.  
The study of the relations between party and elites is the first of 
these aspects: often, these relations involve a small number of 
actors, often taking decisions in informal contexts, which tend to 
be scarcely measurable with quantitative methods.  
Similar considerations can be done relatively to the forms of 
support offered to the party by the elites: it is actually very 
difficult to penetrate, not to mention measure, the external layer 
of party activity and actually understand how the party 
competition is actually biased towards the party of power. A 
qualitative mixed-method approach allowed me to analyze the 
issue from different perspectives, looking both at legislation and 
official documentation, relying on interviews and looking, when 
possible, at public manifestations of these forms of support, like 
in the case of privileged access to mass media.  
The functions performed by the party constitute the third main 
aspect of this research. Also in this case, the choice of a 
qualitative research design results as the most suitable. By 
emphasizing understanding and in-depth analytical exploration, 
the qualitative approach allows a better understanding of these 
complex dynamics and of their consequences for regime 
stability.     
The decision of focusing on a single case-study attains to the 
necessity of adopting an intensive research design, which is 
better suited to understand longitudinal dynamics as well as 
establishing causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2004: 349). In my case, 
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the understanding of the party of power and of its origins and 
functions is developed according both the line of historical 
reconstruction, as well as through the elaboration of causal 
mechanisms.  
Moreover, I conduct my research on a largely under-studied 
case, Kazakhstan, which is only recently attracting the attention 
of political scientists, and single-case studies constitute a better 
choice when there is scarcity of studies on a subject (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
Obviously, there are drawbacks to this choice: single-case studies 
have not the same theory-development potential as comparative 
research designs (George & Bennett, 2005). This problem is 
partly relevant for this work, which is devoted for a large part to 
the testing of existing, although not yet established, theories on 
party functions.  
Relatively to the supporting role of elites, this shortcoming is 
addressed by establishing, when possible, internal comparisons 
between Nur Otan and previous attempts to build a party of 
power.  
As said, in this work both the historical/longitudinal and the 
theoretical dimension are addressed.  
Theoretically, I address two questions. One is the effect of party 
origins on the development of party structure, especially in 
regard of its independence; the second question is whether and 
how the party of power Nur Otan is contributing to the stability 
of the Kazakhstani regime. Causal mechanisms are looked for in 
both cases, although a search for a predictive model is not the 
aim of this work. Rather, the focus is on the identification of 
causal mechanisms, the ways they work and the conditions they 
are associated with (Sayer, 2000).  
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At the same time, this work gives great importance to the 
historical element. The importance of the historical perspective 
in party studies has been long recognized (Duverger, 1964; 
Panebianco, 1988), and this approach was adopted when 
reconstructing Nur Otan’s origins in order to show the role of 
elites in establishing and supporting the party. The other 
important application of this historical approach is done in order 
to show how the party has been addressing a series of challenges 
over time, and how elites have gone through a learning process 
which has allowed the improvement of  their strategies. In the 
last case, the method used process-tracing – with the appearance 
of potential regime challenges and the establishment of certain 
party-supporting measures serving as my primary data.  
Process-tracing is defined as the ‚method *that+ attempts to 
identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and 
causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.‛ (George 
& Bennet, 2005: 206). The advantage of this method is that it 
allows to identify the causal mechanisms that connect causes and 
effects. They define causal mechanisms as ‚ultimately 
unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes 
through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in 
specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or 
matter to other entities‛ (George & Bennet, 2005: 137).  
This is a suitable method for my study, as it allows testing 
hypotheses and theory-based mechanisms by specifying the 
linking causes and effects of the processes involved. For every 
hypothesis about party functions, I reconstruct the chain of 
events which may have brought the ruling elites to use the party 
tool in such a way, and to adopt specific party-supporting 
measures. 
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1.3.2 Details on the empirical research 
The main empirical source for this work is a series of more than 
30 semi-structured interviews with party elites and activists, 
local experts, local and international journalists, local NGO 
activists and members of international organizations. Political 
activists mostly belonged to Nur Otan, but members of other 
political parties were also interviewed, when possible.  
The main sites chosen for the interviews were the former capital 
city, Almaty, and the capital city Astana. This choice was made 
on considerations of opportunity. Although Astana has been the 
capital city for more than ten years, Almaty is still the most 
important economic centre of the country, and it has a very 
lively civil society. Most opposition parties have their main office 
in Almaty, and even politicians who have to be in Astana for 
official reasons travel to Almaty on a regular basis. More than 
Astana, Almaty also offers a large and varied expert community. 
Therefore, I tried to divide equally the available time between 
the two cities. A few expert interviews were conducted also in 
other contexts: these were usually experts met in occasion of 
international conferences.  
After initial interviews, the method of snowball sampling was 
used. It should be noted that, especially in Almaty, 
representatives of the various political parties and NGOs are 
connected with each other in a close network, keeping updated 
on each other’s activities and, in many cases, maintaining 
personal relations regardless of the political affiliation. In more 
than one instance, I was introduced to a representative of Nur 
Otan by an opposition politician, and vice versa.  
The method of contact also deserves a little note. I had initially 
prepared formal letters of introduction, which were sent by mail 
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or e-mail, according to the age and level of the interviewee. After 
the initial interviews, contact was made mostly by phone, 
personal introduction and social networks: politicians of all ages 
seem to be very keen at using this tool in order to communicate 
with each other, promote their latest activities and give their 
opinion on various topics. The most used social networks are the 
Russian-based ones V Kontakte, Odnoklassniki and Moi Mir, but 
also Facebook and Twitter are very widespread.  
Interviews were semi-structured (Kvale, 1996; Leech, 2002). 
Questions were designed in order to take into account the 
position of the interviewee, as well as their personal history. 
Semi-structured interviews were preferred to structured ones 
because, like this, it was possible to maintain a certain flexibility 
and to adapt questions to the interviewee’s expertise.   
A number of questions, however, were asked to each 
interviewee: these regarded the role of political parties in the 
political system of Kazakhstan, their perception about the most 
crucial moments for the party system and for the ruling party 
since independence, and which functions they thought the party 
of power is performing. 
This research relies on a variety of sources: empirical evidence 
for its claims does not come only from interviews, but also from 
the analysis of documentary sources and legislation and, in some 
cases, of the printed press, which underpin the triangulation of 
data.  
Data from documentary sources constitute the second most 
important source of empirical evidence for this dissertation. This 
included a variety of Nur Otan documents, including the party 
program and statute, retrieved personally or from the party 
website. Other first-hand data included legislation and party 
documents by other political parties. Books by local authors, as 
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well as newspapers and reports by international organizations, 
also constitute a very important part of these sources. In 
particular, access to databases of local media like EastView and 
INTEGRUM were crucial for conducting the content analyses 
presented in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 6. The methodology 
employed in these cases is described in detail in the Appendixes 
Four and Five. 
Finally, secondary sources like books, journal articles, analytic 
reports and websites also contributed to increase the validity of 
findings. A limited addition was given by the observations 
carried on during the period of fieldwork. In particular, I was 
admitted in the Nur Otan branches of both Almaty and Astana 
and had the chance to observe several meetings, including a 
session of the High Party School. While this does not have 
specific relevance, it contributes to the overall triangulation of 
data by confirming impressions gained elsewhere, or triggering 
new questions to be later confirmed by interviews or to be 
looked for in documental analysis. 
The period considered for this research starts well before the 
creation of Nur Otan, and actually coincides with the 
establishment of Kazakhstan as an independent country in 1992. 
Some periods are considered more carefully, especially those 
which were particularly relevant for elites when adopting party-
building strategies.  
 
 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure and chapters outline 
We have seen how this introductory chapter presented the main 
research question and the relevance of the research and 
discussed the most important methodological issues.  
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The following chapter (Chapter 2) introduces the main concepts 
which constitute the tools for the following discussions, and 
answers a few preliminary questions. The first of these questions 
regards the authoritarian nature of the Kazakhstani regime. 
Subsequently, the relation between the formal and the informal 
levels of Kazakhstani politics is presented, as well as the role of 
bridge that the party seems to have in it. The chapter ends with a 
brief discussion of the ‚party of power‛, a concept elaborated in 
order to explain executive-based parties in the post-Soviet 
region. While the concept is imprecise and somehow redundant, 
studies on the ‚party of power‛ offer significant insights on the 
origins of executive-based parties and the consequences of this 
‘special relation’ with the ruling elites, and the term can be 
successfully used to indicate an executive-based dominant party. 
Chapter 3 investigates the relation between the party and the 
elites. First of all, the dominant nature of Nur Otan is questioned. 
In fact, despite dominating the electoral competition, and the 
party system, Nur Otan is not a ruling party in the classic sense. 
In fact, if taken within the whole political system, for example 
considering its agenda setting capacities, or its control on 
resources and strategic areas, Nur Otan seems much less 
powerful, not only than a dominant party, but probably even 
than any party which managed to get the governing majority. A 
second section is devoted to the issue of party genesis. The 
literature on party origins has long determined that the way a 
political party came into existence and ‘solidified’ into an 
institution has important consequences on its future features. 
More specifically, the literature on the post-Soviet phenomenon 
of ‚parties of power‛ has looked at the consequences of the 
party’s origins in the executive branch of power, and in 
particular at the relation of dependence that connects the party 
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and the elites in power. The origins of Nur Otan are finally 
reviewed in light of these considerations.  
The ways elites support the party of power are reviewed in 
Chapter 4. Two forms of support are found: the first one involves 
substantive resources, consisting of institutional and economic 
forms of support which were put forward with the explicit 
purpose of favouring the party. These include the creation of ad 
hoc institutional constraints, and their selective application; and 
the use of ‚administrative resource‛, which I examine in its form 
of privileged access to State media. The other category comprises 
less tangible resources, better understood as advantages that the 
party gets from its very position of power. I try here to show 
how the success of Nur Otan is due mostly to the popularity it 
receives from being the ‚President’s party‛, and from the general 
consensus enjoyed by the regime, especially in connection with 
its positive economic performance. Moreover, by maintaining a 
flexible ideological profile, Nur Otan is able to present itself as 
an acceptable entity to most of the population.  
Chapter 5 presents a discussion on party functions. A first 
section investigates the issue diachronically, reconstructing the 
phases of development of Nur Otan. The choices of the executive 
elites to establish a strong party of power, as well as the later 
decisions to enhance and support it, are seen as the result of a 
prolonged learning process, taking place since independence; 
also, it is argued that the founding of a party of power was 
contemporary and contingent to the establishment of a soft 
authoritarian regime. In the second section, the regime-
supporting functions of Nur Otan are analyzed according to 
different categories, including elite coordination, the offering of 
career opportunities, mass and youth mobilization. 
Finally, the issue of the similarity and possible influence of the 
Russian party of power on Nur Otan is the object of Chapter 6. 
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After considering the commonalities between the two parties, I 
present a reconstruction of the evolution of United Russia, which 
followed a path very similar to Nur Otan. In order to detect 
possible influences, two strategies are undertaken: on the one 
hand, the relation between the two parties is examined, in order 
to look for signs of contacts and occasions for learning; secondly, 
a content analysis is performed on a sample of Kazakhstani 
printed media in order to look at whether and how values 
originating in Russia are received in Kazakhstan.  
The appendixes provide additional details to the argumentation 
developed in the thesis, by offering general data on Nur Otan’s 
organizational structure (Appendix Two) and election results 
(Appendix Three) or by clarifying better the methodology 
utilized for interviews (Appendix One) and for the media 
analyses (Appendixes Four and Five).  
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Chapter 2.  
Party and Power: a Complex Relation 
 
It was stated earlier that the purpose of this dissertation is the 
understanding of the relation between the ruling party, Nur 
Otan, and power elites in the authoritarian system of 
Kazakhstan. 
This chapter has the goal of introducing the main concepts, 
which constitute the pillars of the following discussion, and of 
answering preliminary questions.  
First of all, a discussion on the nature of the Kazakhstani regime 
is presented, together with a review of the literature on ‚new 
authoritarianism‛.  
A further section is devoted to introducing the complex relation 
between the formal and informal elements of Kazakhstani 
politics, particularly the nature and structure of ruling elites. 
The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the ‚party of power‛, 
a concept elaborated in order to explain executive-based parties 
in the post-Soviet region. While the concept is imprecise and 
somehow redundant, studies on the ‚party of power‛ offer 
significant insights on the origins of executive-based parties and 
the consequences of this special relation with the ruling elites, 
and the term can be successfully used to indicate an executive-
based dominant party. 
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2.1 Party Politics in the Authoritarian System of  
Kazakhstan 
 
2.1.1 Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime 
Despite the formal introduction of democratic institution and of 
a phase of relative pluralism in the early 1990s, Kazakhstan soon 
consolidated in an autocracy. 
Measurements of political freedom calculated by Freedom 
House and the Polity IV project classify Kazakhstan as an 
authoritarian regime11.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Freedom House and Polity IV values for Kazakhstan, 1991-2011 
                                                 
11 Freedom House, is a non-profit advocacy group, founded in New York in 1941 to 
promote democracy and expand political and economic freedom around the world. It 
compiles annual ratings of the extent of political and civil liberties in different countries. 
The Polity project also evaluates countries annually on the authority characteristics of 
their political regimes.  D. Treisman (2009). Twenty years of political transition. Paper 
prepared for the UN-WIDER Conference ‚Reflections on Transition: Twenty Years after 
the Fall of the Berlin Wall‛, Helsinki, September 2009, pages 1-2. Although useful, these 
measurement have to be taken with a pinch of salt, as they measure absolute levels of 
democracy, and do not give great relevance to the domestic context.   
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Freedom House organizes its ratings, on a 7-point scale, with 7 
representing the least free conditions. Kazakhstan was rated as 
partly free from 1991 through 1993 (Karatnycky, Motyl & Shor, 
1997); after that, the polity has been labelled as ‚not free‛, 
assuming a general score of 5.512. Polity IV rates the regime on a 
21-point scale that runs from -10 (a ‚fully institutionalized 
autocracy‛) to +10 (a ‚fully institutionalized democracy‛). 
Kazakhstan has scored in the negative numbers since 
independence, and the value has further diminished over the 
years. Currently, and since 2003, its score is of -6, and the regime 
is qualified as ‚authoritarian‛13.  
In this work, I use a minimal definition of autocracy, meaning by 
it the regime that does not fulfil two minimal requirements: free 
and competitive legislative elections, and an executive that is 
elected either directly in free and competitive presidential 
elections. According to this procedural approach, these two 
criteria are at the basis of the distinction between democracy and 
authoritarianism (Przeworski et al. 2000; Cheibub et al. 2010; 
Boix, 2003). 
Kazakhstan has not yet experienced alternation in power, as the 
country leader, the former Secretary of the Kazakhstani 
Communist Party Nursultan Nazarbayev, has remained in 
power as the President for two decades, winning elections with 
extremely high margins and even becoming the ‚Leader of the 
Nation‛.  
Elections take place regularly according to universal suffrage, 
but their results are often criticized for irregularities, and always 
fail to be considered totally ‚free and fair‛ by international 
monitoring organizations like the OSCE. Moreover, as it will 
                                                 
12 http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/central-and-eastern-europeeurasia 
13 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Kazakhstan2010.pdf 
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diffusely explained later, the conditions of the political 
competition are manipulated in order to favour the party of 
power over its competitors. 
Hence, the Kazakhstani regime is, by this definition an 
authoritarian regime, or autocracy14. A survey of the relevant 
literature will be presented in the next section. 
The Kazakhstani regime can also be characterized according to 
the nature of this authoritarian regime, which is found to be 
‚soft‛ (Means, 1996; Schatz, 2009). By ‚soft authoritarianism‛ is 
meant one where forms of subtle manipulation and persuasion 
are generally preferred over repression. Schatz individuates a 
‚soft authoritarian tool kit‛, including: a committed core of 
supporters, the possibility to ‚mobilize those outside of the core 
believers through material enticements and blackmail‛, 
occasional use of ‚hard‛ coercion to manage the opposition, an 
efficient media management and a successful ‚discursive 
preemption‛, meaning the ability of staging political dramas in 
order to weaken opposition (Schatz 2009: 206-207). 
In the following chapters it will be seen how the party of power 
contributes to the construction of such a regime, which has its 
first advantage in being a more cost-effective option in 
comparison with regimes largely relying on coercion (Fish, 2005). 
 
 
2.1.2 The study of “new authoritarianism” 
The study of non democratic types of rule has a long tradition, 
which goes back to the seminal work of Juan Linz on the topic 
(1975). While in the 1990s, in the wake of the ‚third wave‛ of 
democratization, the debate on democratic transitions occupied 
                                                 
14 In the thesis I will use the terms interchangeably. 
 23 
most of the discussions among scholars in Comparative Politics, 
the contemporary diffusion of autocracies and the consequent 
feeling of uneasiness in continuing to use the ‚transition 
paradigm‛ have brought about a renewed attention on 
authoritarian regimes and their governance (Carothers 2002; 
Huntington, 1992).  
After a phase of despair among scholars and policy makers 
about the dangers of a ‚democratic rollback‛ (Diamond 2008) 
and the formation of a front of non-democratic powers (Gat, 
2007), a ‚new sobriety‛ is now spreading in the social sciences, 
allowing the proliferation of regime studies which lack both the 
enthusiastic approach of transitology or the dimness of the 
return of autocracy (Burnell & Schlumberger 2010). 
A number of studies, going under the denomination of ‚new 
authoritarianism‛ are investigating the internal features of non-
democratic regimes, in connection with the stability and 
durability of their rule.  
This new literature on authoritarian politics follows three main 
lines of research. On the one hand, there are economic models of 
dictatorship, which underscore the connection between political 
order and property rights: among the most important 
contributions there are Tullock (1987), Olson (1993), Wintrobe 
(1998), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Boix (2003) and 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2006). Political scientists tried also to 
investigate authoritarian regime by using a broad cross-sectional 
approach, which allows accounting for institutional variation 
among autocratic regimes (Geddes, 2003; Gandhi and 
Przeworski, 2006). A third category are in-depth studies, which 
attempt to uncover different mechanisms of autocratic survival 
under various institutional settings, for instance looking at how 
dictators use electoral rules to divide opponents (Lusk-Okar, 
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2005) or looking at the logic of autocratic elections (Magaloni, 
2006).  
Studies belonging to this third category often focus on the role of 
formal institutions usually associated with democratic political 
systems, including multiple political parties, partially 
competitive elections and parliamentary assemblies, in autocratic 
context (Brownlee, 2007; Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski, 
2006; Geddes, 2006; Schedler, 2006; Magaloni, 2008; Levitsky & 
Way, 2002; Way, 2005).  
In particular, the study of one-party rule, meaning both single-
party and dominant party regimes, has received particular 
consideration. First, this attention is due to the diffusion of this 
regime type: one-party regimes are the most common type of 
autocracies: one-party regimes represent the 57% of 
authoritarian regimes during 1956-2006, and 33% of the total 
numbers of regimes in the world (Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010: 
124). The other reason for such an attention is the relative 
stability and durability that characterize party-based regimes in 
comparison with other regime types, in particular military ones 
(Geddes 2003, Magaloni 2008). Obviously, a cautious approach is 
necessary when defining this as a causal relation. As Magaloni 
and Kricheli (2010) suggest, it may well be that there are other 
reasons for party-regimes to survive for a long time, associated 
with performing regime-supporting functions but not 
conditional to them15.  
In general, the investigation of the functions of authoritarian 
parties is a promising avenue for the better understanding of 
authoritarian politics, especially when this is done, as in this 
case, on a single-case basis. 
                                                 
15 A wider discussion on the literature on party authoritarian functions is presented in 
Chapter 5.  
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One may argue that Kazakhstan is more of a personalist regime, 
rather than a party-based one. The personal powers of the 
President are indeed very large, and Nazarbayev exercises them 
extensively, making a large use of his decree and veto power.  
Instead of adopting this distinction as a categorization, as 
Geddes (2003) does16, I prefer treating the definitions of ‚party-
based‛ and ‚personalist‛ as ideal-types, as suggested by 
Magaloni (2007).  
This way, it is possible to see how elements of the two ‚pure‛ 
types coexist in the same regime, and how the two elements 
communicate and influence each other.  
 
                                                 
16 Geddes (2003) divides regimes between personalist, party-based and military. 
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2.2 The formal and informal in Kazakhstani politics 
 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the relation between 
formal and informal politics in Kazakhstan, as well as to provide 
some fundamental definitions.  
The Kazakhstani system has a very important component in 
informal politics, which is partly due to its traditional structure 
(the clan structure), but more to the presence of large patronage 
networks. This informal element conditions and interacts with 
the formal level, the one of institutions, and is, at the same time, 
conditioned by it (Isaacs, 2011). This relation is at the basis of the 
origins of the party of power Nur Otan, which was created by a 
restricted group of people in power in order to achieve a better 
control of the formal sphere.  
Relatively to political parties, three mechanisms of informal 
influence have been found (Isaacs, 2011). The first one is the 
central role of Nazarbayev, who is the head of a personalist 
regime where he enjoys enormous influence with the support of 
the elites, and takes relevant decisions in managing the party 
system (Isaacs, 2011).  
The second is the existence of patron-client networks between 
the president and the elites. Nazarbayev seems to favour 
different members of the elites, sometimes on clan basis, but 
more often on other relations, with his patronage in exchange for 
loyalty (Schatz, 2004). Patronage networks operate at many 
levels, including the local one: the regional akims (governors) are 
appointed by the president and have the power of appointing 
local administrators at lower levels (Schatz, 2004). 
The third informal element of the political game in Kazakhstan is 
the conflict between the elites. While the aspect of their conflict 
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will be treated in greater detail in Chapter 5, the nature and 
structure of these elites deserve a few more words.  
Although it can be considered as a quite homogeneous group, 
compared, for instance, with Russia (interview, Beshimov, 2011), 
the Kazakhstani elites are divided in different groups, which 
emerged either from the Soviet nomenklatura, or from new 
economic activities, or within the family and friends’ circle of the 
President. Table 2.1 shows the most important groups, together 
with their economic and media assets.  
In this dissertation, the term ‚elites‛ will be used to indicate 
these different groups. These groups are different from the 
restricted group at the very centre of the system which gave 
origins to the party of power Nur Otan. This group, which can 
be identified in the President and his closer allies, including his 
adviser Ermukhamed Ertysbayev and the former Prime Minister 
Tereschenko, is the group which has the closer control on the 
legislative process as well as on the country’s key assets. For its 
overlap with the highest state institutions, this group can also be 
referred to as ‚the authorities‛. In this work, I will refer to this 
group with expressions like the ‚ruling elites‛, the ‚power 
elites‛ or the ‚executive elites‛. While the choice of refer to this 
group also as ‚power‛ or ‚ruling‛ elites underscores their 
position of power. The last expression indicates their belonging 
to the executive branch of power, rather than to the legislative, in 
order to highlight the origins of Nur Otan in that context. This 
perspective is taken from the literature on the post-Soviet parties 
of power, which will be discussed in the next section. Indeed, as 
it will be seen, the expression ‚party of power‛ is successful in 
conveying the idea that the party actually belongs to the groups 
in power.  
  
Nursultan Nazarbayev: President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Rakhat Aliyev and Dariga 
Nazarbayeva Group 
(Son-in-law and daughter of 
the President) 
Timur Kulibayev Group 
(Son-in-law of the 
President) 
Eurasian Natural Resources 
Corporation (ENRC) Led by 
close associates of the 
President, Aleksandr 
Mashkevich, Patokh 
Chodiev and Alijan 
Ibragimov 
The Group of Nurzhan 
Subkhanberdin (long time 
friend and clansman of the 
President) 
The Group of Mukhtar 
Ablyazov (Former Energy 
Minister and close associate 
of the President)  
Assets: Sakharny Tsentr 
Neftianoy Tsentr, 
Mangistaumunaigaz: 
TV Stations: Khabar, NTK, 
KTK 
Newspapers: Novoe 
Pokolenie, Panorama, 
Karavan 
Assets: KazEnergy, Almex 
Holding Group, Halyk 
Bank. 
(many of these assets have 
been sold now, but 
Kulibayev’s fortune is said 
to be worth 2.1 billion USD) 
Assets: Kazkhrom, Aluminii 
Kazakhstana. 
 
 
Newspaper: Express-K 
Assets: Kazkommertsbank 
(largest bank in Kazakhstan) 
 
 
Newspaper: Vremya 
Assets: Bank Turan-Alem, 
Astana Holding, 
Kazakhstan International 
Bank, Neftiania Strakhovaya 
Kompanya. 
Newspaper: Respublica 
Political Connections: 
Access and allies in the tax 
police and security services 
Political Connections: 
Limited but close to former 
Prime Minister Karim 
Masimov. 
 Political Connections: Uraz 
Zhandosov (former Finance 
Minister), Alikhan 
Baimenov (ex Labour 
Minister) 
 
Political Party: 
Asar 
 Political Party: 
The Civil Party 
Political Party: 
Alleged links to Ak Zhol 
and Nagyz Ak Zhol 
Political Party: 
Alga 
Table 2.1 Elite map. Source: Isaacs, 2011. 
  
Political parties in general, and Nur Otan in particular, constitute 
a sort of bridge between this informal realm and the formal 
element of Kazakhstani politics, the one constituted by the state 
institutions and by the administrative and bureaucratic system17. 
As it will be shown in greater detail in chapter 5, elite groups 
participate in institutional life through political parties, both pro-
government and opposition. While striving to control these elite 
parties, elite groupings aim to conquer a higher place in the 
informal hierarchy and to get closer to the top layer of political 
power18. The president acts as an arbiter between them, deciding 
how much power each elite will have and managing conflicts to 
its own advantage (see also Isaacs, 2011).  
Nur Otan occupies a specific place in this system, because it does 
not represent just one segment of the elites, but its centre, the 
restricted group who is in the very top position. 
Created by the top elites, Nur Otan seems to occupy an 
intermediate place between the formal and the informal level, 
acting in a way as a bridge between them. 
As noted by Isaacs, Nur Otan is ‚focused on the president, his 
personality and his centrality to the country’s prosperity *<+. It 
is the informal politics of personality as opposed to formal 
                                                 
17 Obviously there are also other points of contacts between the two realms: for instance, 
the use of formal rules in order to harass opponents or to favour the party of power is an 
example. 
18 Isaacs finds different mechanisms of connection between parties and elites: parties 
created by ‚charismatic personalities‛ in order to remain or to claim public office; parties 
created by the new-liberal professional elite in order to protect its political and economic 
interests; parties as organizations for the representation of oligarchic interests in the 
parliament; ‚spoiler‛ parties; and parties created on the basis of political personality for 
representation of presidential interests in the legislature (Isaacs, 2011: 112-116).  
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ideological ideas that drive party representation‛ (Isaacs, 2011: 
123).  
This circumstance could actually have important consequences 
for the future of the party and the political system in general: 
although there are still little signs of this, the gradual transfer of 
power from the President and the top elites to the party could be 
a sign of an on-going process of institutionalization, which 
would lead to the evolution of the system towards a party-based 
form. 
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2.3 “Party of power” as a working term 
 
The term ‚party of power‛ – ‚partiya vlasti‛ in Russian – has 
gained great popularity among both actors and analysts of post-
Soviet politics in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s. Today, the 
term is widely used in the general press, mostly in reference to 
Russia but also to other post-Soviet countries, including 
Kazakhstan19.  
The term has been used widely also in the scholarly literature. 
Initially coined for the Ukrainian case (Wilson and Yakushyk, 
1992)20, it came to indicate a Russian phenomenon, the one of 
political parties founded by or connected with the Kremlin in the 
1990s and 2000s (Myagkov et al., 2005). There are also few 
attempts to analyze ‚parties of power‛ in comparative 
perspective (Resende & Kraetzschmar, 2005; and, in part, 
Meleshevich, 2007). 
Despite its popularity, there is a large degree of confusion on the 
concept: definitions are sometimes lacking, not always clear and 
very different from each other. Andrey Ryabov (2005), for 
instance, defines the party of power as ‚a political organisation 
                                                 
19 In order to have an overview of the usage of the term in the press, I made a search for it 
in the electronic databases collection ‚East View‛,  covering more than 400 publications 
in the post-Communist area. The search for the terms ‚party of power‛ and ‚partia vlasti‛ 
for the period 1989 – 2010 resulted in 1710 and 41090 findings respectively. The diffusion 
of the term has increased greatly in the 2000s: restricting the search to the period 2001 – 
2010 it is possible to see that the majority of the results are found in this decade: 992 
results for ‚party of power‛ and 35463 for ‚partia vlasti‛. The term refers mainly to 
Russian parties of power, but it is used to indicate parties in other post-Soviet countries, 
in particular Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The database was accessed in March 2011. 
20 This is true also for the news media: already in occasion of the Ukrainian parliamentary 
elections of 1993, the term was used to indicate the spectrum of parties supporting central 
power. Vladimir Bogdanovsky, ‚Ukrainskaya Prevybornaya Mozaika: Risunok ne 
Poluchaetsa‛ in Krasnaya Zvesda, n. 278, 2 December 1993.  
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that participates in elections and has its representatives in the 
bodies of power at different levels‛, making it indeed quite 
difficult to distinguish the party of power from any other 
political party (Ryabov, 2005: 4, in Meleshevich, 2007). 
By ‚party of power‛ scholars have meant very different things, 
such as the group of people in power, an electoral bloc, or an 
elite strategy.  
The first interpretations of parties of power focused on the 
structure of such parties, pointing at their elite-based composition 
and pragmatic orientation. 
Starting from the observation of the Ukrainian case, Wilson and 
Yakushyk (1992) defined the party of power as ‚a political bloc 
that includes pragmatically oriented and deideologized upper 
level circles of the old [Communist] nomenklatura, representatives 
of the state apparatus, mass media, managers of traditional 
sectors of industry and agriculture‛ (Wilson and Yakushyk, 
1992: 164). Sergey Khenkin (1996) also defined the party of 
power as a sort of bloc which coagulated around the highest 
spheres of power. In his definition, the party of power is a ‚set of 
institutions, structures and organizations, grouped around the 
head of state, which follow the official policy, and participate in 
the definition of goals and strategies for the development of 
Russia (including single regions)‛ (Khenkin, 1996: 1). Khenkhin 
explicitly states the low level of organization of the party of 
power, and assigns to it a quasi-party quality: ‚differently from 
dominant parties in the majority of the countries in the world, 
the Russian party of power is not politically or organizationally 
outlined. It remains as a peculiar quasi-party‛ (ibidem). Colton & 
McFaul (2000, 2003) present the term as a synonymous, for 
Russians, of what Westerners call ‚the establishment‛, the rather 
amorphous group of people in power (Colton & McFaul, 2000: 
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202; Colton & McFaul, 2003: 48). Turovsky (2006) relates the 
phenomenon to the specific structuring process of a new Russian 
political elite, made of three components: part of the Soviet 
nomenklatura, which managed to adapt to the new political 
conditions; the new business elite; and new bureaucrats, who 
started their career in post-Soviet times. He describes parties of 
power as ‚institutionalised‛ elite groupings (Turovsky, 
2006:153).  
While these definitions reflect quite accurately the situation as it 
was in the first phases of the evolution of Russian parties of 
power, they are inadequate to explain the later developments of 
these parties, which evolved in complex and somehow influent 
organizations. Moreover, the scope of these approaches is 
limited to the Russian case at a specific point in time. This leaves 
little space for generalizations, even within the post Soviet space, 
where the idea and terminology of the party of power seem to be 
successful.  
Things are not different also for the other approach to the study 
of the party of power, which focuses on the electoral function of 
these parties: this approach identifies the party’s main function 
and raison d’être in competing in the elections and eventually 
controlling the legislature in the interest of elites who are outside 
of the party. 
In what they call their ‚narrow‛ interpretation of the party of 
power, Colton & McFaul define it as ‚the contender in a multi-
party election most closely tied to the incumbent‛ (Colton & 
McFaul, 2000: 203). Oversloot and Verheul (2006), perhaps a little 
too retrospectively, define the party of power as the designed 
winner in elections. More precisely, Regina A. Smyth defines 
‚Russia’s parties of power‛ as ‚electoral blocs organized by state 
actors to participate in parliamentary elections and forge 
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national organizations for presidential elections. They rely on 
state resources over building a party bureaucracy and depend 
heavily on charismatic appeals to vote to win supports‛ (Smyth, 
2002: 557) 21.  
This approach provides an accurate description of the emergence 
of Russian parties of power as creatures of state elites, giving 
account of the appearance of several party experiments which 
were discarded as a consequence of their poor electoral 
performance (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Reuter & Remington, 2009). 
Russian parties of power, though, have later evolved to become a 
stable organization, United Russia, which survived three 
electoral cycles, increased its complexity and institutionalization, 
and started serving in other ways the interests of the elites 
(Roberts, 2010).  
Andrey Meleshevich (2007) tries to find a synthesis among the 
two approaches described before, and to extend the scope of the 
party of power beyond its electoral function. He defines the 
party of power as ‚a political bloc that: (1) has a de-ideological, 
pragmatic and centrist nature; (2) is created (i.e. founded or 
utilized) by and acts in the interest of the executive branch of 
government; (3) relies on state and other administrative 
resources available to representatives of the executive managers 
to achieve its goals including participation in elections; and (4) 
bases its electoral participation on a strong personality-centered 
factor (Meleshevich, 2007: 195).  
Even Meleshevich, however, treats parties of power just as a 
phenomenon, without trying to establish a party typology. The 
                                                 
21 This definition resembles in many points the one provided by Vladimir Gelman (2006): 
parties of power are (1) established by the executive branch in order to get a majority in 
legislative arenas; (2)  lack a definite ideology; (3) use state resources for campaigning 
and are merely captured by the top state officials (Gelman, 2006: 8). 
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absence, in the literature, of definitions for the parties that are not 
‚of power‛ makes it difficult to reason in terms of ‚typology‛, 
which should be exhaustive by definition. The category of ‚party 
of power‛ cannot be inscribed within existing typologies neither, 
as those categorizations capture its most characterizing elements 
according to different dimensions, creating overlaps that cannot 
be considered as mutually exclusive22. Dominant parties, for 
example, are known to control legislative bodies and use 
extensively state resources in order to perpetuate their rule, in 
democracies as well as in autocracies (Pempel, 1990). Also, 
parties with a low ideological profile are already successfully 
classified under the category of ‚catch-all‛ parties (Kirchheimer, 
1966).  
Despite this, the literature on the party of power still offers 
useful insights to understand the specific relation existing 
between these parties and the elites which created them, 
including the ways the party is supported, which are two of the 
goals of this dissertation. 
In a way, I propose to focus on the ‚of power‛ half of the 
expression. In fact, while classic theoretical approaches can 
provide an adequate framework for the understanding of these 
parties’ electoral and survival strategies, they mostly suppose the 
party as an autonomous source of power – with the relevant 
exception of the literature on party origins. The party of power 
literature, instead, brings on focus the party’s peculiar relation 
with the executive elites and help understanding differences 
between different types of dominant parties, as it will be seen in 
Chapter 3.   
                                                 
22 Exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness are the two conditions around which 
typologies can be built. See Sartori, 1984; Marradi, 1990. 
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Therefore, although it cannot be considered as a specific category 
for the abovementioned reasons, ‚party of power‛ is still a useful 
term, as it successfully and succinctly conveys the idea of a party 
which is deeply connected with the executive branch of power.   
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Chapter 3. 
The party and the elites 
 
Nur Otan occupies a unique position in Kazakhstani politics: it 
has been the main parliamentary party for more than a decade 
and even the only party between 2007 and 2011; since its 
foundation, it dominates the electoral competition, reaching 
extremely high vote shares; it monopolizes public attention, 
thanks to its capillary presence in the provinces and privileged 
access to mass media; a large organization, it boasts a wide 
membership and capillary territorial structure. Also, it is 
commonly referred to as Kazakhstan’s ‚ruling party‛, especially 
by members of the party elite (interviews, Kharitonova, Bokaev, 
Rakimzhanov, Karin, 2011). 
At first glance, Nur Otan seems indeed to have all the requisites 
of a dominant party, on the model of the Mexican Institutional 
Revolutionary Party. 
At the same time, Nur Otan exists in a presidential, rather than a 
party-based political system. In this highly personalized context, 
moreover, the role of informal politics is extremely relevant, and 
the party seems to have little power, resources and charisma of 
its own. 
At a closer look, in fact, Nur Otan seems to be a dominant party 
only when taken within the party system and the electoral arena. 
If, instead, it is taken within the whole political system, for 
example considering its agenda setting capacities, or its control 
on resources and strategic areas, Nur Otan seems much less 
powerful, not only than a dominant party, but probably even 
than any party which managed to get the governing majority. 
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The classic literature on dominant parties offers a starting point 
for the understanding of this puzzle. This exercise is fruitful for 
two reasons: first, it allows to state clearly Nur Otan’s prominent 
position within the party system; second, it allows seeing also 
the main difference between ‚classic‛ examples of dominant 
parties and parties which, like Nur Otan, are executive-based: an 
unbalanced relation with the executive elites which created the 
party. 
The key for understanding this difference is party’s origins: the 
circumstances of party genesis are known to have extremely 
important consequences on a party’s organizational features and 
strength. In the case of Nur Otan, its relative weakness is due to 
the first-rate role of the executive branch of power in creating, 
organizing and supporting it. 
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3.1. Understanding Nur Otan: The dominant party 
framework and beyond 
 
3.1.1 Party dominance within the party system 
Maurice Duverger defined as dominant parties those which are 
believed to be dominant by the public opinion (Duverger, 1964). 
Other authors focused on the more measurable criterion of 
electoral success (Sartori, 2005: 174; Magaloni, 2006: 36-37; 
Pempel, 1990: 3-4). 
In his seminal study on parties and party systems, Sartori 
defined the dominant party as one which is ‚significantly 
stronger than the others‛ (Sartori, 2005: 193), and distinguished 
between dominant parties in competitive and non-competitive 
political systems. In a system characterized by genuine 
competition, a party establishes a ‚pre-dominant party system‛ 
by winning at least three consecutive absolute majorities (Sartori, 
2005: 175). In semi-competitive systems, instead, the number of 
consecutive majorities is not relevant. Other parties exist and are 
allowed to participate into elections, but only the ‚hegemonic 
party‛ can win (Sartori, 2005: 204-205). 
At a first glance, Nur Otan qualifies as ‚hegemonic party‛. 
Founded as Otan in 1999, the party has so far taken part in four 
electoral cycles, obtaining progressively larger results, and 
obtaining the absolute majority of votes and seats in the last two 
elections. The measure of the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 
in the political system, based on the allocation of seats in 
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parliament, gives an immediate visualization of this (see Table 
1)23. 
 
 
The index has assumed low values for the past decade, reaching 
the lowest point (1) in 2007, when Nur Otan occupied all the 
seats in the Parliament’s lower Chamber, the Mazhilis24. In 
January 2012 the situation changed slightly, as two other parties 
entered the Mazhilis. However, the change is minimal and 
scarcely relevant, as the two small pro-regime parties which got 
seats barely overcame the 7% entry threshold. 
The level of competition in the Kazakhstani political system is 
indeed quite low, especially in the last two elections. Some of the 
opposition parties were not allowed to compete because of 
alleged violations of formal rules, while others, despite having 
concurred and received some votes, did not win seats on the 
basis of a restrictive party legislation25. Also, the main party has 
                                                 
23 The index is calculated according to the formula N = 1/  𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  where p is the 
proportion of seats assigned to each party as a result of an election. See Laakso, M. and R. 
Taagepera (1979). 
24 Data for the calculation were retrieved from the Central Electoral Commission website: 
http://election.kz/portal/page?_pageid=153,511661&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL  
25 For example, in September 2011 the Communist Party was suspended for six months 
and was therefore not allowed to contest the January 2012 elections. The activities of the 
Communist Party were suspended for six months by a court decision on 4 October 
 1994 1995 1999 2004 2007 2012 
ENP 4.67 3.96 4.37 2.66 1 1.37 
Table 3.1 Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENP) in 
Kazakhstan  
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larger media visibility, and irregularities in the electoral process 
have been reported by international observers. 
 
 
3.1.2 Is Nur Otan a dominant party outside of the party system? 
Considered the above, Nur Otan seems indeed a ‚hegemonic 
party‛. However, electoral success and the scarcely competitive 
nature of the political system are not the only elements which 
define party dominance. In particular, definitions focusing on 
the party system, like Sartori’s, say little about the position of the 
dominant party in relation to the other state institutions. 
A more complete view is the one presented by Pempel (1990), 
who found four common features of dominant parties. Parties 
should be dominant in number; enjoy a dominant bargaining 
position; shape the public policy agenda; and be in power for a 
substantial period of time (Pempel, 1990: 3-4). 
Nur Otan seems to have at least some of these features. The 
party is definitely dominant in number, controlling almost 
exclusively the national legislature and boasting a capillary 
territorial diffusion and a membership of almost one million26. 
                                                                                                           
2011.The suspension of the party was due to the participation of the party leader in the 
activities of an unregistered political association, the Khalykh Maidany (National Front). 
The 4 October 2011 decision of the district court on suspension of the activities of the 
party was upheld by the appellate court in Almaty on 24 October. See 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/86985. The opposition party OSDP-AZAT is still 
waiting for registration as a united party (in the latest elections it participated as a 
coalition bloc of two parties), after two years from the initial request (Interview with 
Kosanov, 2011). The opposition party Alga’s application has never been accepted. The 
rules on party registration are particularly demanding, and the presence of a 7% entry 
threshold makes it very difficult for small parties to obtain seats in the Mazhilis. A 
detailed discussion on the use of legislation and technicalities to shape party competition 
can be found in chapter 4. 
26 Nur Otan counts  916 363 members as of June 2012. See the official party website: 
http://www.ndp-nurotan.kz/site/content/79 
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It can be also said to have a bargaining position within the party 
system. Nur Otan’s officials organize regular meetings with 
representatives of other political formations, and offer assistance 
to other parties, including the opposition. In doing so, the ‚party 
of power‛ shows in every occasion its superior position, 
somehow patronizing the other parties and acting as a mediator 
between these parties and the central ‚power‛27. 
At the same time, Nur Otan seems to have little bargaining 
power towards the executive elites, especially the President. 
Important political decisions tend to be taken outside of the 
party, in a context where informal practices are extremely 
relevant, even more than formal institutions. According to the 
political analyst Dossym Satpayev, the ‚real players in 
Kazakhstani politics are not official political parties but 
underground and shadow players around the President and his 
circles‛ (interview, Satpayev, 2011). 
Also, the role of Nur Otan as a broker between candidates 
interested in public office and the centre of power seems 
controversial. Applying Pempel’s model to United Russia, David 
White (2011) concludes that the party has a bargaining position 
because ‚candidates seeking public office either at the federal or 
regional level have sought to ally themselves with the party in 
order to maximize their electoral potential‛ (White, 2011: 659). 
                                                 
27 I observed one of such meetings in Astana in November 2011, and interviewed the 
participants, asking about the frequency and scope of these meetings, as well as their 
attitude about them. The participants seemed to be well aware of the patronizing 
tendencies of Nur Otan, but related the necessity to be attending these meetings, in order 
not to be excluded by ‚the game‛ (interview, All-parties-meeting participants, 2011). In 
another interview, a Nur Otan representative pointed out that other parties ‚need 
assistance‛, and that Nur Otan would help them out until they will be able to stand on 
their own (interview, Rakhymzhanov, 2011). 
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In Kazakhstan, independent candidates in elections, common 
until the mid-2000s, were indeed progressively substituted by 
party-affiliated candidates, especially after the change in the 
electoral legislation which instituted Proportional 
Representation with party list for all seats. Since then, anyone 
who would like to get an elected post has been forced to be 
affiliated to the ‚party of power‛. However, this process seems 
to be limited to the electoral arena, where, as we have seen, Nur 
Otan has a dominant position. On the other hand, the electoral 
path is not the only, and not even the most important way to 
public office. Official positions are mostly obtained through 
informal channels, especially through personal connections with 
the leader28. 
The third feature assigned by Pempel to dominant parties is the 
capacity of shaping the public policy agenda. Nur Otan seems to 
be having mostly an ‚implementing‛ role, while the President 
has most of the policy-making powers. This arrangement is 
formally stated: according to the party program, the first 
objective of the party is the ‚successful realization of the First 
President’s policy agenda‛ (Nur Otan, 2007). In the ‚National 
strategy 2009-2012‛ it can be read that the ‚fundamental national 
values, as they were formulated by the Leader of the Nation, 
constitute the substance of Nur Otan’s ideological platform‛ 
(Nur Otan, 2009). 
Finally, according to Pempel, dominant parties should be in 
power for a substantial period of time. Nur Otan was founded as 
Otan in 1999, and has been the first parliamentary party only 
since 2004. This is a very short time, compared to other dominant 
parties such as the Mexican or the Japanese ones, although this 
                                                 
28 The topic of the party as a promoter of career advancements will be treated in Chapter 
5. 
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does not exclude that the party could be in power for a long time 
afterwards. 
According to these parameters, Nur Otan is therefore only 
‚partially‛ a dominant party: it is dominant in the electoral 
arena, as well as in the landscape of party politics. In relation 
with the executive elites, instead, it seems to have a subordinate 
role: it implements, rather than deciding, the policy agenda; and 
seems to have scarce control on the distribution of key official 
positions. 
 
 
3.1.3 Party dominance: a functional analysis 
The impression that Nur Otan is only halfway dominant is 
confirmed if we look at the functions traditionally assigned to 
dominant parties, and see whether and to what extent Nur Otan 
performs these functions. 
In a study on United Russia, Sean Roberts (2010) surveys the 
classic literature as well as empirical studies on dominant 
parties, finding a set of basic functions: legislating, distributing 
state resources, stabilizing regime succession and guaranteeing 
control over strategic areas (Roberts, 2010). In his work, Roberts 
concludes that United Russia is ‚dominant, but not ruling‛, and , 
rather than having the position in power typical of a principal, it 
is only an agent of executive elites. 
It is possible to reach a similar conclusion for Nur Otan. 
Relatively to the power to legislate, it could be argued that, 
dominating the national parliament, Nur Otan actually has the 
control on the law-making process. Moreover, the adoption of 
party and electoral legislation which favours Nur Otan over 
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other parties, would support the idea that the party is legislating 
in order to perpetuate its dominance. 
In reality, the Parliament is a little more than a rubber stamp for 
the President’s initiatives. As mentioned before, the party has 
little influence on the definition of the policy agenda, having the 
role of implementing the President’s plans, who appears to be 
also the party chairman. 
The President’s prominent position relatively to the Parliament is 
also stated at the institutional level. While the legislative 
initiative belongs to the President, the Parliament and the 
Government alike (Constitution, Art. 61.1), the President has the 
right of setting the agenda of the Parliament, establishing 
priorities among drafts and deciding on urgent law projects 
(Constitution, Art. 61.2). Moreover the President is able to send 
drafts back to the Parliament and can even overcome the 
Parliament by exercising his own legislative power29. 
This means that the leader has the possibility to overcome the 
decisions of the ‚party of power‛ at any moment, but especially 
in the event of a crisis. This situation, created by the super-
presidentialist Constitution of 1995, has not changed even after 
the Constitutional reform of 2007, which was supposed to start 
the transformation of the system into a presidential-
parliamentary republic (Shaymergenov, 2007). 
The functions of distributing resources and controlling key areas 
are intimately related, as the economy is one of these very 
important areas. In Kazakhstan it is the executive power to 
control the most important economic outlets and strategic 
resources, through a system of state holdings. 
                                                 
29 The President’s power of legislative initiative was further enlarged with the 
Presidential decree N. 413 of September 21st 2007. 
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Although most members of the cabinet are members of Nur 
Otan, this does not seem a sign of influence of the party on the 
government. Membership in the ‚party of power‛ is actually 
better understood as a ‚loyalty card‛, a way for politicians and 
civil servants to show their loyalty to the leader. Many important 
political actors, including cabinet members, joined the party in 
the summer of 2007, in coincidence with the announcement that 
the President Nazarbayev would become the party chairman 
(interview, Nurmakov, 2011)30. Presumably by that time it was 
clear that the President and his close circle were giving 
unconditioned support to the project, and these personalities felt 
compelled to give a clear sign of their loyalty. 
Dominant parties are also supposed to have a role in facilitating 
regime succession in closed regimes, where the struggle for 
leadership can cause elite splits (Way & Levitsky, 2006). As 
Roberts notes, the dominant party works as a conveyor belt, 
which regulates the competition for the highest executive office 
(Roberts, 2010). 
In Kazakhstan, the current President has been in power since the 
country got its independence, in 1991. Hence, the country has yet 
to experience alternation in power. 
Recently, there were talks of Nur Otan becoming the regime’s 
‚collective heir‛ (kollektivny preemnik). This expression started to 
be used especially after the abovementioned Constitutional 
                                                 
30 The announcement was made public on July 4th 2007 
http://news.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=218151. Four ministries received their party cards in 
July 2007: Bakhtykozha Ismukhambetov (Energy), Gulzhan Karagusova (Social Security 
and Labour), Ermukhamet Ertysbaev (Culture and Information) and Akhmetzhan 
Esimov (Agriculture) http://news.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=218824. Other important 
personalities received their partiinniy biliet (party card) in those days, including the  
Speaker of the Senate Kasym-Zhomart Tokaev and the akim of Almaty Ismangali 
Tasmagambetov. 
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reform, which gave, at least in theory, larger powers to the 
parliament and to the party of power. In fact, the President had 
even declared his will to transfer some powers to the political 
parties and the parliament (Shaymergenov, 2007). 
At the moment, as noted by the expert Natalia Kharitonova, the 
mechanism of transmission of power in Kazakhstan is 
problematic. In the last twenty years the leadership of 
Nazarbayev was never in doubt, and  no other relevant political 
figure emerged. Also, it was not possible to find an heir within 
the President’s family circle, despite some attempts. This is 
partly due to the risks connected with being the designated heir, 
exposed to the attention of several competitors31. The idea to 
have a ruling party succeeding the President originates from this 
situation, and involves the transformation of the system into a 
parliamentary-republic, where the head of State is elected by the 
Parliament. The conditions for such a change, though, are not in 
place yet: the ruling party exists and dominates the parliament, 
but the President has not yet initiated the necessary 
modifications in the legislation (interview, Kharitonova, 2011). 
Therefore, the possibility that Nur Otan becomes the President’s 
‚collective heir‛ seems remote. 
Roberts (2010) finds yet another strategic area where a dominant 
party potentially exercises its control, and it is the coercion 
system. The party supporters, as well as organized youth groups 
could be used to control the public sphere, deter opposition,  
harass voters and even as tools of violence. 
Nur Otan has recently created a youth branch, Zhas Otan, but 
this organization, has so far been involved mostly in non-
                                                 
31 The example of Rakhat Aliyev, son-in-law of the President Nazarbayev and for some 
time designed heir, is indicative. See also chapter 5. 
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political initiatives, such as charity and socializing events. While 
it could have potentially a role in controlling civil society and in 
diverting active young people from joining the opposition, this 
kind of activities seems very different from the political 
mobilization enacted, for instance, by the Communist party of 
the Soviet Union. 
The answer to the question: ‚is Nur Otan a dominant party?‛ is 
therefore not univocal. As seen in this review of Nur Otan’s 
dominant features and functions, the party has indeed a 
dominant position, but only when considered in the context of 
the party system. On the other hand, it seems to have little 
influence on the executive branch of power. In other words, it is 
‚dominant, but not ruling‛ (Roberts, 2010), more of a tool in the 
hands of the executive and of the ruling elites around the 
President. 
It follows that the dominant party framework is probably not the 
most appropriate to understand parties like Nur Otan32. Not only 
should its position within the party system be considered, but 
also its relation with power-holders. 
A successful strategy (Roberts, 2010) is to switch the focus of 
analysis from the party-system to individual parties, in 
particular to the problem of their origins. Nur Otan is the result 
of a party-building process, carried out by elites during the 1990s 
and 2000s, and the consequences of these origins are reflected on 
its structure and strength. 
 
 
  
                                                 
32 And like United Russia, as successfully explained by Roberts. 
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3.2 Party genesis and the problem of independence 
 
Political parties can be analyzed at different levels. One 
approach is to consider them as actors, interacting with other 
parties and with the State institutions. This is the approach 
adopted by theories on party dominance, as it was noted in the 
previous section. It is also possible to look at parties as 
‚organizations‛ (Panebianco, 1988). This approach considers the 
internal features and dynamics of a political party, and the way 
these processes influence the party’s structure and choices. 
The moment of foundation is considered particularly relevant 
(Duverger, 1964; Panebianco, 1988). It is in the very first stages of 
development that the party’s most important features are 
decided. Using Panebianco’s words, ‚a party organizational 
characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how it 
consolidated, than upon any other factor‛. 
 
 
3.2.1 The “genetic model” 
Although dated, Panebianco’s ‚genetic model‛ offers an 
interesting view on the consequences of the founding conditions 
on the future features of a political party, particularly in terms of 
dependence of the party from external actors. 
Departing from Duverger’s distinction between ‚internally 
created‛ and ‚externally created‛ parties (Duverger, 1964), 
Panebianco elaborates a complex model, where he relates a 
number of factors with the way a party consolidates. 
Influencing factors include the party’s territorial organization, 
which can be based on penetration, diffusion or a combination of 
the two; the presence or absence of an external sponsor 
50 
 
institution; and the presence of a charismatic leader (Panebianco, 
1988: 51-52). The process of party consolidation, called 
‚institutionalization‛, takes place according to two dimensions, 
‚autonomy‛ and ‚systemness‛ (Panebianco, 1988: 56-57). 
Autonomy is connected with the capacity of a party to control, 
and possibly change, its external environment. Parties with a low 
level of autonomy, instead, tend to adapt to the surrounding 
environment. Systemness, on the other hand, concerns the 
relationship between the party and its resources and subgroups. 
Strongly institutionalized parties have a firm control on these 
elements, while weakly institutionalized ones have a weak 
centre and more authoritative sub-groups. 
Panebianco describes in detail the three main influencing factors, 
and connects them with the level of institutionalization reached 
by a party. 
The first element is the way a party is organized on the territory: 
its development could start from a centre, a ‚restricted group of 
national leaders‛ which forms the nucleus of its dominant 
coalition (penetration). Or it could originate from a 
‚spontaneous germination‛, where several organizations come 
together and form a sort of federation (diffusion). 
Panebianco argues that parties originating through diffusion 
tend to be less institutionalized and more prone to internal 
power struggles than parties where the centre guides the 
development of periphery. 
A second conditioning factor is the presence, or absence, of an 
external sponsor at party’s origins, which affects the party’s 
source of legitimation. If such a sponsor exists, the party will be 
considered as its ‚political arm‛, and the loyalty to it will be only 
indirect (Panebianco, 1988: 63). Moreover, the leadership’s 
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loyalty will be divided between the party and the external 
institution, and the latter can change the balance in the power 
struggle. 
Finally, Panebianco considers as a crucial circumstance, whether 
the party was, or not, created by, and a vehicle for, a charismatic 
leader33. According to Panebianco, parties created by a 
charismatic leader tend to resist institutionalization, unless 
charisma is ‚routinized‛. These parties are bound to a short 
existence:  ‚they are parties which pass like a meteor over the 
political firmament, which spring up and die out without ever 
institutionalizing‛(Panebianco, 1988: 53). 
 
3.2.2. Origins and dependence of parties of power 
At various points, also the literature on the post-Soviet 
phenomenon of parties of power has focused on the problem of 
party origins, stressing the role of executives in the composition 
or in the creation of the party of power34. 
The fact that they have been created by, and serve the interests of 
the executive branches of the State is actually one of the defining 
elements of parties of power (Gelman, 2006; Meleshevich, 2007). 
As Likhtenshtein notes, parties of power do not simply 
correspond to Duverger’s internally-created parties: they did not 
just originate from parliamentary groups, but were created on an 
initiative of the executives (Likhtenshtein 2002, in Meleshevich 
2007: 196). Golosov & Likhtenshtein (2001) even treat the ‚party 
                                                 
33 Meant as Tucker’s ‚situational charisma‛, an influence that is connected with ‚a state 
of acute social stress that gets the people ready to receive as extraordinary qualified and 
to follow with enthusiastic loyalty a leadership offering salvation from distress‛ (Tucker, 
1968; in Panebianco, 1988: 52). 
34 A wider discussion on the concept of ‚party of power‛ is presented in Chapter 2. 
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of power‛ as a strategy of the elites, enacted in order to adapt to 
changing conditions of the political environment, and not as a 
type of political party. 
A discussion strictly connected with the origins of parties of 
power, but not a very developed one in the literature, is the one 
on the degree of autonomy of such parties. Meleshevich notes 
that parties of power ‚do not and cannot exist outside of the 
realm of executive power‛ (Meleshevich, 2007: 203). They are 
created in order to achieve specific goals, including electoral 
participation, and have their main source of strength in their 
access to ‚administrative resources‛ and their main source of 
popularity in the leader and his personal reputation. Moreover, 
parties of power are often discarded, usually whenever their 
electoral performance is not satisfying (Gelman, 2006; Reuter & 
Remington, 2009). 
Oversloot & Verhuel (2006) stress the subordinate nature of the 
party of power in a clearer manner, pointing out that ‚the party 
of power’s centre of gravity is always located in the executive 
branch of government‛, and that ‚the so-called ‘ruling party’ 
does not have a life of its own; it is in fact neither ‘ruling’ nor 
much of a party at all.‛ (Oversloot &Verhuel, 2006: 394). 
The party of power, hence, has in its own origins the reason of its 
dependent position from the executive elites which created it. 
This view is resonating with the ‚genetic model‛ presented 
before, although it presents the connection in a less systematic 
manner. 
This perspective still has an advantage, as it highlights the 
relation between the party and the power-holders. In particular, 
the literature on parties of power focuses on the ways executive 
elites can directly affect the development of the party and the 
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conditions of the party system. Elites could be favouring their 
party over competitors by establishing a favourable electoral 
legislation, or by providing their party with various types of 
resources, including privileged media access and a close 
connection with the overly popular country leader (Gelman, 
2006; Colton & McFaul, 2000). Founding elites are also able to 
influence the party in the choice of a weak ideological platform: 
by adopting a centrist, ‚catch-all‛ position, parties of power 
manage to attract wider majorities (Gelman, 2006, Smyth, 2002). 
While a detailed discussion on these strategies and how they are 
implemented in Kazakhstan will be presented later, the aim of 
this section is to present the process of party-building which took 
place in Kazakhstan since independence, looking at the role of 
executives in party-building. 
In particular, I focus on the top-down origins of Nur Otan – 
created within the executive branch of power – and on how its 
features at origins may influence its position and role within the 
political system, according to the ‚genetic model‛. 
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3.3 Nur Otan’s origins and their consequences 
In 1992 Nursultan Nazarbayev, former Secretary of the 
Kazakhstani Communist Party and nominated to the office of 
President of the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan, 
tried to organize a presidential party which would be the 
‚functional equivalent of the banned CPSU‛ (Brill Olcott, 2010: 
93). 
After several – failed – attempts to take control of the Socialist 
Party  and of the Congress Party, the President sponsored the 
foundation of the Union of People’s Unity (SNEK). The party 
was supposed to facilitate the control of the legislative chamber, 
which had proved to be difficult after the 1991 coup (Brill Olcott, 
2010). 
At this time, the efforts of the President and of his close circles 
did not focus exclusively on the party of power. In occasion of 
the legislative elections of March 1994, the executive elites tried 
to influence the parliament composition by making sure that 
loyal functionaries were elected in the so-called governmental 
list (gos-spisok). This list included 42 deputies, two from each 
oblast’ as well as from the two cities with special status, then 
Almaty and Baikonur. 
However, the Union of People’s Unity was still the party of 
power: institutional measures, such as the re-designing of 
districts to guarantee Kazakh majorities and restrictive norms on 
party registration, were adopted. Also, a large use of  
‚administrative resource‛ in favour of Nazarbayev’s party was 
reported in the regions (Kuttykadam, 2010). Indeed the voting 
process presented evident irregularities, and the OSCE decided 
to certify the elections only after long consideration and despite 
the criticism of the international community (Brill Olcott, 2010). 
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Even with these efforts, the new parliament had a diverse 
composition, reflecting the different political forces present in 
the political landscape at the time35. In particular, the deputies 
elected through the governmental list joined different 
parliamentary fractions, and in the end the pro-presidential 
party was supported by a mere 31% of the deputies 
(Kuttykadam, 2010). 
This parliament proved to be vocal and independent: the 
privatization program proposed by the Prime Minister 
Tereshenko encountered several obstacles, leading even to the 
government’s resignation. The parliament was eventually 
dismissed in March 1995. The official reason was a constitutional 
court decision which ruled that the 1994 parliamentary elections 
were invalid, due to administrative irregularities involving the 
vote counting process (Brill Olcott, 2010)36. For nine months the 
parliament was replaced by a ‚People’s Assembly‛ appointed by 
the President. Using powers that he had been granted by the 
1990 Parliament, in these months the President ruled by decree 
and managed to organize two referendums, which respectively 
approved his mandate extension until 2000 and a new 
Constitution. New elections were held in December 1995: the 
SNEK, now renamed People’s Unity Party, or PNEK, acquired a 
slightly steadier position in the new legislative body, the 
Mazhilis. Its majority was not sufficient, though, to avoid new 
legislative rebellions. 
                                                 
35 Totally, 177 seats were contested, of which 42 in the governmental list and 135 
uninominal mandates. Just fewer than 74% of voters participated in the election. A table 
showing the distribution of seats is in the Appendix Three. 
36 Some accounts openly accuse the President to have manipulated the Court towards this 
decision (Kuttykadam, 2010). Whether this is true or not, it is undeniable that the 
President Nazarbayev responded to this crisis with an increase of his personal power and 
ruling by decree for the following nine months. 
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In 1999, the scarcely successful PNEK was abandoned in favour 
of a new pro-presidential party, Otan (Fatherland), founded by 
the former Prime Minister Tereshchenko. In the same years the 
elites around the President started sponsoring also other pro-
regime parties, hoping to appeal different categories of voters: 
the Civil party was founded in 1998 by influential businessmen, 
including those in the Eurasia group, in order to protect their 
business interests in the Parliament; the Agrarian Party was 
formed in January 1999 and appealed to proponents of private 
property in agriculture (Brill Olcott, 2010). We can include in this 
group also Asar (Together), formed a bit later, in 2003: this party 
was set up by the daughter of President Nazarbayev, Dariga, to 
promote her political ambitions and constitute the basis for her 
political authority. These parties obtained a certain success:  
prior to the decision to merge, Asar and the Bloc ‚Agrarian and 
Industrial Union of Workers‛, made up of the Civic and 
Agrarian parties, were the third and second largest blocs in the 
Mazhilis, respectively (Kennedy, 2007). These parties formed 
pro-presidential coalitions in the Mazhilis both after the 1999 and 
2004 elections, and eventually were incorporated into Otan in 
2006 to form Nur Otan (Fatherland’s Light). Nur Otan has since 
dominated the parliament and the political landscape. In the 
Mazhilis elections of 2007 it received 88.41% of the votes and all 
the seats (Bowyer, 2008: 6), and maintained an overwhelming 
majority also after the January 2012 elections37. 
As seen in this brief reconstruction, Nur Otan originated from a 
project of the President and of the people who were most close to 
him, like the former Prime Minister Tereschenko. 
                                                 
37 The election results are available on the website of the Central Electoral Commission of 
Kazakhstan 
http://election.kz/portal/page?_pageid=153,511661&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. 
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Using Panebianco’s terminology, Nur Otan originated mostly by 
penetration, starting from a solid centre and then proceeding to 
spread on the territory. 
Nur Otan has a hierarchical and centralized structure, 
maintaining a strong control on its local branches. Officers from 
local party representations are invited to join initiatives like the 
High Party School and host regular visits by inspectors from the 
party’s central bodies, including the Control Committee. 
The other important element is that Nur Otan did emerge from 
within, and thanks to the impulse of, the executive branch of 
power. The executives, and in particular the President, can be 
considered as the party’s ‚sponsoring institution‛. Indeed Nur 
Otan seems to have only an indirect legitimation. The first object 
of loyalty of party members is the country leader, not Nur Otan. 
Actually, as it was mentioned previously, membership in the 
party can be considered as a proof of loyalty towards the leader. 
The country leader is also behind the party’s foundation, and is 
the party’s charismatic leader. This contributes, according to 
Panebianco’s model, to put the party in a weak  position: just as 
the SNEK and other pro-presidential parties before, Nur Otan 
could be easily discarded, substituted or merged into another 
body. The eventuality of the party becoming a ‚collective heir‛ 
is, at the moment, quite remote, as there is no sign of 
‚routinization of charisma‛, which is instead firmly retained by 
Nazarbayev. A similar development is actually not foreseeable in 
the near future, despite some declarations in this sense 
(Shaymergenov, 2007): the party would need to acquire more 
power within the institutions and act as balancing force towards 
the executive, instead of being its extension. Such a process 
would require extensive institutional change, as well as a radical 
transformation in the style of leadership and an increase in the 
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professionalism and sense of responsibility of party officials 
themselves. 
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Chapter 4. Supporting the party of power: 
Substantive and intangible resources 
 
 
4.1 Introducing Resources  
 
As shown in the previous chapters, Nur Otan was established 
thanks to the efforts of a group of people closely connected with 
the centre of power. This means that from the very first moment 
of its existence, the party of power could benefit from a series of 
resources, which contributed to create and maintain its dominant 
position within the political system of Kazakhstan. 
This topic is closely related to the strategies that dominant 
parties enact in order to stay in power: the use of legislation in 
order to maintain an hegemonic position in the electoral arena 
and in the legislature (Boix, 1999); the adoption of a flexible 
ideology (Tarrow, 1990); the mobilization of selected parts of the 
population through the use of material resources and extensive 
propaganda (Arian & Barnes, 1974).  
Using Pempel’s terminology, a party which manages to maintain 
its policy-making position for a long time becomes able to 
implement its ‚historical agenda‛, using everything at its 
disposal to become stronger and weaken the opposition (Pempel, 
1990: 16). Pempel uses the expression ‚virtuous cycles of 
dominance‛ in order to indicate this ‚interrelated set of mutually 
reinforcing processes that have the potential to beget even more 
dominance‛ (ibidem). 
In the case of Nur Otan, though, the party is not the main factor 
behind these strategies, elaborated and implemented by same 
restricted group of people who established the party in the first 
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place. This is particularly evident for mass media: Nur Otan has 
almost no control on media outlets, but still it manages to obtain 
a much larger visibility than any other political party.  
Hence, I think it is more sensible to refer to these measures as 
resources: the party of power is only endowed with these 
advantages, without significantly contributing to their creation. 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate these resources, the way 
they are made available to the party and how Nur Otan uses 
them.  
I distinguish between two types of resources. One involves 
substantive resources, consisting of institutional and economic 
forms of support which were put forward with the explicit 
purpose of favouring the party. These include the creation of ad 
hoc institutional constraints, and their selective application; and 
the use of ‚administrative resource‛, which I examine in its form 
of privileged access to State media.  
The other category comprises less tangible resources, better 
understood as advantages that the party gets from its very 
position of power. I try here to show how the success of Nur 
Otan is due mostly to the popularity it receives from being the 
‚President’s party‛, and from the general consensus enjoyed by 
the regime, especially in connection with its positive economic 
performance. Moreover, by maintaining a flexible ideological 
profile, Nur Otan is able to present itself as an acceptable entity 
to most of the population.  
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4.2 Institutional Engineering 
 
The role of the institutional setting in shaping party competition 
has been widely studied, particularly in the context of 
transitional regimes. A debate on this topic developed in the 
1990s, as a result of the third wave of democratization. It regards 
the effects of two aspects of institutional design on democratic 
consolidation: the choice between a presidential and a 
parliamentary regime and the selection of electoral system 
(majoritarian over proportional representation). Another aspect 
of this debate regards the reasons bringing to one or another 
institutional design. Factors influencing such a choice include 
cultural and structural legacies, elite bargaining and the 
uncertainty of transition have been found to be relevant in this 
respect (see Isaacs 2011)38.  
While this literature is useful in understanding the general 
effects of institutions on the behaviour of actors, it is necessary 
also to look at the behaviour of actors in shaping the institutions 
themselves. Talking about post-Socialist parties, Gryzmala-Busse 
(2007) talks about the ‚re-building of the Leviathan‛. Parties in 
the former socialist bloc have in fact used their position within 
the state structures in a moment of uncertainty (the transition 
period) in order to build institutions which would help their 
staying in power and next to resources. In general, parties 
already in power have been found to have strong incentives to 
modify the electoral regime whenever they feel it will not serve 
them well (Boix 1999), reproducing the ‚cycle of dominance‛ 
described by Pempel.  
 
                                                 
38 Isaacs mentions: cultural and structural legacies, elite bargaining and the uncertainty of 
transition (Jones Luong 2002; Frye 1997; Bawn 1993). 
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                            Figure 4.1 The cycle of dominance 
 
 
This discourse applies to Nur Otan in a different way, given its 
subordinate role to governing elites. The mechanism of 
generating change to maintain an electoral advantage is similar 
to the one found in contexts of party dominance. The difference 
is in the way these parties first get in power and in the extent the 
electoral context is manipulated. As shown before, Nur Otan is 
in fact a party of power, originating within the power structures 
and endowed with extra resources since its very foundation. It 
did not need to get in power in order to modify the rules in its 
favour. It was actually created by the same people establishing 
the rules of the game.  
Another difference is the degree of competitiveness in the 
political system. In this context the adoption of ad hoc rules for 
favouring the party of power is combined with a great informal 
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influence of the executive, and of the President in particular, on 
the party system (Isaacs 2011). This includes a series of informal 
ways of supporting the party of power and frequent 
manipulation of electoral results.   
The role of institutional measures as a way to create advantages 
for a ‚party of power‛, erect higher barriers for new political 
actors and marginalize opposition has been studied in reference 
to the Russian case (Oversloot and Verheul 2006; Hale 2006; 
Smyth et al. 2007; Gelman 2008). In studying the recurrent use of 
institutional engineering, the degree of intentionality and 
awareness of elites regarding the effects of such measures has 
been highlighted (Gelman 2008). This literature mainly points at 
two institutional constraints, used by authorities to maintain 
control of the party arena: the legislation on political parties and 
the electoral rule. Recent research on Kazakhstan has also 
focused on the same aspects, confirming them as the most 
relevant elements of this strategy (Isaacs 2011). As the 
discretional application of these rules also constitutes a further 
lever to shape party competition, a brief final section will be 
devoted to the analysis of a few cases illustrating these 
dynamics.  
 
 
 
4.2.1 The Law on Political Parties 
The Law on Political Parties was first adopted in 1996, and 
initially presented no particular restrictions on the basis of which 
parties could organize. For registration, it required that parties 
had a minimum of 3.000 members in at least half of the oblasts.  
This law was emended in 2002 introducing a series of restrictive 
norms, especially concerning the requirements for the 
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registration of political parties (Law on Political Parties 2002). 
The reasons for the sudden increase of restrictions are to be 
looked for in the appearance of organized opposition 
movements in the 1990s, apparently able to pose a serious 
challenge to the elite party-building project (Isaacs 2011: 97).  
The emended law created indeed many limits to the appearance 
of new party formations. The number of valid signatures to be 
presented in order to formalize the registration was raised from 
3.000 to 50.000 (Art. 10.5). This requisite sounds even more 
demanding considering that the country population was at the 
time of less than 15 millions. Moreover, a requirement that at 
least 1.000 people participate in the party’s founding congress 
was added (Art. 6.1). This introduced significant difficulties for 
small parties, which struggled in getting the necessary funding 
for travelling expenses and had to require permission from local 
Akimats for the use of suitable venues (Isaacs 2011: 98). Finally, 
limits on the nature and ideological scope of political parties 
were introduced, prohibiting parties based on the basis of a 
particular profession, race, nationality, ethnicity or religion (Art. 
5.8). The limits regarded also the formation of parties within the 
structures of central and local administrations (Law on Political 
Parties 2002).  
As it is often the case, the rules were applied with a great deal of 
discretion. The officials of the Ministry of Justice could 
discretionally judge about the authenticity of signatures, 
checking them with an almost fastidious zeal when the 
proceeding regarded opposition parties. Also, they were able to 
invalidate the whole application when only an illegitimate 
signature was found (Isaacs 2011: 98).  
The effects of the law on the party systems were immediate, as 
the requirement was applied also to existing and active parties, 
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which were asked to re-register under the new rules. For 
instance, its violation was the reason for closing the Republican 
People’s Party, one of the most important opposition actors of 
the previous years (Interview with Kosanov, October 18 2011). 
Other parties were refused re-registration, including Azamat, 
Alash, the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (NKK), the Socialist 
Party of Kazakhstan (SPK) and the Party of Compatriot (Isaacs 
2011).  
Some of the restrictions were lifted in 2008. The number of 
required signatures was reduced (to 40,000), as well as the 
number of people that have to be present at the founding 
congress (from 1000 to 600) (Brill Olcott 2010: 253). Also, it was 
given more time to parties to prepare their documentations (four 
months instead of three) and it was stated that minor violations 
could not be used anymore as a reason to reject the whole 
application. The decision was related to the commitments taken 
by Kazakhstani authorities before the OSCE Chairmanship, in 
2010. However, the application of such norms continued in many 
cases to be biased in favour of pro-government parties (Isaacs 
2011: 99).  
  
 
4.2.2 Electoral rule 
 
Hale (2006) had studied the effects of changes in the Russian 
electoral system (from mixed to proportional representation) on 
party consolidation, finding that institutional change can be not 
only an incentive but actually a tool that the executive elites use 
to shape party competition. In Russia the introduction of a 
single-member districts quota in the early 1990s had the objective 
to hinder party formation and to make it easier for the Kremlin 
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to negotiate with members of the Duma elected as independents. 
Conversely, the adoption of proportional representation for all 
the 450 seats in the mid-2000s supposedly served the purpose of 
strengthening national parties and contrasting the formation of 
strong regional political entities, favouring greatly the pro-
regime party United Russia (Hale 2006: 29-33).  
In Kazakhstan the electoral rule has undergone a similar change 
in 2007, possibly with comparable effects. Before then, the 
electoral system in place was a majoritarian one (1993-1998), and 
then a mixed one (1999-2007) (Isaacs 2011: 87).  
 With the electoral system established in 1993, 135 of the 177 MPs 
were elected in Single Member Districts, while the remaining 42 
were selected from a state list, two from each oblast’ as well as 
from the two cities with special status, then Almaty and 
Baikonur. This appointed quota seemed to have the goal of 
ensuring a number of deputies loyal to the President. However, 
this measure did not guarantee the formation of a pliable 
legislature: the parliament so elected entered into open conflict 
with the leader and was eventually dismissed in 1994 (Brill 
Olcott 2010). 
The system was partially changed in 1995, when a new 
Constitution was approved, as well as a Constitutional law ‚On 
Elections‛ (Constitutional Law on Elections). The new 
parliament had two chambers: a lower, the Mazhilis, with 67 
elected deputies; and a higher, the Senate, where members are 
elected from each oblast (two per oblast plus major cities), apart 
from seven who are appointed by the President of the Republic. 
Isaacs notes that this measure was necessary to maintain control 
of the Parliament in absence of a strong party, as the PNEK was 
still in its initial stages of formation (Isaacs 2011: 87).  
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It was in fact in 1999, when the new party of power was created, 
that the first institutional measure toward a ‚partizanization‛ of 
the Parliament took place. A new electoral law established that a 
small quota of seats (10% of the total) was to be assigned through 
national distribution to party lists. Still, party affiliation was not 
yet a prerequisite for being elected in the Single Member 
Districts, and many deputies entered the parliament as 
independents (bezpartinniie) until 2004.  
In 2007 Proportional Representation (PR) was extended to the 
totality of seats, requiring that all the candidates would be party-
affiliated. Just as in Russia, this change created an advantage for 
the main national parties and in particular for the party of 
power. Establishing a centralized distribution of seats, it 
discouraged the formation of regional party organizations, and 
made much less significant the advantage opposition parties had 
in the main cities. Most of the opposition parties, in fact, are 
based in the southern capital, Almaty and have representations 
only in the main cities, lacking resources for reaching the rural 
areas (interview, Satpayev, 2011).   
The change of electoral rule was combined with an increase  of 
the threshold for entering the parliament , which was brought to 
7% by the May 2007 Constitutional reform (Vadurel, 2008). These 
measures favoured significantly the concentration of the political 
market: the high threshold guaranteed an advantage for the 
party of power – a huge organization with branches even in the 
most remote provinces - over opposition parties, smaller and, as 
mentioned, concentrated in the main cities.  
Indeed Nur Otan was the only party which could overcome the 
threshold in the August 2007 elections, forming a single-party 
parliament. In its observation mission report, the OSCE 
recommended that the threshold was lowered, ‚in order to 
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promote pluralism‛ (OSCE 2007)39. Recommendations in favour 
of political pluralism were included also in the list of steps 
Kazakhstan should have taken before its chairmanship of the 
OSCE, in 2010. The threshold it is felt as a particularly strong 
constraint for the political system by many observers and 
political actors, including Nur Otan senior members (interviews, 
Sarym,2011; Bokayev, 2011; Karin, 2011).  
The electoral law was emended in 2009 but, contrarily to the 
expectations, the 7% threshold was not lowered. Instead, a 
special provision was added: in the case of only one party 
overcoming the 7% limit, also the first runner-up is now allowed 
to enter the Mazhilis (Constitutional Law ‚On Elections‛ Art, 97. 
1. 2). In the latest elections (January 15th 2012), this measure 
proved superfluous, as three parties managed to reach the 
threshold and entered the Parliament: Nur Otan, which 
conquered 80.99% of votes and 83 seats; the business party Ak 
Zhol (8 seats); and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan 
(7 seats). While it is now nominally a multi-party legislative 
chamber, it is still very unbalanced in favour of pro-regime 
forces: Ak Zhol is a pro-presidential party, led by the former 
Civil Party leader and Nur Otan member Azat Peruashev. The 
Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan is the most moderate 
among the two communist parties, and is generally considered 
as a representative of the ‚loyal opposition‛. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The recommendation to lower the threshold has been renewed in the Preliminary 
Observation Report for the 2012 elections (OSCE 2012a)  
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4.2.3 Some cases of selective rule application  
 
Chosen institutional features are often combined with a selective 
application of rules. Similarly to what happens in the media 
sphere (see 4.3) very high requirements in legislation come 
together with a great deal of discretion endowed to the officials 
in charge of verifying compliance. Hence, regulations become a 
powerful lever in the hands of authorities for shaping the party 
system in favour of the party of power. The most common cases 
regard the registration of new party organizations. 
The Republican People’s Party was the first ‚victim‛ of the party 
legislation adopted in 2002. Founded by the President’s former 
ally and former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin in 1999, 
the party was closed soon after  and as a consequence of the 
adoption of the 2002 law on political parties, which, in this case, 
had retroactive effect (Bowyer, 2008; Isaacs, 2011). 
The opposition party Alga’s is the most explicative case of 
selective rule application, related in particular to the registration 
procedure. Formed after the dissolution by the Ministry of 
Justice of the DVK movement, Alga has been repeatedly refused 
registration and is still not able to compete in elections. Isaacs 
(2011) illustrates in detail the repeated attempts of the party to 
get registered and the motivations and techniques used by 
officials, including delaying the procedure and suspending the 
whole process on the basis of minor falsifications (Isaacs 2011: 
100-101).  
The Socialist party OSDP-AZAT has also experienced difficulties 
in registration due to its opposition stand. Formed by the merger 
of two separate parties, OSDP and the People’s Democratic Party 
Azat in 2009, the organization still waiting for registration as a 
united party, despite the repeated applications (Interview with 
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Kosanov, 2011). The two parties are allowed to compete in 
elections, but only as a coalition bloc. 
The difficulties encountered by these parties are even more 
striking when compared with the ease pro-government parties 
go through their registration process. Otan/Nur Otan is the least 
surprising case, having been founded within the state 
administration, and it has received registration quickly and 
without problems of sort, as well as the other pro-government 
parties Adilet and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan 
(see Isaacs 2011). More recently, Ak Zhol has been re-registered 
as a party in record times before the 2012 elections. 
Not only registration requirements are used. On October 4, 2011 
the activities of the Communist Party were suspended for six 
months by a court decision. Such suspension was due to the 
participation of the party leader in the activities of an 
unregistered political association, the Khalykh Maidany (National 
Front). The October 4 decision of the district court was upheld by 
the appellate court in Almaty on 24 October40.  
Many analysts and politicians agreed that this measure was 
aimed at making sure that the Communist party would not 
compete in the 2012 early parliamentary elections. While in 
September 2011 the date of elections had yet to be announced, 
there was a generalized expectation that elections would be held 
earlier than the natural term of the legislature and probably at 
the beginning of the year41. Actually, a few politicians took the 
suspension of the Communist Party as a secure sign that 
elections would be held within six months from October 
(Interviews, Satpayev 2011; Bokayev, 2011).  
                                                 
40 See http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/86985 
41 This was reported by almost all my interviewees, belonging to the pro-regime and 
oppositions fields alike.  
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4.3 Control and use of administrative resource: the case of mass 
media42 
 
Financial and material support is another crucial factor for the 
success of Nur Otan. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, 
Nur Otan is, in this regard, similar to other types of dominant 
parties, which are known for  ‚their ability to access state 
resources and monopolise key media resources to strengthen 
their hold on power‛ (White, 2011: 661). Parties of power like 
Nur Otan, though, are involved only marginally in the process of 
monopolising key resources. The main actor is same elite who 
initiated the party-building, while the party is a simple user of 
these resources. 
The literature on post-Soviet parties of power refers to this form 
of elite support as ‚administrative resource‛, defining it as the 
ability of political candidates and parties to use their official 
positions or connections to government institutions to achieve 
party objectives‛ (Meleshevich, 2007: 196)43. Concretely, 
administrative resource includes: funding, support networks on 
regional level, personnel and structures of administration, 
                                                 
42 This chapter in part draws and expands my conference paper ‚Media, Parties and 
Power in Post Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan‛, presented at the 3rd ECPR Graduate 
Conference (Dublin, 30 August – 1 September 2010). I am indebted to the participants to 
the panel for their valuable comments. I am also thankful to Dr. David White (CREES, 
University of Birmingham, UK) for his helpful remarks on an earlier version of the paper.  
43 The term ‚administrative resources‛ is used almost exclusively in reference to the 
Russian case. The first to use of the term was Dimitri Ol’shanskij, Director of the Centre 
of Strategic analysis and forecasts of Moscow in August 1995. He included 
‚adminresursy‛ into a series of indicators used to evaluate parties and blocs competing 
in the following parliamentary elections. See ‚Slovar Russkogo Publichnogo Yazyka 
Dvadcatogo Veka‛, published on Kommersant-Vlast, 23 June – 23 September 2003. 
Retrieved on January 23 2010 from http://krotov.info/history/20/1950/history.html.  
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relations with business people, privileged access to state media 
(Colton & McFaul, 2000: 208; Gelman, 2006). 
A distinction is necessary at this point: the use of state resources 
to distribute various goods among voters is a common practice 
also in democratic systems, and needs to be differentiated from  
the use of resources with the aim of suppressing opposition by 
unfair political competition or eliminating competition. In her 
study on Russian parties of power, Smyth argues that the 
Kremlin chose almost always the second solution, because of 
their need to get results in the short term while investing 
relatively little into the process of party building (Smyth, 2004, in 
Gelman, 2006: 12)44.  
In Kazakhstan, a combination of these measures is adopted: the 
use of the general economic growth as a source of legitimacy for 
the party and the regime will be considered later in the chapter. 
Also, money from the state budget has been allegedly used in 
order to build Nur Otan branches in the regions (Isaacs, 2011: 
187).  
 This section will deal with one of the concrete forms of creating 
a disadvantage in favour of the party of power: privileged access 
to mass media. 
There are a few reasons to focus on this specific element. The 
first one is the relevance of this particular asset in the context of 
Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstani regime tends to relies more on  
techniques of persuasion and mass communications than on 
hard repression (Schatz, 2009). Elections, thus, although offering 
                                                 
44 See Regina Smyth, Translating State Resources into Political Dominance: The Prospects for 
the Consolidation of Dominant State Party in Russia, Manuscript, Pennsylvania State 
University (2004), in Gelman, 2006, p. 12. There is some evidence, though, of the Kremlin 
also increasing public spending just before an electoral cycle, for example in 1999 (Colton 
& McFaul, 2000: 213). 
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little alternation and having often predictable results, have an 
important role in the Kazakhstani political system, acting as a 
source of legitimacy for the current regime at the internal and the 
external levels45. In this context, privileged access to media is 
indeed very important, because it contributes decisively to the 
party’s electoral success. 
The other reason attains to feasibility: it is quite difficult to 
quantify the amount of financial resources endowed to the party 
of power – information that most of the times is kept secret – or 
about the use of personnel or State facilities – being very difficult 
to distinguish the cases when they are used by party-men in 
order to campaign, for example, or for other, legitimate, uses. 
Information about media is on the other hand, relatively more 
accessible, for the presence of a number of national and 
international NGOs acting as watchdogs. Also, the effect of the 
disparity in access is measurable, being possible to monitor 
media outlets and compare the number and tone of mentions of 
the various political parties.  
 
 
4.3.1 The Media in Kazakhstan  
The Kazakhstani media scene does not totally lack pluralism, 
though this is mostly limited to print and electronic new media; 
and also there, diversity is given more by the presence of 
antithetical voices than by balanced and constructive 
commentaries. Generally, Kazakhstani media lack 
professionalism and actors share the perception of media as 
‚ideological weapons‛ (Interview, Sarym 2011). A legacy of 
Soviet times, this tendency to use media to discredit political 
                                                 
45 More about this role will be said in Chapter 6.  
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adversaries is widespread among pro-regime and opposition 
media alike: the latter are often violently critical towards the 
regime and show strong biases towards political formations 
close to their owners.  
The advantage of the party of power is particularly strong in 
accessing broadcast media. This is partly due to the specific 
economic structure of television, with high management costs 
and a monopoly regime on frequencies, which make it easier to 
control. Another reason is the perception of its strategic role. 
Television channels reach even the most remote areas, and TV is 
still the main source of political information for the majority of 
population (Nurtazina 2010).  
However, differently from Communist times, the party of power 
has almost no direct control on media. Media outlets are owned 
either by State bodies or by groups close to the presidential 
circles, reflecting the complex and asymmetric relation between 
the party and the ruling elite. Even in the case of party-owned 
media, they look more like an endowment of the State to the 
party, rather than the result of a takeover from the party’s side. 
The strategies put in place to ensure media control are thus 
‚outside‛ of the party. With rare exceptions, the party does not 
own media outlets; the opposition media is kept in a marginal 
position through ‚draconian‛ rules, implemented mostly by 
government agencies; a government agency is also in charge of 
the most powerful tool of content management in the media, the 
Goszakaz program.  
The result is still an immense advantage for the party of power 
in terms of access, visibility and positive image. 
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4.3.2 Media Control 
 
(i) Ownership models 
The control of media by the State is mostly indirect. Media 
outlets in Kazakhstan are mostly owned by private 
entrepreneurs: recent statistics show that only about 20% of 
media outlets are State-owned (Kazakhstan, Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices, 2010; Nurtazina, 2011). This is scarcely 
a sign of diversity. The political and business elites often 
coincide in Kazakhstan, and the steady economic growth has led 
successful groups and companies to acquire stakes in the media 
sector, creating a situation of almost total control (Pannier, 2007). 
From time to time there is an attempt to break this monopoly, 
but it usually comes from the spheres of power, leaving the 
general situation unchanged.  
Since the mid-1990s the Kazakhstani State has exerted its control 
on the mass media in a decided, albeit indirect, fashion. Between 
1992 and 2006 the sector was privatized, putting an end to the 
monopoly of the media maintained by the State in Soviet times 
(Nurtazina, 2011: 141). The privatization was a ‚clever‛ way to 
establish control on the sector, especially in regard of electronic 
media: the goals of economic restructuring were said to be more 
relevant than those of political reform (Brill Olcott, 2010: 105). 
Mostly through a system of bids for air frequencies and licenses, 
the property of the most important media groups was 
distributed among business people related or loyal to the 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev (Karin, 2001). According to 
experts close to the President, this move was addressing the 
situation of potential political instability created by repeated 
scandals and never-ending information against the President’s 
figure. In this situation, the ‚only correct move‛ for the President 
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would be to take over the initiative in the information field 
(OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 2002: 11) 46.   
Already by 2000 only 25% of the country’s media outlets were 
owned directly by the State (Kazakhstan, Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices, 2001, in Brill Olcott, 2010: 105).  
A large part of the national media assets came in the hands of 
Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, Dariga, and her husband Rahat 
Aliyev, who at the time had a relevant position in the National 
Security Committee. The Nazarbayeva-Aliyev’s group controlled 
the media holding Khabar and a series of satellite companies. 
Among others, they owned the television channels Khabar, 
Khabar-2, and NTK, the National TV and Radio Corporation 
Kazakhstan-1, a number of radios and print publications and the 
news agency Kazakhstan Today (Karin, 2001: 2). Thanks to their 
large financial resources, the group easily expanded, acquiring 
also ‚independent‛ media which had been critical of the 
government in the early 1990s, including the television channel 
KTK and the publication ‚Karavan‛ (Pannier, 2007; Brill Olcott, 
2010). Ms. Nazarbayeva stepped down from the direction of the 
holding to enter national politics in 2003, but she was said to 
retain ‚great influence‛ in the media sphere (Pannier, 2007) 47. No 
essential change followed the scandals that involved Aliyev in 
2007, apart from the brief suspension of two media outlets 
belonging to the group – officially for language-related issues48. 
Nazarbayeva gave up her stakes in the Khabar group only in 
                                                 
46 Erlan Karin, at the time the Director of the Central Asian Agency for Political Research, 
made these declarations in an interview with the newspaper Argumenty I Fakti. 
47 Dariga Nazarbayeva founded the political party Asar, which obtained a considerable 
success in the 2004 Parliamentary elections. Re-elected in the Mazhilis in 2012, 
Nazarbayeva is now heading the Cultural Development Parliamentary Committee. 
48 ‚Kazakhstan’s Powerful President‛, The Economist, July 8 2007 available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/9320660 
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2008, when the group, after a brief passage in the hands of the 
State holding Samgau, returned under direct control of the 
Ministry of Culture and Information49.  
Since November 2008, the party of power controls directly the 
media holding Nur-Media. It includes the TV channel ‚Astana‛, 
the radio stations ‚NS‛ and ‚Delovaya Volna‛ and the 
newspapers ‚Aikyn‛, ‚Liter‛, ‚Nur Astana‛, ‚Izvestia-Kazakhstan‛, 
‚Turkystan‛, ‚Kazakhstan Temirzholshysy‛, ‚Strana i mir‛ and 
‚Dala men kala‛ (the last two are the official press organs of the 
party).  
  
 
(ii) Legislation 
Formal rules are often used in order to maintain a firm control of 
the media sphere. Similarly to what happens in the political 
sphere, norms on registration and administrative rules – often 
applied discretionally – are commonly used to marginalize 
opposition media. 
The legislation that Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union 
at the beginning of the 1990s was incomplete, as in Soviet times 
the subject was regulated through party directives and 
administrative acts. The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the first 
law on mass media in June 1990, as a result of the glasnost policy: 
this law abolished censorship and proclaimed freedom of 
information (McCormack, 1999).  
The 1991 law ‚On mass media‛ adopted in independent 
Kazakhstan was largely based on this text. Freedom of 
information was included in the catalogue of fundamental rights 
                                                 
49 ‚Holding Samgau peredast svoi 49% akcii agenstva ‚Khabar‛ ministerstvu kultury i 
informacii‛, Gazeta.kz. June 12 2008 
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of the 1995 Constitution (art. 20). The provision was mostly 
modelled on the article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, prohibiting censorship and proclaiming free 
access to information. However, several limitations were already 
included at this stage, including State secret and the prohibition 
for anti-system propaganda. The latter provision is not 
accompanied by an obligation to discipline the matter by law, a 
sign, this, of the priority accorded to those interests (first of all 
State security and integrity) respect to freedom of expression50.  
As in the party sphere, registration procedures are often used as 
a lever to decide which media are allowed and which ones are 
not. The establishment of complicated procedures and their 
discretional application give authorities the opportunity to close 
opposition media on the basis of formal irregularities.  
The registration (postanovka na uchyot) of new media outlets, as 
well as their re-registration (postanovka na pereuchyot), is 
regulated by the Law ‚On Mass Media‛ (N. 451-I of July 27th 
1999, last modified with the Law N. 354-IV of November 23rd 
2010). Media owners have to register their outlet with a 
certification body (upolnomochenny organ), whose procedures and 
guidelines are indicated by the Government of Kazakhstan (art. 
4.2).  
A first problem is that this body is not independent, but instead 
is directly managed by the Government: there are not guarantees 
                                                 
50 The full test of the Article 20 recites: (1) The freedom of speech and creative activities 
shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited. (2) Everyone shall have the right to 
freely receive and disseminate information by any means not prohibited by law. The list 
of items constituting state secrets of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be determined by 
law. (3) Propaganda of or agitation for the forcible change of the constitutional system, 
violation of the integrity of the Republic, undermining of state security, and advocating 
war, social, racial, national, religious, class and clannish superiority as well as the cult of 
cruelty and violence shall not be allowed. 
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of impartiality in its decisions. While the decision to revoke 
registrations is to be taken by the owner or a judicial decision, 
the State can suspend or block publication in case registration is 
found not to be valid. Regular checks (planned as well as 
unannounced) are carried on through local administrations 
(gosudarstvennii kontrol, art. 4.4).  
Though it has been simplified in January 2009, when Kazakhstan 
introduced a few OSCE-recommended amendments to the 
media law in preparation for the 2010 chairmanship, the 
registration procedure remains quite complicated: a number of 
documents have to be presented, including a notary certified 
copy of the owners’ identification document and a declaration 
(zayavlenie) on the publication features (language, orientation, 
name and data of the editor in chief - art. 11).  
On the other hand, the list of reasons for denying registration is 
long and articulated (art. 10.4). Apart from procedural faults, 
registration can be refused if there is already a media outlet with 
a very similar name, or if a media outlet with the same name had 
been previously suspended by a tribunal. According to Adil Soz, 
a respected media organization in Kazakhstan, this has been 
frequently the reason for refusing registration or re-registration 
to critical media in the last years51. Reportedly, in some cases the 
‚homonymous‛ papers or radio channels were created ad hoc by 
state authorities in order to silence ‚uncomfortable‛ media 
outlets (Interview, Kalsin, 2008). Moreover, despite several 
official announcements, a central register of existing media 
names has yet to be published52.  
                                                 
51 See http://www.ifex.org/kazakhstan/2011/01/31/defamation_law_amendments/ 
52 A recent example of dubious application of this rule is the case of the editor in chief 
Tokbergen Abiev, a journalist who had previously been jailed for alleged violations of 
media laws. In 2011, he was refused registration of two new papers – ‚The corrupted 
should be in jail‛ (Korrupcioner dolzhen sidit’ v tiurme) and ‚Kazakhstani Media Alliance: 
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Among the reasons to suspend or revoke registration (art. 13) 
there is a specific mention of the use of media in order to disturb 
electoral campaigns and illegitimately influence the results. In 
particular, the latter refers to actions performed ‚by foreigners, 
people without citizenship or foreign organizations‛ (art. 13.3). 
The formulation of this norm seems to have been strongly 
influenced by the experience of ‚colour revolutions‛ in Ukraine, 
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. The dominating narrative of these 
events among post-Soviet leaders saw them as the result of pre-
determined actions by external agents, often suspected to be 
U.S.-backed, which manoeuvred the local population through 
pro-western NGOs and mass media (Cooley, 2010). Indeed, the 
whole Eurasian region experienced a tightening of the control on 
mass media and civil society organization as a result of these 
events (Finkel & Brudny, 2012).  
In 2009 these restrictions were expanded to the Internet. The Law 
N. 178-IV (10.07.2009), which introduced amendments to the 
legislation on information and communications, states that 
online resources, including websites, blogs, online shops and 
libraries, should be treated as mass media in terms of civil and 
penal responsibility. While the most restrictive aspects were 
corrected after OSCE’s recommendations (initially the Procurator 
would have been able to block the incriminated websites in any 
moment), the law still creates confusion, making forums, blogs 
and other sites where the content is public-generated equivalent 
to mass media (Human Rights Watch, 2009). This restricts 
significantly freedom of expression, generates self-censorship 
                                                                                                           
Law and Justice‛ (Alians Kazakhstanskikh SMI: Zakon i pravosudie) – on the basis of this 
rule. See http://www.ifex.org/kazakhstan/2011/01/31/defamation_law_amendments/ 
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and creates problems for media quality and professionalism, also 
lowering media social responsibility (OSCE 2009).  
The law leaves the State authorities great discretion in 
determining which behaviours are in violation of the law. 
Interestingly, the norms of the media law forbidding the use of 
the media in order to interfere with election campaigns and 
disturb social order, especially from foreigners, foreign entities, 
and international organizations, have been extended to internet 
sites, blogs and forums. Authorities did not make a mystery that 
the intention of this law is to prevent the use of the Internet as a 
channel for social and political instability. Presenting the law 
draft to the Parliament, the Chairman of the Commission on 
Information and Networks Kuanyshbek Esekeev declared that 
this law serves the purpose to avoid ‚Moldova-like‛ scenarios, 
where strikes and protests were organized and mobilized 
through the Internet53. 
Similar concerns may be also behind the decision to reduce the 
presence of international electronic media in Kazakhstan. The 
new law ‚On Broadcasting‛ (N. 545-IV of 18.01.2012) makes it 
more difficult for foreign media to obtain air frequencies and 
extends to international channels the system of State control on 
the contents (Article 19, 2011). Also there, particular emphasis is 
given to anti-system and de-stabilizing propaganda (art. 21.3). 
Licensing procedures are problematic for other reasons as well. 
Electronic media are required not only to register, but also to 
participate in bids (konkurs) in order to receive air frequencies for 
their transmissions. The matter was previously regulated by a 
                                                 
53 ‚V Kazakhstane vstupil v sil zakon, reguliruyushchy internet‛, August, 4 2009. 
Available at: http://www.profit.kz/news/5092-V-Kazahstane-vstupil-v-silu-Zakon-
reguliruuschij-internet/. 
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general law ‚On Licensing‛ (N. 2200 of 17.04.1995) and a series 
of Government acts. The legislative void had allowed the State 
wide discretion in managing the matter, as we saw when looking 
at the distribution of frequencies among loyal allies of the 
President in the 1990s. The new law ‚On Broadcasting‛ is not 
likely to change this situation: it creates a licensing body which is 
not independent, but is a direct emanation of the Government 
(art. 5) and maintains a tight control on media contents (Article 
19, 2011).  
The discipline of defamation and of other violations of the right 
to personal dignity is also used to control the media. The Soviet 
practice of criticism towards political enemies is still well alive 
and there is a tendency to use media as weapons against 
adversaries (Interview, Sarym 2011). For paradoxical that can 
seem, criticism towards officials is tolerated, and sometimes even 
encouraged from the centre, as long as the President and his 
narrow circle are not involved, possibly to give an impression of 
publicity and maintain local officials under the ‚eye‛ of the 
centre (Interviews, Satpayev, Nurmakov 2011).  
On the other hand, defamation of public officials is a criminal 
offence: punishment usually includes extremely high fines and 
sometimes condemnation to jail (Criminal Code of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, art. 129 and 130). Also, the burden of proof lies in 
any case on the journalist, and the criterion of ‚reasonable 
publication‛ is not considered (Article 19 2000: 12). The difficulty 
in proving their claims and fears for high fines or even 
imprisonment have often the effect of generating self-censorship 
among journalists, and the recent lessening of punishment 
measures for such violations is not likely to change this situation 
(Law "On Introducing Amendments to Some Laws of 
Kazakhstan for the Further Humanization of Criminal 
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Legislation and the Strengthening of Legal Safeguards in the 
Criminal Process" of February 4th 2011)54.  
 
 
(iii) Social Procurement - Goszakaz 
In the mid 2000s the Kazakhstani State has started to implement 
another indirect system to influence media content: the so-called 
goszakas (Gosudarstvenniy Socialniy Zakaz – State Social 
Procurement) program55. The program regards mass media as 
well as non-governmental organizations and is aimed at 
improving the interaction between the State and civil society 
(Law on State Social Procurement, 36-3 2005).  
In the media sphere, goszakas is run at the central level by a 
specific body (upolnomochenny organ), managed by the Ministry 
of Culture and Information, and at the local level by oblasts’ 
administrations (Law ‚On Mass Media‛, Art. 4.2 and 4.4). The 
State allocates funds to media outlets by commissioning articles 
and reportages on themes of public interest, for instance about 
tolerance and interethnic harmony, or in order to stimulate the 
use of Kazakh language. By promoting publications on socially 
relevant topics, the system works as a partial substitute for the 
absence of public service media. In Kazakhstan, in fact, State 
media have not developed according to a public service model 
and there are few examples of community media as well 
(Interview, Karpov 2011).  
According to local experts, however, Social Procurement has also 
negative consequences, both on the independence and quality of 
                                                 
54 See also http://www.ifex.org/kazakhstan/2011/01/31/defamation_law_amendments/ 
55 In reference to media, it is also commonly called gosinformzakaz or gosdotaciya. 
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publishing (Interview, Mednikova 2011)56. Needing no revenues 
from advertising or sales to survive, editors lose motivation in 
finding and developing interesting stories to reach their 
audience; on the other hand, in exchange of generosity, loyalty to 
the regime is expected, limiting the possibility of media to act as 
a watchdog. Moreover, just by increasing the coverage of 
authorities’ initiatives – including Nur Otan’s –, the system 
contributes to the creation of a positive image of the regime. A 
specialized report confirms that, this way, the State has profited 
of the lack of independent financing sources connected to the 
2008 economic crisis in order to put media effectively under 
control (MediaNet, 2010). The extension of Social Procurement 
seems to be quickly increasing and to have had a spur after 2008: 
between 2007 and 2008 the number of media outlets involved 
practically doubled, and they reached 50% of the total media 
outlets in 2009 (MediaNet, 2010: 5)57. Also the resources destined 
to this formula have increased, reaching the sum of 7,3 millions 
of US Dollars in 200958. According to independent experts, in 
2010 almost 70% of the media outlets were regularly 
commissioned articles by State authorities (Interview, 
Mednikova, 2011)59.  
                                                 
56 Also the 2009 Annual Media Kurultay (Council) has pointed at the extensive use of 
Goszakaz as one of the most relevant problems for Kazakhstani media, particularly 
because it strongly increases the State’s influence on media content and at the same time 
generates self-censorship. A full report on the contents of the conference is in Gazeta.kz 
(2009) SMI legli v dreif, November 26, 2009. 
57 ‚V Kazakhstane v tekushem godu vdvoe uvelichen ob’em gosudarsvennogo zakaza v SMI – 
Glava MKI‛. Zakon.kz, October 10 2008 
58  ‚SMI legli v dreif‛ Gazeta.kz November 26, 2009. 
59 In his speech at a roundtable organized by the Club of the Institute of Political 
Decisions (KIPR), Vyacheslav Abramov from Freedom House Kazakhstan mentioned the 
same percentage. During the event, several independent experts voiced their concerns 
about the dangers for media freedom related with the Goszakaz system. The script of the 
roundtable ‚The Role of Media in contemporary Kazakhstan‛, Almaty 24 November 2011 
is available at: http://ipr.kz/kipr/3/1/66#.T7VdclIZQnM  
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4.3.3 Media and Elections: an advantage for the party of power 
The results of such efforts are an overwhelming presence of the 
party of power in Kazakhstani media. A look at the number of 
mentions of parties in the press confirms that Nur Otan (and 
Otan before 2006) enjoys much wider coverage than any other 
political formation, both in the pro-regime and in the opposition 
camps (See Appendix Four).  
This advantage is particularly relevant during electoral 
campaigns, and it is likely to have a role in the party’s 
overwhelming victories.  
The use of biased television news in electoral campaigns is a 
particularly interesting media effect. While electoral advertising 
is perceived for what it is, propaganda, news is more credible in 
the eyes of the audience, because it is generally considered 
impartial. This happens also in other contexts, but this effect is 
usually limited because it is counter-balanced by other news, 
neutral or biased in other directions. But when this happens in a 
situation of significant control of the national TV channels, it 
results in a very powerful tool to shape public opinion and 
influence electoral results (Oates & Roselle, 2000: 34). 
Theories on the effect of media on the political process have 
found that the association between media messages and electoral 
results is stronger when the political competition is weak and the 
participation to the political debate is mediated by television for 
the majority of citizens. The influence of the media, and in 
particular of television, is especially strong on audiences which 
are less sophisticated, less informed and not interested in politics 
(Oates & Roselle: 2000: 34). 
Television is known to have a greater impact on receivers, 
compared to printed media. The quality of its message is 
87 
 
somewhat different: it does not appeal to people’s logic, but uses 
a more emotional language, downing the individual’s 
‚immunity system‛ against manipulation.  
In Kazakhstan, television has a wide territorial diffusion: the two 
state-run channels (TV Kazakhstan and TV Khabar) cover almost 
the entire territory of the country60.  
Television is also the main source of political information in 
Kazakhstan, even among young people: while the use of Internet 
is rapidly increasing, it is doing so in an unequal way, especially 
in the poorest regions of the country. A survey conducted in the 
mid-2000s shows that national television is still the most relevant 
source of news about politics, preferred by 74% of Russian 
young people, 66.8% of young Kazakhs and 71.8% of youths 
belonging to other nationalities (Shoikin, 2006, in Nurtazina 
2011). According to a recent survey, 82% of Kazakhstani citizens 
declared to get their information about the latest Presidential 
elections from television (IRI, 2011, in Nurtazina 2011).  
In 1999 the coverage of parliamentary elections (organized in 
two rounds, the 11 and 25 October). Among the party lists, 
however, the pro-government Otan and Civic Party received the 
most coverage. In overall news content, pro-governmental 
parties fared better in terms of ‚positive coverage‛ than 
opposition parties. Of the private channels monitored, KTK 
demonstrated a distinct bias toward Otan, which enjoyed nearly 
60% of the coverage given to all parties. Otan also monopolized 
the market with 65.7% of paid political advertisements 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2000). 
                                                 
60 As of 2010, the channels Khabar and Kazakhstan reach respectively 92% and 93% of the 
total population. See Nurtazina 2011. See also OSCE, Final report on the parliamentary 
elections in Kazakhstan, 18 August 2007 (October 30, 2007), www.osce.kz. 
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By 2004 the control of the State on the media consolidated, and 
the OSCE media monitoring during the electoral campaign for 
the Mazhilis revealed a strong bias in the news coverage of the 
election campaign, particularly in favour of the dominant pro-
presidential parties. The state television station Kazakhstan-1 
devoted 64 percent of its political news coverage to Otan and its 
members. The tone of coverage was mainly neutral, but the other 
nine registered parties or blocs received little coverage. Khabar 
television station largely favoured Otan and Asar, with 31 
percent and 44 percent of coverage respectively. These two 
parties also fared better in terms of positive coverage, while the 
opposition party Ak Zhol and the bloc formed by the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan and Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan received little coverage, often negative 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2000).  
The news program of the private station Channel 31 was more 
balanced in its coverage of the main contestants, although 
favouring Ak Zhol (36 percent of political news coverage). 
Conversely, the commercial television station KTK was notably 
biased in favour of Asar and its candidates, (45 percent of all 
political news coverage). KTK newscasts repeatedly contained 
editorial attacks against opposition parties, mainly against Ak 
Zhol (OSCE, 2004).  
The situation did not change much also in 2007, with an 
important difference. While in 2004 the support of some of the 
TV channels was divided between Otan and some of its allies, 
now Nur Otan, the new party of power, was enjoying all the 
possible advantages of its privileged position: state media gave 
preferential treatment to Nur Otan in news coverage, 
particularly by giving coverage of President, who is also the 
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party leader, and promoted his achievements61. Coverage was 
almost exclusively (99.8 per cent) positive or neutral in tone 
(OSCE 2007). 
In 2012, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM conducted quantitative and 
qualitative media monitoring of six TV stations during the entire 
campaign period: Channel 31, Astana TV, Kazakhstan TV, Khabar, 
KTK and Channel 7. The most balanced shares of visibility 
among political parties were given by Channel 31 , Kazakhstan 
TV, Khabar and KTK, although in all cases the largest share was 
for Nur Otan. Channel 7 and Astana TV, instead, mentioned 
almost only the party of power, leaving little or no space for the 
others62.  
 
 
                                                 
61 On state-funded television, which has a particular obligation to provide balanced news 
coverage of an election campaign, Nur Otan received 20 % of the political news coverage 
on TV Khabar and 17 % on TV Kazakhstan. In contrast, the ANDSP (All National Social 
Democratic Party) received 3 and 4 per cent respectively, while Ak Zhol received 7 and 
12 per cent respectively. The other parties received between 3 and 6 per cent each. OSCE, 
Final report on the parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, 18 August 2007 (October 30, 2007), 
www.osce.kz 
62 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/89401  
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4.4 “Intangible” resources 
 
The very position of the ‚party of power‛ within the political 
system brings significant advantages to Nur Otan.  
Unlike the use of legislation and media seen before, these 
advantages are not of the material type. They are intangible, 
related with the party’s image, popularity and ideological basis.  
Nur Otan’s popularity, for instance, has its primary source in the 
leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev. Being the President’s party 
is Nur Otan’s label, its most characterizing feature.  
The adoption of a flexible  and vague ideology is also a factor of 
success for Nur Otan. Adopting a flexible ideology is a common 
strategy of dominant parties, which need it in order to maintain 
their dominant position by appealing to a larger pool of voters. 
Nur Otan, an executive-based party in a soft authoritarian 
context, needs this with less urgency, as the extensive elite 
support already guarantees that it has a decisive advantage on 
competitors.  
It still needs it, though, in order to address the whole population, 
and increase regime legitimacy. In particular, the party benefits 
from its association with the country’s economic success and 
with its position of promoter of national unity.  
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4.4.1 Nur Otan, or the President’s Party 
Nur Otan’s success is mostly due to its connection with the 
President Nazarbayev, an immensely popular figure in 
Kazakhstan.  
The support from the executive – and in particular from the 
leader - seems a crucial factor in the success of post-Soviet 
parties of power. Colton & McFaul (2000) connect the success of 
Unity, in comparison with previous parties of power, with 
Putin’s declaration of vote, made on November 24th 1999. This 
sole event has been believed to increase the success of the party 
by a dozen percentage points (Colton & McFaul, 2000: 211). Also 
the elites seemed to be influenced by Putin’s support of Unity, as 
well as his personal increased popularity (Markov, 1999: 19 in 
Colton & McFaul, 2000: 211). 
This is true also for Unity’s successor, United Russia. Putin never 
accepted to become the leader of the party while he was the 
President of Russian Federation: nevertheless he always 
supported United Russia, and his high approval rating was 
always ‚a major resource for the party of power‛ (Gelman, 2006: 
8). Eventually, after stepping out of the presidency and 
becoming Prime Minister, he accepted the role of party leader. 
In Kazakhstan, the relation between party and leader is even 
more intense. The party of power has a primary role in the 
political scene, and the president accepts and encourages its 
growth, using his popularity to increase the one of Nur Otan.  
Nazarbayev’s popularity is immense. Over time, he built a 
personality cult in which he is seen as the guarantee of 
prosperity for the multinational and multi-confessional 
Kazakhstani society and as the ‘father of the nation and a symbol 
of unity and stability’ (Isaacs, 2011: 121). Pictures and quotations 
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by Nazarbayev are common sights in towns and big cities alike, 
and there is a number of President’s Museums. 
This effort is indeed repaid by the trust the majority of 
Kazakhstani seem to have toward Nazarbayev. A recent survey 
of the Strategic Center of Social and Political Studies in Almaty 
has found that most citizens are happy with his government (see 
Lillis, 2010)63. On the other hand, especially in big cities and 
among young people, a feeling of discontent about the lack of 
change in leadership is increasing, although most young people 
seem to live in their private sphere and do not engage in politics, 
caring more about their own education and career perspectives, 
at least for the time being64. 
A big component of Nazarbayev’s rhetoric is connected with the 
idea of stability: Nazarbayev managed to lead the country 
through the difficult phase of independence and the drastic 
economic reforms of the 1990s without serious societal and 
ethnic clashes. This was not the case in neighbouring countries, 
such as Tajikistan, which experienced a civil war in the early 
1990s, and especially Kyrgyzstan, where the consequences of a 
frail political and ethnic balance are still well evident and 
continue to be a reason of instability. Nazarbayev has always 
relied on this element, which earns him a great share of genuine 
popularity, and has associated it with a discourse about gradual 
democratization. 
An example is the organization of early presidential elections in 
2011, where both the timing and the type of slogans used in the 
campaign show that Nazarbayev tried to convince the 
                                                 
63 The survey was conducted in 2010 and interviewed 1,592 people:  89% said to be 
satisfied with Nazarbayev’s government.  
64 Although this could be only a phase, due to the previous (Soviet) over-saturation of the 
society with politics.  
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citizenship that he would avoid a contagion from the recent 
events in Kyrgyzstan65.  Also in this case, the party positions 
itself on the same policy goals and values as Nazarbayev. As 
noted by Isaacs, ‚the party espouses the same message as the 
president and shares his commitment of stability and gradual 
democratization‛ (Isaacs, 2011: 143). 
The association between party and president is very strong in 
Kazakhstan:  Nazarbayev has been the leader of the party since 
its foundation and simply reflects his position and ideas in its 
program: according to the party program, the first objective of 
the party is the ‚successful realization of the First President’s 
policy agenda‛ (Nur Otan, 2007). In the ‚National strategy 2009-
2012‛ it can be read that the ‚fundamental national values, as 
they were formulated by the Leader of the Nation, constitute the 
substance of Nur Otan’s ideological platform‛ (Nur Otan, 2009).  
Also, Nur Otan largely depends on Nazarbayev’s popularity and 
charisma: electoral posters of Nur Otan often depict Nazarbayev, 
and Nur Otan proudly presents itself as the ‚President’s party‛66. 
Obviously this has consequences on the party’s success, because 
Nur Otan can rely on higher vote shares because of this 
association. This circumstance has consequences also on the 
relative position of the party in comparison to the leader. 
As already introduced (Chapter 3), the leader’s charismatic 
popularity is one of the fundamental features conditioning the 
                                                 
65 In June 2010, Kyrgyzstan experienced serious ethnic clashes in the Southern region of 
the country, especially in the region of Osh, where both Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities 
live. The violent events followed an earlier coup in April 2010, which substituted the 
former leader Bakyev with a new coalition. In his pre-electoral speech, Nazarbayev called 
the country to make a choice in favour of ‚maintaining stability‛, and mentioned the 
events of Osh as the result of the absence of  ‚order‛, ‚harmony‛ and ‚stability‛. See: 
http://www.newskaz.ru/society/20110315/1240160.html  
66 See the party’s website: www.ndp-nurotan.kz/  
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origins and the future institutionalization of a political party 
(Panebianco, 1988). Panebianco describes a situation where 
competition exists and the party uses its leader’s charisma to get 
into power, by convincing people that he is the necessary person 
in that specific moment, what is called ‚situational charisma‛ 
(Tucker, 1968; in Panebianco: 1988: 52). However, the case of 
Kazakhstan is slightly different. While it is undoubted that 
Nazarbayev’s personal charisma was crucial for his remaining in 
power after independence, and that Nur Otan’s popularity is 
heavily relies on the leader, the two things did not happen at the 
same time, as in Panebianco’s scenario. Nazarbayev’s power 
position was already more or less established when he tried to 
establish a party in order to consolidate his rule. This means that 
the party of power has even more of a dependent position on the 
leader’s popularity, because the leader, in a way, comes before 
and stays above the party.  
In this context, the ‚routinization of charisma‛ is totally 
dependent on the leader’s will67: being in a superior position, 
Nazarbayev is connected to the party only until when he decides 
so. In the same way, he can decide easily to discard it, as he did 
with previous parties of power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
67 With this expression Panebianco meant the transfer of personal charisma to the party,  
in order to make it a more durable institution.  
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4.4.2 Ideology: strategic vagueness, economic growth and 
national unity 
 
The ideological basis is one of the fundamental features of 
political parties, even when it is vague and flexible.  
In his seminal work on the transformation of Western party 
systems, Otto Kirchheimer showed how the detachment from a 
strong ideological basis is a progressive phenomenon, by which 
the pre-war mass integration parties started looking at the 
electoral scene and abandoned their sharpest claims and class 
lines in order to reach ‚a wider audience and more immediate 
electoral success‛ and transforming, thus, into ‚catch-all‛ parties 
(Kirchheimer, 1966: 184) 68.  
Ideological flexibility is even more relevant for dominant parties. 
Pempel (1990) noted that dominant parties experience a tension 
when, from the initial moment of mobilization, they pass to the 
position of power. While they have to maintain some rigidity, in 
order to maintain the core of supporters, they have to become 
flexible enough to attract new political support. Tarrow refers to 
this approach as ‚soft hegemonic‛: the party needs to appeal to 
the wider public (Tarrow, 1990: 308-309). The adoption of a 
flexible strategy is functional to this, because it allows the party 
to co-opt opposition policies, as well as opposition politicians 
(White, 2011). 
                                                 
68 In the post-war period, bourgeois parties, or ‚parties of individual representation‛, 
failed to become parties of integration, and did not evolve from their nature of ‚clubs for 
parliamentary representation‛ to ‚agencies for mass politics able to bargain with the 
integration-type mass parties according to the laws of the political market‛ (183). At the 
same time, mass integration parties, which imposed themselves in Europe at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and  contributed to socialize masses, lost their 
sharpest class lines and claims and started looking at the electoral scene, transforming 
into ‚catch-all parties‛. 
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One may argue that, in the case of authoritarian politics, this 
flexibility is of little relevance, if relevant at all. The electoral 
process is biased in favour of the ruling party, and in some cases 
is not meaningful at all, being only a sort of farce.  
In the context of Kazakhstan, where indeed the elections have 
only a relative meaning, a flexible ideology contributes to 
improve the perception of the regime at a wider level: by 
showing that its goal is to improve the general wellbeing, rather 
than favouring one or another part of the society, the party of 
power and the regime become more acceptable for the 
population. In a way, this is an easier method than having to 
impose an ideology and creating a complex system of 
indoctrination, as it was happening in Soviet times. 
It could be also that the adoption of a vague ideology is more apt 
to the post-Soviet context, which had been characterized by 
ideological saturation. Indeed, this ideological flexibility it is not 
only a feature of Nur Otan but also of the other Kazakhstani 
parties, which have very similar platforms, characterized by 
centrist positions (Brill Olcott, 2010; Isaacs, 2011; interview, 
Satpayev, 2011). Also, this feature is common to many parties in 
the post Soviet space, including the Russian party of power 
United Russia, where the lack of a clearly defined ideological 
position actually is said to have contributed to the success of the 
Russian party of power (Gelman, 2006: 10)69.  
                                                 
69 Ideological flexibility has been pointed out as a characteristic feature of the party of 
power and as a crucial element for its success. Igor Tanchin noted that ‚ideology for a 
party of power is an impermissible luxury since ideology should not prevent the 
authority from achieving its objectives‛ (Tanchin 2005, in Meleshevich 2007: 195)This was 
clearly perceived also by the masters of parties of power: Sergeii Shoigu, founder and 
leader of Unity, described it as a party ‚without program, without members and without 
ideology‛ See: Stephen White, Ian McAllister, Sarah Oates, ‚Was It Russian Public 
Television That Won It?‛, The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 7, n. 2 (2002). on 
the same party, Yevgenii Nazdratenko once declared that ‚the ideology of Unity is the 
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Nur Otan’s ideological position is indeed very vague, focusing 
on universal worries of the people of Kazakhstan: economic 
development, societal, inter-ethnic and multi-confessional 
stability (Nur Otan 2007).  
The economic welfare of Kazakhstani citizens is the first priority 
of Nur Otan, in its double aspect of economic growth and 
redistribution. For instance, in the new party strategic goals for 
2017,  the first section is totally devoted to economic objectives, 
including measures encouraging growth, anti-crisis legislation 
and better life conditions for the citizens of Kazakhstan (Nur 
Otan, 2011).  
The impressive economic growth experienced by the country in 
the last two decades is indeed a very important source of 
legitimacy for the regime. While a fair economic performance 
could be regime-supporting in itself, because it decreases the risk 
of coups of rebellions70, a strong economic growth has also been 
                                                                                                           
lack of any ideology‛. Nezavizimaia Gazeta, October 2, 1999, in Hale, 2004. In particular, 
Gelman underlines the advantages of occupying a centrist position in the political 
spectrum, in particular in a context like the Russian one, where the role of ideology has 
shrunk. See Steven Hanson, ‘Instrumental Democracy: The End of Ideology and the 
Decline of Russian Political Parties’, in Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger (eds.), The 
1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), pp.163-185. United Russia has located itself on the ‚zero point on the left-
right continuum between pro-statist and pro-market parties‛, as well as on other 
ideological axes. This ‚median-voter‛ position allowed United Russia ‚wide room for 
political manoeuvring that was unavailable for the disunified segments of the 
opposition‛, too distant to create an anti-regime coalition (Gel’man 2006: 10-11). Centrism 
is considered an asset of such parties also by Regina Smyth, who argues that the success 
of the party of power is actually ‚contingent‛ on its ability to portray itself as a centrist 
organization (Smyth 2002: 558). 
70 Economic performance has long been considered crucial for regime survival, with 
failure raising the probability of either mass protests and loss of legitimacy, or splits 
within the regime over diminishing rent sources (see Cho 2005). Insights from political 
economy theories confirm that higher levels of wealth and greater equality in the 
redistribution of resources decrease the incentives for actors to support revolutionary 
movements (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006).  
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one of the most convincing arguments in favour of autocratic 
government. The opinion that autocracies have better capacities 
to deliver economic development is known as the Lee thesis, 
named after former Singapore’s political leader Lee Kuan Yew 
(Sen, 1999). The central claim of this thesis is that political 
freedoms hamper economic development because a democratic 
government has to cater to short-term populist demands instead 
of implementing pragmatic long-term policy. According to this 
view, an authoritarian government is more able to implement 
sensible economic reforms that are good for society as a whole. 
Indeed Nazarbayev has tried to associate their mode of rule to 
the style of the Singaporean leader, and this is reflected also into 
the programs of Nur Otan. In particular, Nazarbayev’s most 
popular slogan, ‚first, the economy and then politics‛71, 
summarizes the essence of the Lee thesis, justifying with the 
necessity of economic growth the delay of political reforms. 
This is indeed a popular position among Nur Otan party-men: in 
the interviews conducted, often the necessity of giving priority to 
economic development went together with a strenuous defence 
of the gradualist approach adopted in politics72. 
Nur Otan, as well as the president, also dedicates a great 
attention to the theme of national unity. This is actually an 
application of the gradualist and harmonizing approach of the 
regime to a very controversial issue, the one of nationality and 
linguistic policies. Kazakhstan is in fact a multi-ethnic country, 
where ethnic Kazakhs live together with a number of minorities, 
among which the most consistent in number and importance is 
                                                 
71 Shulembaeva R. ‚Politaren priamie paralleli‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 124, August 
10, 2007 
72 One of the most popular objections is that ‚it took 200 years to the United States to 
become a democratic country‛. Zhas Otan activist (2011b). 
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the Russian one. Actually, as noted by Dave (2007) Kazakhstan 
still deals with ethnicity in the same way Soviet authorities did, 
focusing on culture and ignoring its political aspect (Dave 2007). 
The policies of ‚Kazakhsification‛ (Dave, 2007: 151) adopted 
after independence have been limited to top-down processes 
aimed at the elites. Even the adoption of a new language 
legislation, which made Kazakh the first language, has had 
limited effects, although it has created advantages for Kazakh 
speakers73. 
This indecisiveness is probably the result of a strategy of 
authorities, using again the instrument of vagueness and of 
appealing to the totality of citizens with general considerations 
of harmony in order to maintain consensus. In particular, the fact 
that Russian is still widely spoken and has maintained a status of 
almost-official language makes sure that the Russian-speaking 
community continue to support the regime. There is a general 
sense of fear among ethnic Russians, in fact, relatively to the 
development of a Kazakh nation-state, which would exclude 
their community (interview, Sarym, 2011).  
On the other hand, the President, as well as Nur Otan, often 
declare themselves as the promoters of the Kazakh nation, in 
order to appease the growing Kazakh population, which starts to 
demand more decisive nation-building policies. In this respect, 
maintaining a vague position is only a temporary equilibrium, 
which may reveal very dangerous for the regime74.  
 
                                                 
73 For instance, with the 1997 Language Law it became mandatory that at least 50% of all 
TV and Radio broadcasts be in Kazakh (Dave 2007). 
74 For these considerations, I am partly indebted to Marlene Denice Elwell, who presented 
a paper on ‚Ethno-nationalism in Kazakhstan‛ at the ASN Conference, Moscow, 2011. 
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Chapter 5. 
Nur Otan’s and the stability of the Kazakhstani 
regime 
 
The topic of how authoritarian parties contribute to regime 
stability is deeply intertwined with the reasons why 
authoritarian leaders should create and support a political 
formation.  
This chapter focuses on both topics. On the one hand, it is seen 
how the party-building process was deeply connected with a 
series of regime-threatening challenges, such as the presence of an 
unruly legislative chamber, splits within the elites and the 
possibility of destabilizing external influences, coming from the 
international community in the form of criticism to non-
democratic elections, or from the region, in the shape of ‚colour 
revolutions‛. On the other hand, the regime-supporting 
functions of the party of power Nur Otan are analyzed in detail. 
The chapter is placed in the literature on authoritarian 
institutions, in particular on authoritarian parties.  
 
 
5.1. Why a party at all? The party of power as an answer 
to regime-threatening challenges 
We have seen how the formation and the success of the party of 
power Nur Otan resulted from a deliberate and complex party-
building strategy of the ruling elites. It is not yet clear, though, 
why did the elites, and especially the President, engage in such 
enterprise, which undoubtedly involved a long-term investment 
of political and material resources. 
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A conventional explanation for the presence of parties and 
elections in non-democratic regimes is the need for international 
legitimacy and the influence of international trends in favour of 
democratization triggered by the end of Cold War (Gelman, 
2008b; Brill Olcott, 2008). This argument alone seems not 
sufficient to give account of the presence of strong executive-
supported parties, though. 
Starr (2006) considers the establishment of pro-regime parties in 
Central Asia as a necessary step in the wake of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. In that moment, Central Asian leaders, including 
Nazarbayev, were in a position of weakness, depending heavily 
on the domestic elite groups that helped them re-gaining power 
after Gorbachev’s attempt to break local power networks. 
Elections and parties were the leader’s corrective tool for this 
situation: they served the purpose of ‚engaging the populace 
with the president’s programs and ratifying the presidents’ 
general course‛, while the control guaranteed by election 
management and by a party of power ensured that the elective 
principle did not undermine the presidency and the informal 
deals on which it depended (Starr, 2006: 11). While the 
description of that condition as a one of ‚weakness‛ is debatable, 
as Nazarbayev had large personal power already in 1991, the 
intuition that the President was looking for a direct and 
‚manageable‛ source of legitimacy, which would make him 
more independent from other elite groupings, seems correct.  
The Soviet legacy may also have had a great influence in the 
establishment of a ruling party of this type. 
The long experience under the Soviet Union has probably had an 
important role in shaping the relation of the society with political 
parties, by creating a lack of engagement in politics, increasing 
scepticism regarding politicians or even a totalitarian regime 
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dependency (Isaacs 2011). In a way, the post-Soviet Kazakhstani 
state sought symbolic legitimacy by adopting a social contract 
totally similar to the one in force in Soviet times: in exchange of 
security and welfare guarantees, the general public had to offer 
compliance. This contract allowed individuals to ‚preserve their 
autonomy from the state through a structure of overt compliance 
and routine subversions of policies that impinge upon the 
private domain‛ (Dave 2007: 115-116).  
Also, the choice of establishing a system based on party rule has 
been possibly influenced by the familiarity of the post-Soviet 
elites with this instrument, developed and refined in more than 
seventy years. Possibly, the establishment of a party that was 
declaredly the ‚functional equivalent‛ of the CPSU (Brill Olcott, 
2010: 93) was more the continuation of an established practice, 
rather than the instauration of something new. 
There are indeed signs of influence, although it is not possible to 
treat Nur Otan as a simple replica of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. Nur Otan shares several commonalities with the 
CPSU: for instance, its formal structure, which is highly 
hierarchical and includes a youth branch (in this case, Zhas Otan, 
in that case the Komsomol) and a specialized ‚school‛ for the 
ideological education of its activists (in both cased it is called the 
Higher Party School, the Vyshaya Partiinnaia Schkola). These 
features are common also to another example of party of power, 
United Russia. 
However, Nur Otan, as well as United Russia, emerged in 
extremely different conditions of the political system than those 
in place in Soviet times, even at the very end. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, it was clear that the leadership had lost its monopoly 
on political power, and that it would have been impossible to 
continue ruling in the old fashion. Nazarbayev had to face since 
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the very beginning the opposition of several segments of society 
and of fragments of the elites, and he managed to maintain his 
authority after independence only forcing the situation in a state 
of emergency and ruling by decree (Brill Olcott, 2010; 
Kuttykadam, 2010)75. 
There was not such a thing like the ‚continuation‛ of party rule. 
When the Soviet regime collapsed, also institutions, including 
the party underwent a serious crisis. This phase, in other words, 
represented a break in party rule, which was then re-established 
in a different form.  
The nature of the party which emerged from this situation is 
inherently different from the CPSU. 
The discussion on party origins is helpful also in order to 
highlight this difference. The CPSU originated outside of power. 
Only through massive mobilization and violent outbreaks it 
managed to get in power. Its successors, instead, were created 
within the executive branches of power in order to maintain the 
situation. This reflects the difference, highlighted by Shefter 
(1994) between parties created by power and parties created to 
break into power. It can be argued that the late CPSU had little in 
common with the Bolshevik party which took control of the 
Russian empire in 1917, and that evolved in an organization 
more interested in maintaining power than in conquering it.  
The key consideration here regards the subject of the 
proposition: although the goal and the methods were changed, it 
was still the party to be interested in maintaining power, and 
                                                 
75 In a way, this necessity of using the hard hand is related to the condition of weakness 
proposed by Starr (2006). The resort to force possibly meant that the leader had 
insufficient institutional strength to maintain authority. 
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enacting strategies to achieve its goals. The CPSU was a party-
state, a pervasive structure which controlled policy-making at all 
levels, through a capillary network of party officials (Hough, 
1979).  
Nur Otan, instead, is a state-party, created and controlled by an 
external group, the executive elites. In a way, the relation 
between party and power in this case is reverse. 
Moreover, although widely relying on its leaders’ personal 
power, the CPSU managed to ‚routinize charisma‛ (Panebianco, 
1988) and establish collective and party-based tools of rule, first 
of all the Politbureau76. Nur Otan, instead, is still depending on 
the will and popularity of Nursultan Nazarbayev, and could 
possibly be dismissed if the President decides so. 
A last important difference regards ideology, which was a 
fundamental component of the CPSU. As it was seen in chapter 
4, instead, ideology is a secondary and almost accessory element 
for Nur Otan, coming after the party structure. 
Parties in autocracies may as well be needed for their ability to 
sustain the regime (Magaloni, 2008). While authoritarian leaders 
would prefer to rule unchecked, they are ready to establish 
‚authoritarian institutions‛ whenever these help lowering the 
risks of instability and crisis. In particular, dictators seem to 
resort to the creation of parties especially when they confront 
strong opposition (Smith, 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). In 
this chapter it is argued that the choice of the executive elites to 
establish a strong party of power, as well as the later decisions to 
enhance and support it, are the result of a prolonged learning 
process, taking place since independence; also, it is argued that 
                                                 
76 It is probably more correct to talk about more or less personalist phases of Soviet Rule.  
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the founding of a party of power was contemporary and 
contingent to the establishment of a soft authoritarian regime. 
There were a few crucial moments in this process, represented 
by important challenges for the regime, mostly related with 
internal stability, but also to international events. The party of 
power was always central in the executive elites’ answers to 
these challenges: enhanced through ad hoc legislative measures 
and administrative resources, it contributed to the effective 
management of conflicts and to the improvement of the regime’s 
legitimacy.  
Three main phases are individuated: the first phase corresponds 
to the establishment of the party of power, and corresponded to 
the necessity of having a better and more cost-efficient control of 
the legislature, which had shown to be quite unruly in the early 
1990s. The second phase, taking place in the early 2000s, 
corresponds to a wave of elite splits, which posed a serious 
threat to regime stability. The party was then reinforced and 
transformed in a super-party. The new party, sending a message 
of invincibility, proved an effective deterrent for the rebel 
segments of the elites, as well as for the opposition in general. 
The last phase, in the late 2000s, corresponds to an attempt of the 
party to become closer to the population and to increase, this 
way, the legitimacy of the regime. It corresponded to the attempt 
of Kazakhstan of improving its legitimacy also on the 
international scene, with the bid for the OSCE Chairmanship. 
Another challenge that was dealt with in this phase was the 
increase of youth activism and the fear of contagion from protest 
events in the post-Soviet region, a phenomenon that goes under 
the name of ‚colour revolutions‛. The main challenges, with 
corresponding strategies and party functions are schematically 
introduced in Table 1. 
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As the learning process is to be intended as dynamic and 
extended over time, in some cases strategies were implemented 
some time after the challenge. It is therefore important to 
highlight in every case the connection between events and elite 
reactions.  
Moreover, challenges and strategies are connected with what are 
considered the regime-supporting functions of the party of 
power. These are closely related with the perceived threats to the 
regime, although the correspondence between the two categories 
is not total, the party possibly going beyond the initial scope, or 
evolving along different lines. 
The method used here is theory guided process-tracing 
(Aminzande, 1993), with the appearance of potential regime 
challenges and the establishment of certain party-supporting 
measures serving as my primary data. 
This method relates historical narratives and events with 
theoretical explanations. According to Aminzande (1993: 108), 
the researcher must provide ‚theoretically explicit narratives 
that carefully trace and compare the sequences of events 
constituting a process‛ of interest. These narratives ‚allow us to 
capture the unfolding of social action over time in a manner 
sensitive to the order in which events occur‛ (ibidem). The 
method is useful because it seeks to explicitly specify the linking 
causes and effects of a process. With this method, I try to identify 
the key events, processes, actors and decisions that link the 
development of the party of power in Kazakhstan with the 
literature on authoritarian parties.  
More specifically, the theoretical propositions around which the 
analysis revolves are taken from the literature on ‚new 
authoritarianism‛, in particular from the developing literature 
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on authoritarian institutions. While here the hypotheses about 
party functions are presented and connected with the historical 
events constituting regime-threatening challenges and triggering 
the elites’ response, they will be treated in greater detail later in 
the chapter. 
Some preliminary discussion is needed, though. In particular, 
this regards the approach to the problem, which in this case is 
dynamic. Studies relying on a rational choice perspective like 
Magaloni’s (2006; 2007; 2008) tend to deal with the issue of ‚why 
a party‛ only in the moment of its emergence, assuming, 
therefore, that the reason for a party to exist stays the same over 
time.  
A partial exception is represented by Reuter & Remington (2009), 
who tried to treat the issue of the formation of United Russia in 
dynamic perspective, by looking also at the previous 
experiments of party of power. However, their goal was 
different. Given the fragmented nature of Russian elites – at least 
in comparison with Kazakhstan – to individuate the presence of 
higher or lower incentives for the elites in supporting the party 
of power is crucial in order to understand the reasons for the 
success of United Russia. 
In this case, instead, the goal is to see how the party is used as a 
flexible tool to maintain stability. The control instruments seen 
before – institutional change, media access and administrative 
resources in general – are used as leverages in order to change 
the level of pressure exercised by the party on the opposition 
and civil society.  
 
 
  
 
Time Challenges Strategies Party Functions  
 
1991- 1997 Inter-Institutional conflict, potential 
instability 
Create functioning parties of power 
 
Having taken control of the Mazhilis, 
Otan and other pro-regime parties 
ensure that legislation is passed 
smoothly and decrease the risk of 
conflicts 
 
1997-2003 
 
Elite splits, emergence of new political 
formations - some of the pro-regime 
parties become more independent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access for other parties is further 
restricted (party and electoral 
legislation) 
 
Other pro-regime parties are forced 
to merge into Otan (attacks on 
personalities) 
  
Restrictive civil society legislation, 
ersatz social movements 
 
Marginalization of the opposition 
 
 
With its stellar victory in 2007, Nur Otan 
shows to be a super-party, sends a 
‚message of invincibility‛ to opposition 
and potential defectors 
 
 
2004-2012 Further involvement in international 
politics – bid for OSCE chairmanship 
 
Signs of internal dissidence (protests 
in the Western regions), fear of 
propagation of instability from the 
region and outside, especially among   
youth (Colour revolutions, Kyrgyzstan 
2010 events, Arab Spring).  
 
Legislation is loosened , second 
party is created 
 
Initiatives to get closer to people 
(Golos Naroda) 
 
Institution of a youth branch, Zhas 
Otan 
 
Nur Otan takes charge of ‚democracy 
promotion‛ 
 
Party as the channel for closer 
connection between the people and the 
regime.  
Zhas Otan becomes a mobilizing force, 
co-opts young ‚leaders‛, involving them 
in regime-approved activities 
Table 5.1 Challenges to the regime, elite strategies and party functions 
  
5.1.1 The age of inter-institutional conflicts 
 
Despite having tried already in the early 1990s to establish a 
party that would be the ‚functional equivalent‛ of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Brill Olcott, 2010: 93), the 
Kazakhstani elites and especially the leader Nursultan 
Nazarbayev had not invested significantly in the project (see 
chapter 4). 
Their commitment increased only later, in connection with a 
situation of instability and inter-institutional conflict, when it 
became crucial to establish an effective control on the legislature. 
This challenge had its culminating moment during the 1995 
parliamentary crisis. 
As seen previously (see Chapter 3), the parliament resulting 
from the 1994 elections had a pluralist composition and, despite 
the executive’s efforts to influence its composition, proved in 
several occasions to be vocal and independent. 
The initial reaction to the legislature’s attempts to establish 
barriers to the presidential power was of the ‚hard‛ type: the 
President dismissed the Parliament, substituted it with a hand-
picked Assembly and ruled by decree for nine months. 
Moreover, media and opposition movements, who had become 
more vocal and engaged in street protests as a result of the 
parliamentary crisis, were silenced, and for days the army 
patrolled the streets of Almaty, officially busy in dealing with 
criminality (Kuttykadam, 2010). Even if it was effective, this 
strategy had enormous costs in terms of consensus and put the 
President and his circle in front of the need to find a more 
effective and less conflict-generating way to stay in power and 
‚manage‛ the political system. 
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The answer was found in the establishment of a party of power, 
which could act as a loyal, flexible and reliable tool to solve the 
conflicts generated by the executive-legislative relation.  
The one of dominating the state legislature in the interests of the 
executives is actually recognized as one of the most important 
features of post-Soviet ‚parties of power‛, especially of United 
Russia (Gelman, 2006; Meleshevich, 2007). 
It is worth to dwell more on the mechanisms of this control and 
on what makes it preferable to a more personalist style of rule. 
Vladimir Gelman (2006) pointed at the ‚reduction of transaction 
costs‛ as one of the main advantages of well functioning parties 
of power. Without the introduction of United Russia, Gelman 
argues, the Kremlin would have been forced to engage in a 
costly bargaining process with separate deputies and special 
interest groups. This would have implied the resort to the use of 
force, permanent purges and individual bargaining, all methods 
with high political and economic costs. 
A party of power would ensure a better control of the legislature 
also avoiding the risk of open conflict between the legislature 
and the executive. Always in Russia, the presence of a strong 
pro-government party has been interpreted as the establishment 
of a sui generis Westminster model (Chaisty, 2008)77. In this 
system, the party, controlled by a solid party-based majority, 
dominates the Parliament and smoothly implements the political 
agenda of the executive. This situation is easily reversible, as the 
party is tightly controlled by the executive, and this ‚partisan-
                                                 
77 The main, and obvious, difference with the authentic Westminster model is that the 
party of power is actually devoid of political authority and programmatic energy: this 
comes to it from the outside, from the President and the ruling elites from which the 
party is dependent. 
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parliamentary‛ phase can be easily ended by the President, who 
can take back in his hands the law-making activity and 
inaugurate a ‚presidential‛ phase (Chaisty, 2008). Interestingly 
enough, Chaisty points out that the president resorts to his 
decree power only in situations of serious crisis. 
Indeed it seems that the use of unilateral tools such as the decree 
power is more frequent when the level conflict within a political 
system is high. 
Moving from studies on the models of delegative democracy in 
Latin America to analyze the cases of Russia and Argentina, 
Willerton and his co-authors found that the choice of governing 
by decree is influenced not only by institutional and socio-
economic factors, but also, and most importantly, by the level of 
conflict within the political system: governing by decree is a 
reliable unilateral means by which presidents can attempt to 
influence events and consolidate their power (Willerton et al, 
2007). 
The example of Kazakhstan confirms that ruling by decree is an 
effective but also dangerous tool. In the short term it has proved 
to be an effective way to solve conflicts, allowing bypassing an 
unruly legislature. But it is also very risky. It is dangerous for the 
leader to get to the rupture point of open conflict: the 
confrontation among institutions can possibly transfer to the 
square, generating greater instability, and this could be further 
kindled by a repressive reaction by the regime. 
As mentioned, moments of tension followed indeed the decision 
of Nazarbayev to declare the state of emergency and rule by 
decree: and although the media and oppositions were quickly 
silenced, the possible costs of another similar crisis constituted a 
powerful incentive for implementing a party of power. 
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Indeed, the successful establishment of Otan and later of Nur 
Otan made sure that the Parliament transformed into a rubber 
stamp for the Presidential legislative initiatives: Otan, the 
Agrarian Party, the Civic Party and Asar took progressively 
control of the Mazhilis (see Appendix Three). As a consequence, 
the President was not forced anymore to use his own legislative 
power78. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Number of Presidential Decrees per Year 1992 – 2011 
                                                 
78 In 1995 Nazarbayev had extensive decree powers, which had been accorded to him by 
the Kazakh SSR Parliament in order to solve another parliamentary crisis, in 1991 (Brill 
Olcott, 2010). According to the 1995 Constitution, the President of Kazakhstan ‚on the 
basis of and with the exercise of the Constitution and the laws, shall issue decrees and 
resolutions which are binding on the entire territory of the Republic‛ (Article 45). The 
entire text of the Constitution can be found at: 
http://www.eicee.org/e_doc_kasachstan.html 
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The graphic (Figure 1) presents the number of Presidential 
decrees issued every year since 199279. 
President Nazarbayev had released a large number of ukases 
between 1994 and 1997, with a peak in 1995, coinciding with the 
aforementioned parliamentary crisis and nine-month period of 
rule-by-decree. The number of decrees started to lower after the 
December 1995 elections, when pro-regime forces acquired a 
slightly steadier majority in the Parliament. However, it was 
only after 1999 that the President started to rely less on his own 
law-making powers. As mentioned previously, in 1999 the pro-
presidential coalition which later merged to form Nur Otan 
formed a solid majority the Mazhilis. Despite a little fluctuation, 
the number of decrees remained low for the following years. 
The establishment of a stronger party of power had, thus, the 
effect of imposing a more effective control on the Parliament and 
of decreasing the level of institutional instability. In this respect, 
the decision to establish a party of power can be interpreted as a 
step towards the establishment of a ‚soft authoritarian‛ regime, 
relying less on repression and more on subtle strategies of 
manipulation. 
As seen before for the party, the reasons for preferring this kind 
of regime to a ‚hard‛ personalist one reside mainly in the high 
costs of repression, not only in terms of material costs of the 
coercive apparatus but also in terms of international isolation 
and risks of instability connected to succession crises. 
 
                                                 
79 The website of the President of Kazakhstan presents a list of the most important ukases. 
A comprehensive list can be found at 
http://niiep.keu.kz/regulatory_framework/laws_and_decrees_of_the_president_of_kazak
hstan/ 
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5.1.2 Elite splits and the super-party 
The Kazakhstani authorities found further incentives in the 
creation and the reinforcement of a strong pro-presidential party 
in the emergence of repeated conflicts within the elites. In the 
1990s, their energies and resources were dispersed on a number 
of pro-regime parties, including Otan, the Civil Party and the 
Agrarian Party, all representing different groups within the 
government elite 
A first event was the removal of the premier Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin in 1998: a former loyal ally of the President, 
Kazhegeldin declared his intention to compete in the 1999 
Presidential elections and created his own political platform, the 
Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan. His personal political 
ambitions were soon curtailed, as his candidature for the 
Presidential office was never registered. 
Again, the immediate response of the authorities to this new 
threat was of the ‚hard‛ type. Kazhegeldin was allegedly 
deprived of his assets, and, under the pressure of an 
investigation on his financial misdeeds, he was eventually forced 
to leave the country (Isaacs, 2011). His party managed to win one 
seat in the 1999 elections, but never managed to acquire more 
power, also due to the restrictive party and electoral legislation 
adopted in 2002 (see 4.2). 
As Isaacs rightly notes, this was the first time that a political 
party which was not sponsored by the authorities had a secure 
and independent financial backing, and this fact led the 
authorities to re-think about their party-managing strategies and 
to increase their efforts to support a larger party of power 
(Isaacs, 2011). The abovementioned reforms, aimed at creating 
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higher barriers for other parties, were probably inspired by this 
event. 
Another wave of crisis took place at the beginning of the 2000s, 
when a group of prominent young business people founded a 
new opposition movement, the Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan (Demokraticheskiy Vybor Kazakhstana, DVK). The 
movement’s official aim was to claim for a better transparency 
and establish clearer anti-corruption rules. In particular, the 
group wanted to force the President to curtail his son-in-law’s 
business activities: Rakhat Aliyev, husband to Nazarbayev’s 
daughter Dariga, was allegedly taking undue advantage of his 
position of deputy head of the Committee on National Security 
(Brill Olcott, 2010). 
The founders of DVK were mostly high-profile figures, like the 
head of Kazkommertsbank Mukhtar Ablyazov, the members of 
Parliament Bulat Abilov and Tolen Tokhtasynov, the akim of the 
Pavlodar Region Galymkan Zhakianov, the vice-premier Oraz 
Zhandosov and the former minister and businessman Mukhtar 
Ablyazov (Kuttykadam, 2010; Isaacs, 2011). 
The real aim of this group was indeed to take a more active part 
in Kazakhstani politics. As noted by the expert Kharitonova, 
these were ‚young oligarchs‛, who had missed the chances 
deriving from the 1990s’ privatization of assets, monopolized by 
the older and established Communist party elite. These young 
businessmen were eager to get their ‚piece of the pie‛, but had to 
ask for it in a public way, through the foundation of a political 
structure (interview, Kharitonova, 2011). To become a fully-
fledged opposition movement was therefore probably not in the 
e plans of the movement. Another local politician, Kuttykadam, 
notes how they were actually fighting for the favour of 
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Nazarbayev, but ‚ended up where nobody had expected to, 
including DVK itself‛ (Kuttykadam, 2010: 144). 
The DVK experience finished both for internal divisions and for 
the intervention of the central power. It became, though, a very 
serious lesson for the Kazakhstani authorities. As a result, the 
party of power was even more empowered, and ended up 
incorporating all the major pro-regime parties (interview, 
Kharitonova, 2011). 
The decision to create a unified super-party has its roots also in 
another circumstance, the emergence of Asar in 2003. This was 
yet another pro-regime party, led by Nazarbayev’s daughter 
Dariga. Despite being generally loyal, the party showed in 
several occasions its potential as an independent force. In 2004, 
candidates from Asar and Otan stood as adversaries in many 
districts, especially in the southern regions, where Asar had a 
larger power basis (interview, Zhanabayeva, 2012). 
Moreover, it seems that, relying on the father’s retirement, 
Dariga Nazarbayeva and her husband Rakhat Aliyev intended to 
use Asar as the basis for their rise to presidency. As noted by the 
former diplomat and political analyst Bakytbek Beshimov, 
‚Dariga, with her control of the media empire, considered herself as the 
rising star of Kazakhstani politics and proposed herself as a possible 
successor: in this period the media were full of articles arguing that was 
not impossible and actually desirable, even for an Asian country, to 
have a woman as a leader. In the same months, Dariga gave a few bold 
interviews, in which she openly and harshly criticized the bureaucracy‛ 
(interview, Beshimov, 2011). According to Beshimov, with this 
behaviour Aliyev and Nazarbayeva generated a struggle among 
the elites, a predatory race that only partially became known to 
the public. 
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As a result, the president decided to get back in control and to 
take active measures in order to weaken the power of 
independent political players, as well as institutional reforms 
which would consolidate the monopoly of his party80. 
The party resulting from the merger, Nur Otan, was a super-
party, an enormous political formation capable to monopolize the 
Mazhlis and the political space. The political ambitions of 
members of the elites, even belonging to the President’s closest 
circle, had now to be channelled in the super-party. Moreover, 
the destinies of the DVK, but especially of Asar, serve as a 
reminder for anyone who would like to engage in an 
independent political project. 
The very size of Nur Otan also discourages potential opponents, 
contributing to the party’s ‚invincible‛ image. This particular 
aspect will be discussed later in the chapter. 
The emergence of a party allowed the leadership to maintain an 
efficient control on the political system and to avoid the 
emergence of opponents. This contributed to characterize the 
authoritarian system of Kazakhstan as a ‚soft‛ one. This does not 
mean that repression is never used: investigations, economic 
pressures, intimidation and sometimes even violence are among 
the instruments of the regime. This use of hard coercion is 
limited, however, and control on the political sphere is mainly 
maintained through the party of power. 
 
 
  
                                                 
80 Including the adoption of Proportional Representation and the introduction of a 7% 
threshold. See Chapter 4 for details. 
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5.1.3 “Democracy promotion” and listening to “people’s 
voices” 
International recognition is one of the most common 
explanations for the presence of institutions like political parties 
in non-democratic regimes. For Kazakhstan this explanation 
assumes a particular value in the last five years, when the 
country leadership has made a remarkable effort to improve its 
international image. 
In the words of the analyst Beshimov, ‚The other reason [for 
supporting a pro-presidential party] is the imitation of western 
standards, for the purpose of complying with international obligations 
and gaining international legitimacy. In 2007 in Madrid, Nazarbayev’s 
representative [the Minister of Foreign Affair Marat Tazhin] gave a 
bald speech promising democratic reforms, with the double purpose of 
promoting democratization, although their own way, and to reach 
international goals, including the OSCE chairmanship and regional 
leadership‛. 
Indeed, a crucial moment in this process is represented by the 
2010 OSCE chairmanship. Kazakhstan had prepared carefully its 
candidature and worked very intensively for the previous five 
years, finally managing to get the support of both Western 
countries and Russia. 
The country’s candidature was accepted during the 
abovementioned OSCE foreign ministers’ meeting on 30 
November 2007 in Madrid, where the then Kazakh foreign 
minister Marat Tazhin officially stated the commitments taken 
by his country, including the adoption of a number of political 
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reforms before the actual beginning of the chairmanship year 
(Wołowska, 2010)81. 
The liberalization of the political systems was among these 
reforms, and was felt as particularly urgent by the OSCE, which 
had expressed concern especially after the 2007 parliamentary 
elections. Indeed, in that situation, the elites’ supporting 
strategies had proved to be even too effective, producing a one-
party parliament. And while this was a desirable effect at the 
domestic level, it had the disadvantage of making the monopoly 
condition very evident also in front of the demanding 
international community. 
The answer was a mild liberalization. Trying to balance the 
necessity to comply with the Madrid commitments with 
maintaining control on the political field, the legislation on 
political parties and the electoral rule were slightly softened. 
In 2008, the number of signatures required for party registration 
was reduced, as well as the number of people that have to be 
present at the founding congress (Brill Olcott, 2010: 253). Also, it 
was given more time to parties to prepare their documentations 
and it was stated that minor violations could not be used 
anymore as a reason to reject the whole application (Isaacs, 2011: 
99). 
The electoral law was also amended but, contrarily to the 
expectations, the 7% threshold was not lowered. Instead, a 
special provision was added in 2009: in the case of only one 
party overcoming the 7% limit, also the first runner-up is now 
                                                 
81 ‚Address of Ministry Marat Tajin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting,‛ OSCE, November 29, 2007, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/28529_en.pdf.html  
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allowed to enter the Mazhilis (Constitutional Law ‚On 
Elections‛ Art, 97.1.2). 
These reforms also served the purpose of giving a better image 
of Nur Otan and of the authorities at the domestic level. 
In fact, while the level of popularity of the regime remained high 
over time, local manifestations of dissent increased in the latest 
years, especially in the Western regions of the country. 
Also, there were fears of instability propagating from 
neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, where repeated protests had brought 
down the regime of Kurmanbek Bakiyev. 
The fear of contagion coming from ‚colour revolutions‛ was 
perceived as a serious threat from the authorities, and followed 
by a number of restrictive measures (especially relatively to 
youth organizations, see 5.2.5). At the same time, the elites 
worked on improving the popularity of the regime. 
Again, they did so by re-tuning the party-supporting strategies. 
Although the fundamental situation of control was not 
endangered, the electoral and party legislation were emended to 
achieve a partial liberalization; also, a series of initiatives were 
put in place in order to give the party a better image. 
First of all, the cooperation between Nur Otan and other political 
parties was enhanced. Representatives from all the political 
formations, apart from the radical opposition, are frequently 
gathered by Nur Otan. In these initiatives, the party of power 
appears in the position of ‚promoter of democracy‛. Actually, 
one of the goals of Nur Otan is to promote other parties, given 
their little experience and professionalism (interview, 
Rakymzhanov, 2011). 
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Another very important initiative, which was designed to bring 
the party closer to people without really losing control, was the 
project ‚Khalyktyn dauycy - Golos Naroda‛ (people’s voice). 
 
The project had a precedent, the initiative ‚Otandastar‛ (the 
listening Otan), but was never carried out on such a scale. In 
October 2011, especially designed boxes were placed in relevant 
landmarks of the most important cities of Kazakhstan in order to 
gather complaint and suggestions from the citizenship. In the 
capital city, Astana, more than 55.000 people ‚had the chance to 
express themselves and being listened to‛ (interview, 
Rakymzhanov, 2011). The merely symbolic nature of the events 
is clear when one looks at what was made public relatively to the 
content of messages: there was no real advice, criticism or 
complaints but just generic praise and support for the regime82. 
A last instrument in getting close to people and especially to 
youth, a category which could be potentially more tempted to 
engage in anti-regime protests, is the party youth branch, Zhas 
Otan. Of this it will be said more in the next section. 
                                                 
82 They regarded mostly the lack of patriotic education for young people, the love for the 
Fatherland, the respect for elderly people, peace and harmony; many expressed support 
for the program of the presidential party, aiming at reaching life improvement for each 
Kazakhstani citizen. It was noticed, that people should show a more proactive attitude, 
and participate in all the initiatives organized by the party ‚Nur Otan‛. There were many 
congratulations and wishes related to the twentieth anniversary of the KZ independence. 
The international recognition and the entry of Kazakhstan in the world elites are, for the 
Astana people, ‚first of all connected with the personality, recognized as of world profile, 
of the President of the Republic, Leader of the Party ‚Nur Otan‛, ‚Nursultan Abishevich 
Nazarbayev‛. See a speech on this topic by the Nur Otan Official Amyrkhan 
Rakymzhanov, held in Astana in November 2011 http://www.astana.kz/ru/node/46033. 
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5.2. Nur Otan’s authoritarian functions 
 
5.2.1. Political parties and regime stability 
It was argued before that the party of power serves the elites by 
maintaining control on the political system in a ‚soft‛ and cost-
effective way. 
But which are the mechanisms by which the party manages to 
perform this function, so important for the regime’s stability?  
The literature on ‚authoritarian institutions‛ has advanced 
different hypotheses about the mechanisms by which 
institutions, including political parties, help maintaining 
authoritarian stability. They are said to enhance communication 
(Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; 
Hermet, 1978), allow the co-optation of potential challengers 
(Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Koehler, 2008), intimidate the 
opposition (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Geddes, 2003); 
contribute to the legitimation of authoritarian rule (Brooker, 
2000; Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004; Hermet, 1978). 
The possible mechanisms can be grouped in two categories: the 
party could ensure that other elite members do not defect, and 
stay loyal to the regime (elite coordination); moreover, the party 
could organize and mobilize popular consensus for the regime 
(mass mobilization). 
 
(i) Elite Coordination 
The starting point of these hypotheses is the willingness of the 
authoritarian leader (the ‚dictator‛) to stay in power (Tullock 
1987; Wintrobe 1998). The dictator has first of all the choice of 
relying on repression or trying to co-opt elite groups by 
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bestowing resources on them. In fact, elites play a pivotal role, as 
they can decide either to support the regime in place or to defect 
and support a potential opponent.  
Elites can be co-opted through the promise of office or other 
spoils, or of policy concessions within the legislature (Gandhi & 
Przeworski, 2006). While the role of legislature in authoritarian 
context is quite debated and has been shown to be of scarce 
relevance in several empirical studies (Lust-Okar, 2005, 2006; 
Blaydes, 2011), establishing a dominant party is seen as an 
effective way for the dictator to make ‚credible inter-temporal 
power-sharing deals with elite opponents‛ (Magaloni & Kricheli, 
2010: 127). In particular, Magaloni (2008) notes that the sheer 
promise of spoils, office or policy concessions does not ensure 
stability in the long term because it creates a perverse system of 
incentives. The dictator is not motivated to remain faithful to his 
promises and not to abuse his ‚loyal friends‛ (Magaloni, 2008: 
715); also, seen the lack of credibility in the dictator’s 
commitment to them, the elites have quite a motivation to defect 
and trying to seize power autonomously, as soon as they have 
sufficient resources. Making his commitment visible, establishing 
a political party is a way for the dictator to make his power-
sharing deals with elites more credible and, therefore, to correct 
this situation (Magaloni, 2006, 2008). 
In these circumstances, the position and relative strength of elite 
groups is crucial: they should be strong enough to have some 
resources and to have a potential for defection, but still be in a 
relatively weaker position, compared to the ruler (Magaloni, 
2008). The ability from both sides to ‚punish the other party if it 
decides to deviate from the joint-government arrangement‛ 
seems in fact particularly relevant in making this kind of 
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bargaining possible and effective (Boix & Svolik, 2008: 2 in 
Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010: 127). 
Also, the party of power lengthens time horizons for the dictator 
and elites alike by acting as a ‚monopolist of jobs‛ (Magaloni, 
2007: 19). To elites, the party appears as a highway for career 
advancements, lowering their incentives to defect both because 
the dictator’s long-term commitment looks more credible, and 
because the party creates a sort of gradualism and 
progressiveness in the access to spoils, office and policy deals 
over time. This is possible only in a situation where the party has 
the total control of important jobs and privileges. 
 
(ii) Mobilizing mass support 
Mass consensus is as crucial as elite support for the dictator to 
survive without recurring to routine repression. The literature 
has indicated several ways a dominant party can serve this 
purpose. The party machine can be first of all used as a 
patronage system, distributing rents to loyal supporters and 
enacting a ‚punishment regime‛, leaving those who defect 
without privileges (Magaloni, 2006). An example of this were the 
Communist systems, which had on the one hand a total control 
of resources and positions and, on the other, an efficient 
espionage system which allowed to have information about 
individual loyalty (Magaloni, 2008; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). 
Even in situations where this total control is not possible, 
consensus is crucial to regime stability, and the party can 
function as mobilizing force. In fact, consensus can be an 
informative signal of regime’s stability: to know that the regime 
is widely supported assures citizens of the reliability of promises 
of rents and deters other elite groups from trying to organize 
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against the dictators (Kricheli, 2008 in Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; 
Magaloni, 2008; Hermet, 1978). This explains why one-party 
regimes invest so much in over-winning elections, generating a 
large turnout and creating an image of invincibility (Geddes, 
2006, 2008). 
Another way to generate consensus is by promoting economic 
growth and having the party promoting redistribution policies. 
The connection between economic growth and the presence of an 
‚enlightened dictator‛ has actually shown to be effective in 
maintaining autocratic stability, though so far it has not been 
clarified whether this works better in one-party regimes 
(Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). 
Finally, the activity itself of mass mobilization can serve for 
sustaining the regime. It does so by allowing the creation of a 
system of rewards for loyal party cadres who invest effort, 
resources and organizational skill in the process of mobilizing 
people for elections (Lazarev, 2005; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). 
 
 
5.2.2 Nur Otan’s functions: coordinating and managing elites 
Establishing a dominant party has been seen as an effective way 
for the dictator to make ‚credible inter-temporal power-sharing 
deals with elite opponents‛ (Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010: 127). 
Making his commitment visible, establishing a political party is a 
way for the dictator to make his power-sharing deals with elites 
more credible and, therefore, to correct this situation (Magaloni, 
2006, 2008). 
A fundamental assumption of this theory is the position of 
relative strength of potentially competitive elite groups: they 
should be strong enough to have some resources and to have a 
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potential for defection, but still be in a relatively weaker position, 
compared to the ruler (Magaloni, 2008). The ability from both 
sides to ‚punish the other party if it decides to deviate from the 
joint-government arrangement‛ seems in fact particularly 
relevant in making this kind of bargaining possible and effective 
(Boix & Svolik, 2008: 2 in Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010: 127). 
This assumption makes the application of this model 
problematic for Kazakhstan, where the power structure has a 
different balance. In this case, the relation between the centre 
and other elite groupings is heavily skewed in favour of the 
former. Moreover, this relationship is not likely to be mediated 
through the party. The party exists, and appears as a dominant 
actor in the electoral arena as well as in the legislature. But, as we 
have seen before, its power is limited when it comes to key 
decisions. The real power relations are to be looked elsewhere, in 
the informal sphere (family, clan, client-network relations 
between these centres). 
The party of power and the party system as a whole still have an 
important regime-supporting function. We can call it, rather than 
of ‚elite coordination‛, a function of ‚elite management‛. The 
party landscape in Kazakhstan is currently characterized by the 
presence of several parties which are formally independent but 
actually support the President and his program, while they 
manage to advance the agenda of their leader. They are all more 
or less connected to the power elites: real opposition is instead 
marginalized and in some cases relegated to extra-institutional 
forms of opposition (interviews, Kosanov 2011 and Satpayev 
2011; see also Isaacs 2011). 
 
 
  
 
Party of Power Pro-Regime / “Loyal Opposition” Parties Opposition Parties 
 
Nur Otan* 
 
Ak Zhol* 
 
People’s Communist Party of Kazakhstan* 
 
Social Democratic Party ‚Auyl‛  
 
Party of Patriots 
 
The Green Party ‚Rukhaniyat‛ 
 
Democratic Party ‚Adilet‛ 
 
 
OSDP-Azat 
 
Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan 
 
 
‚Alga‛ (not registered) 
 
Table 5.2 Party Landscape in Kazakhstan (Sources: interview, Kosanov 2011; Isaacs 2011) *are currently Parliamentary 
Parties 
  
In the 1990s and early 2000s there were even more of these 
parties, formed by elite members to represent and protect their 
interests83. For the asymmetric nature of the power structure, 
though, they did not (and do not) represent a threat for the 
ruling elite or for the party of power. Actually, whenever a 
potentially dangerous actor entered the political scene, it was 
eliminated, often by changing the rules of the game, as it was 
seen in chapters 3 and 4. 
A certain degree of competition, though, is tolerated, and 
actually encouraged. As Satpayev notes, this gives an impression 
of openness and, at the same time, by competing with each other, 
different pressure groups, represented by parties, balance each 
other and prevent each other from becoming excessively 
powerful. Instead of having one, dangerous, rival, the President 
has to deal with a large group of ambitious players, who 
compete with each other. The President acts as an arbiter 
between them: now he offers assistance to one, now to another, 
but he remains above the political competition (interview, 
Satpayev 2011). 
Interestingly enough, the elite groups who engage in party 
competition fight for the favour of the President, knowing that he 
is the only source of real power in the country. 
The impression is actually that the President periodically 
encourages these competitions, in order to keep the system in a 
condition of equilibrium, with forces balancing each other. The 
rise of Asar and the political involvement of Dariga Nazarbayeva 
in 2002-2003, for instance, were in part caused by the repeated 
declarations of the President about his upcoming retirement, 
                                                 
 83 Drawing on the literature on post Soviet parties, Isaacs calls these parties ‚elite 
parties‛ (Isaacs, 2011). 
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which gave the impression that there would be an opening for 
succession (interview, Beshimov, 2011). 
The party system works, thus, as an arena, where political parties 
affiliated to various elite groupings fight with each other as sorts 
of avatars. Just like Nur Otan, which is only the reflection of the 
centre of political power in the electoral and legislative field, 
other parties reflect the influence and strength of other segments 
of the elite. And this is done not only to the benefit of 
international observers, or of the domestic electorate: by 
competing in the party arena, the elite groupings have a chance 
to try their chances in a controlled way, without openly 
challenging the leader. Actually, in this way they manage to get 
closer to the leader and to the system of privileges that is 
associated with the highest circle. 
This is true even for some of the political formations that later 
have been labelled as ‚opposition‛, like the DVK movement: the 
goal of its leaders, powerful businessmen in their respective 
sectors, was apparently to ‚make some noise and get back to 
their positions more powerful‛. For their admission, they ‚ended 
up where nobody would have expected to‛ (Kuttykadam, 2010: 
144). 
This strategy of allowing a certain degree of competition while 
steering it in the desired direction reminds what has been called 
‚managed pluralism‛ referring to the control of the political 
system established by Putin in the early 2000s (Balzer, 2003). 
While, comparatively, the Kazakhstani system is more of a 
closed one, Nazarbayev, like Putin, allows a certain degree of 
openness and competition while focusing all the restraining 
efforts on the most strategic sectors and making sure that these 
expressions of pluralism do not get too independent. 
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It is a suitable strategy for a regime developing in the ‚soft 
authoritarian‛ direction, because it allows maintaining the 
effective control of the system while gaining on the side of 
international image as well as of internal legitimacy. 
 
5.2.3 Career perspectives 
Another interesting function assigned by theory to authoritarian 
parties is the one of ‚monopolist of jobs‛ (Magaloni, 2007: 19). To 
elites, the party would appear as a highway for career 
advancements, lowering their incentives to defect both because 
the dictator’s long-term commitment looks more credible, and 
because the party creates a sort of gradualism and 
progressiveness in the access to spoils, office and policy deals 
over time. This is possible only in a situation where the party has 
the total control of important jobs and privileges. 
An example of this function, particularly relevant for Kazakhstan 
because of the long period spent under Soviet rule, is the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That party worked as a 
‚social elevator‛ for its members, allowing for high social 
mobility. To be a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union was a reason for pride and prestige, and in the majority of 
the cases, the result of a deliberate decision, sometimes cynical 
and tormented, taken in order to increase one’s chances in 
making a career and achieving a better life standard (Glazov, 
1988). 
As far as Nur Otan is concerned, the lack of central data on 
membership makes the task of investigating this aspect 
particularly difficult. However, the impression received from 
fieldwork is somewhat different from what posed by theory or 
by the example of the CPSU. Party membership seems indeed 
necessary to maintain one’s position in jobs paid out of the 
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State’s budget. According to data relative to the Almaty city 
branch, about 30% of the party members work in the public 
service, and constitutes the bulk of Nur Otan membership. Also, 
there are party cells in the main public services, like hospitals 
and schools, who are in charge of ‚coordinating the party 
activities within these institutions‛ (interview, Almaty Nur Otan 
Statistics Department, 2011). Indeed, these party coordinators 
work as controllers and, as it will be seen later on, as mobilizing 
forces in times of elections. 
At the same time, party membership, at least in these cases, often 
comes with the job itself: membership is therefore is not a 
distinguishing factor among employees, and is likely to be 
irrelevant in one’s career advancements (interviews: 
Kharitonova, 2011; Satpayev, 2011; Sarym, 2011). 
The recruitment of young people seems to follow different 
routes, namely personal connections within the elite or a career 
within government institutions, at the centre or the local level. In 
the words of local experts: 
‚Many young people indeed think that membership in NO would 
‚open doors‛ and facilitate their careers. Actually, it is not the reality. 
Without some form of support, relatives in political elites, it is not 
possible for a young person to make a career. […] It is very difficult to 
use the party as a trampoline to start one’s career‛ (interview, 
Satpayev 2011). 
‚The party as a social elevator? There is not such a thing. Indeed there 
are is a big number of talented youths around Nur Otan. On the other 
hand, I do not think that the party as it is, works as social elevator. At 
least I did not see in any case that somebody came to Nur Otan at age 
18 and then, at 35 he was a Minister. I do not remember any case like 
this. I think that here it is more important the role of bureaucratic 
officers, to enter the team of this or that akim, governor or minister. 
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This is a common way to make a career, and actually the only social 
elevators. Others do not work‛ (interview, Sarym 2011). 
This perspective is actually coherent with what said before about 
the subordinate position of Nur Otan with respect to the ruling 
elites. The party does not have sufficient control on strategic 
positions and entrance mechanisms in the civil service to be a 
‚monopolist of jobs‛. These mechanisms, instead, are firmly in 
the hands of the power elites who founded the party, too. 
On the other hand, to be a member of the party is often 
perceived as beneficial for one’s career: many people consider 
being part of a ‚party of bureaucrats‛ an advantage and a 
possibility for a fast career (Isaacs, 2011: 107, quotes from 
interview). This is especially true for young Zhas Otan members 
who hope that being in the party youth branch is ‚the first step‛ 
of a brilliant career involving ‚going to Astana‛ (interview, 
Khalbekov, 2011). This perception could constitute a function of 
the party, as it is in itself consensus-generating. Possibly, it helps 
the regime by attracting young and ambitious people into the 
camp of pro-regime forces with the promise of brilliant 
perspectives, rather than leaving them joining the opposition. 
The regime is currently trying to enhance this perception. The 
creation of channels for the recruiting of young people – 
including the Youth Reserve of Cadres and Zhas Otan itself – can 
be seen as an effort to attract talented young people into the pro-
regime camp, besides being a way to increase the country’s 
social capital. This trend has been developed over the years (see 
also 5.2.5), one of the earliest initiatives in this sense being the 
study-abroad program Bolashak (Future). The program is 
officially open to everyone, although it received some criticism 
because it requires the grantees’ families to provide a financial 
guarantee in case the young person does not come back to 
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Kazakhstan after their study period84. The interesting aspect here 
is that Bolashak alumni have to spend a period working for the 
government administrations: while this contributes to the 
increase of competence of the administration, it also helps 
maintaining talented young people under the close eye of the 
centre, far from the temptation of joining the opposition. 
Recently, the president has confirmed that youth social mobility 
is a theme of particular relevance for the President and, 
consequently, for Nur Otan. In a recent speech, Nazarbayev has 
stated that the instauration of ‚social elevator‛ for young people 
constitutes a high priority for the country (Nazarbayev, 2012). 
At a higher level, party membership has more a quality of 
‚loyalty card‛. Membership is requested to high-rank officials 
only to show their loyalty to the centre. In a local political 
analyst’s words, ‚A lot of akims and high-rank officials are members 
of Nur Otan, but this is only because they are part of president’s 
Nazarbayev’s team. If you are a member of the team, you should be a 
member of the party‛ (interview, Satpaev 2011)85. 
It is not uncommon that a Ministry joins the party soon after he 
has been appointed (interview, Nurmakov 2011). Also, in one 
occasion a number of members of the cabinet joined en masse. 
This coincided with the President’s announcement that he would 
become party chairman (see 4.1.3) and helps to consolidate his 
rule by organizing mass mobilization for the regime. 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 This would mean that poor families would not have access to the program. 
85 This is true only since 2007, when people who hold state positions have been allowed to 
be party members. See Isaacs, 2011. Officers of the army and of the police forces are not 
allowed to join political parties, as well as judges. 
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5.2.4 Electoral mobilization and internal loyalty 
Nur Otan and its youth branch Zhas Otan are primary actors in 
electoral campaigning. This is done chiefly through the capillary 
diffusion of the party’s branches on the territory, even in the 
most remote villages, and the party presence in institutions like 
schools and hospitals. Electoral campaigns are organized 
efficiently, also thanks to the impressive amount of 
administrative resources devoted to it. The party also enjoys, as 
mentioned before, a privileged access to the main mass media, 
especially television channels. 
The main party’s activity seems to collect on the President’s 
immense popular support. Electoral campaigns mostly revolve 
in fact around the figure of the President and his achievements 
during his 20-year rule. The party defines itself as ‚The 
President’s party‛ and its main programmatic position is the one 
to ‚implement the plans and projects of the President to the 
advantage of the whole Kazakhstani people‛86. 
It should be added that extensive campaigning is accompanied 
by occasional irregularities, such as multiple voting and ballot 
stuffing, regularly reported by the international organizations in 
charge of electoral monitoring. Irregularities are more common 
in rural districts, where the presence of opposition activists is 
lower. 
Efforts are repaid by impressive vote shares and turnout values, 
which in some cases look unrealistic, especially for the last two 
electoral cycles87. 
  
                                                 
86 The expression ‚party of the majority‛ (partiya bolshinstva) is found in the party 
programme, page 24. http://www.ndp-nurotan.kz/new/documents/Program.pdf. 
87 There is only anecdotic knowledge about raions (local administrations) where Nur Otan 
has received more than 100% of votes. 
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Provinces 1999 2004 2007 2012 
Akmola 38,14 58,68 81,34 77 
Aktobe 36 63,06 90,48 83,61 
Almaty city 26,21 41,1 62,8 69,71 
Almaty 
Province 
40,39 64,44 93,62 84,02 
Astana city 35,08 53,25 82 80,1 
Atyrau 26,05 71,1 94,4 84,72 
East 
Kazakhstan 
23,41 59,37 84,57 80,69 
Karagandy 27,22 60,03 94,69 85,63 
Kostanay 17,89 58,86 91,87 83,1 
Kyzylorda 24,32 34,49 86,41 78,74 
Mangystau 31,21 47,14 96,9 79,51 
North 
Kazakhstan 
15,68 81,22 91 82,7 
Pavlodar 21,61 58,01 82,61 79,92 
South 
Kazakhstan 
46,92 65,68 88,09 80,1 
West 
Kazakhstan 
29,65 57,65 82 82,66 
Zhambyl 36,49 68,16 87,06 79,2 
 
Table 5.3 Nur Otan’s vote shares (%) in Parliamentary elections, by province, 
1999-2012  
 
 
 1999 2004 2007 2012 
Turnout 62,56 56,7 64,56 75,45 
 
Table 5.4 Voter turnout (%) for Parliamentary Elections, nation-based, 1999-
201288 
                                                 
88 Sources: Central Electoral Commission website, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, (official 
government bulletin), IDEA, http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=KZ 
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A reason for this overdoing could be a preoccupation for giving 
an ‚image of invincibility‛, which would deter the opposition 
from even thinking to compete with the party of power. This 
pattern is pretty common in authoritarian context. Considering 
the case of the Mexican PRI, Magaloni (2006: 8) has shown that 
‚a public image of invincibility‛ helped maintaining stability by 
discouraging defections from within the ruling party, as well as 
limiting the hopes of the opposition. High turnout, as well as 
crushing voting margins are part of this strategy, which include 
also ritualistic ceremonies and a large use of symbols (Magaloni, 
2006, 2008). 
Another reason for election ‚over-management‛ is more 
complex and related to a possible use of the party as tool for 
evaluating the loyalty to the regime of low and middle-level 
officials, in particular of regional governors (oblastnye akimy). A 
sort of competition between the akims seems to be in place 
(interviews, Kharitonova, 2011, Sarym, 2011). Every governor 
puts an extraordinary effort in delivering a better 
implementation of the ‚electoral plan‛ requested by the centre, 
investing huge amounts of administrative resources and pre-
empting employees to vote for the ‚right‛ party. Akims are 
directly appointed by the President and are deeply aware of their 
actions being constantly observed. Moreover, it seems common 
for competing functionaries to collect information on akims’ 
mistakes (including poor electoral performance) and to use this 
information to report them to the centre and try to take their 
place (interview, Satpayev, 2011)89. Therefore, electoral results 
could be one of the criteria used by the leader in order to 
evaluate the performance and the loyalty of local administrators. 
                                                 
89 I am actually working on a more detailed study on these dynamics, together with a 
colleague from New York University. 
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5.2.5 Youth mobilization 
Zhas Otan performs a very important role in the control and 
mobilization of youth also in non-electoral periods. Its local 
branches organize meetings, conferences and travel to other 
cities, and these initiatives involve a growing number of 
university students and young workers. 
The practice is not a new one: for instance, Soviet leaders 
constructed a full system of children and youth organizations 
(from Pioneers to Komsomol), making sure that the next 
generation grew under the eye of the party, and educated 
according to the state ideology, Communism. 
But what is the role of a youth organization in a soft 
authoritarian regime like the one in Kazakhstan? In this case 
there is no such thing as a defined state ideology, and, differently 
from the Soviet Union, there is an array of national and 
international non-governmental organizations which are, at least 
in theory, allowed to work freely. 
Graeme Robertson (2007), who defined such organizations as 
‚ersatz social movements‛, found that the role of these 
organizations in hybrid regimes is to contribute achieving elite 
coordination (Robertson, 2007: 190). Mass protests are 
particularly dangerous for regimes where the stability relies on a 
frail alliance between key elite players. In that context, ‚even 
small signs of weakness‛, like allowing street protests, can cause 
the defection of allies. Therefore, the regime is forced either to 
use the hard hand on even small protests (‚coercion‛), or to try 
and ‚channel‛ internal protest energies in regime-approved or 
regime-based organizations. The full control of the square gives 
the regime an ‚air of invincibility‛, and reinforces the trust of 
allies (Robertson, 2007: 169-171). 
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We have seen before that in Kazakhstan the elite coordination 
mechanism is slightly different from the one illustrated here. In 
Kazakhstan the system of loyalties is mostly centred on the 
figure of the leader, who maintains individual relations with 
most members of the elite. 
Also the elite splits examined before (5.1) did not originate from 
street protests, but in the few occasions the president 
Nazarbayev expressed the will to retire, or showed signs of 
personal weakness. Moreover, at least in regard of movements 
which originated within the ruling elite, it was never real 
defections, but rather battles to obtain the favour of the leader.  
Still, the regime largely invests in the control and mobilization of 
youth, through Zhas Otan and other organizations. 
One reason for this could be the fear of propagation of instability 
as a result of ‚colour revolutions‛. The latter is the common 
denomination of a wave of popular protests taking place in 
Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan 
(2005) and resulting in regime change. 
In all these cases, youth organizations had a primary role in the 
protests, allegedly with the support of international NGOs. In 
the Post-Soviet region, in fact, ‚colour revolutions‛ were 
interpreted as events driven by external powers, particularly the 
United States, a version promoted by Russia in disagreement 
with most Western analysts’ understandings (Jackson, 2010)90. 
Almost paradoxically, these events were instead the trigger of a 
reinforcement of autocracy in the region, mostly led by Russia 
(Finkel & Brudny, 2012; Finkel & Brudny, 2012b), and gave 
                                                 
90 Jackson mentions a number of these reports, for instance: Karatnycky, A. (2005). 
Ukraine’s orange revolution. Foreign Affairs 84 (2): 35–52. Hale, H. (2006). Democracy or 
autocracy on the march? The coloured revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal 
presidentialism. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39 (3): 305–329. 
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origin to a process that has been defined of ‚regional 
authoritarian learning‛ (Jackson, 2010). 
One of the lessons learnt from these events by Russian and 
Central Asian leaders alike, was that state weakness was one of 
the reasons for the success of protests, and that a ‚tough stance 
against protestors *<+ was the remedy‛ (Jackson, 2010: 107). 
As a result, the regimes studied the techniques of mobilization 
allegedly used by western democracy promoters during ‚colour 
revolutions‛ and attempted to find mirroring counter-measures 
to them, by developing a ‚toolkit‛ of measures (Finkel & 
Brudny, 2012). These measures included restrictive policies 
towards foreign NGOs, often advised by Russia (Tolstrup, 2007); 
tighter controls on the electoral process, including limitations in 
media access and the adoption of restrictive electoral legislation; 
the establishment of an alternative system of electoral 
monitoring, which contributed to delegitimize Western criticism 
of electoral standards and to spread a different, local, 
understanding of democracy (Fawn, 2006). 
The control of existing youth organizations, as well as the 
establishment of a regime-supported one, can be seen as part of 
this strategy to avoid contagion. 
First of all, the legislation regulating civil society organizations 
was tightened. Although the adoption of a very restrictive law 
on NGO-control law was avoided when the United States 
registered strong objections (Kramer, 2008), the pressure on 
NGOs became stronger. The law on Extremism, adopted in 2005, 
limits de facto the freedom of association. Also, the 2005 
amendments to the law on Elections introduced restrictions to 
the activity of international NGOs, accused of interfering in post-
electoral protests finalized at changing elections results. 
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Also, especially designed organizations were potentiated or set 
up in order to achieve a better control of youth-  
The Youth Congress of Kazakhstan was founded in 2002 and 
became even more active after 2004. This is an umbrella 
organization, which gathers almost all the youth NGOs in the 
country91, and provides them with generous opportunities for 
funding, usually in exchange for not engaging in criticism 
towards the regime (interview, Mednikova, 2011). 
Another organization is the Student Alliance, created in 2005. 
This gathered all the, previously independent, student self-
government bodies in universities and colleges. According to the 
youth activist and journalist Mednikova, through the Alliance, 
the regime has taken the full student body under control: the 
organization controls the Committees for Youth Policy present in 
every university: often, the head of this body is in close contact 
with Nur Otan. This makes sure there is no ‚dissent‛ in the 
universities (interview, Mednikova, 2011)92. 
Zhas Otan has obviously a primary role in this aspect, too. 
Founded in 2008, the youth branch of the party of power has 
been extremely active in recruiting young people and organizing 
regime-approved initiatives. 
Formal rules and the distribution of resources are again among 
the authorities’ preferred leverages to control the sector. 
Similarly to what happens with political parties and mass media, 
the NGOs which are in the pro-regime camp and show their 
                                                 
91 Apparently, only ten youth non-governmental organizations have refused to enter the 
Congress (interview, Mednikova, 2011). The organization’s website is 
http://www.zhastar.kz 
92 The interviewee used the Russian expression inakomyslie, which literally means ‚think 
differently‛: this was a very common expression during Soviet times in order to indicate 
political dissent. Indeed she compared the current situation to what was happening in the 
country in Soviet times. 
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loyalty to the regime receive a better treatment than independent 
civil society organizations: they encounter fewer problems with 
registration, and have privileged access to state funding. 
The funding system works mostly through the Social 
Procurement Program, regulated by a 2005 Law. With this 
system, the government can hire NGOs to provide social 
services. The scarce transparency of the rules allows a great deal 
of discretion from the authorities’ side on the nature and 
orientation of the financed activities. 
The implementation of this program coincided with the 
departure from Kazakhstan of a number of international donors 
(interview, Mednikova, 2011). Actually, some analysts reckon 
that the government’s intention in permitting contracts for 
NGOs was to reduce the sector’s reliance on foreign donors. 
In any case, after 2006 a great number of organizations were left 
without funding and had little choice but trying to get these 
funds. Interestingly enough, this changed also the nature of the 
activities organized, the first initiatives to disappear being 
project about citizen education (interview, Mednikova, 2011). 
This is also the result of a precise strategy: not only 
‚undesirable‛ organizations are crowded out from the civil 
society scene, but also ‚unacceptable‛ projects and ideas, 
meaning everything that diverts young people’s energy away 
from politics. 
The array of activities of the Youth Congress is a bright example 
of this tendency: cultural activities (the ‚Delphic Committee‛), 
reforestation projects (‚Zhasyl El‛, which actually sees young 
people planting trees), charity and family support (‚Zhas Otau‛) 
and healthcare promotion (‚Future without Drugs‛). 
 144 
Zhas Otan is not different in this respect: despite being part of a 
political party, its activities are mostly non-political: charity 
projects, debates, activities finalized at the promotion of patriotic 
feelings (like the construction of ‚The largest flag of 
Kazakhstan‛). 
There is an important exception, and it is related with the 
necessity, for these ersatz movements, to be attractive for young 
people and to give them an incentive for participation 
(Robertson, 2007). 
In Kazakhstan, the most appealing feature of these organizations 
is their connection with the government structure. Thanks to 
their privileged position, they offer young people the possibility 
of getting skills and competences useful on the job market or 
even direct access to civil service. 
The Youth Congress, for instance, sponsors a ‚School of 
Government Service‛. The school is organized with the support 
of the State agency for the Civil Service and offers, apart from 
courses, internships in government agencies. The possibility of 
being hired after the internship is stated explicitly in the project 
description: ‚Those completing an internship at the School of 
Government Service will be given priority when they apply for jobs in 
state institutions, as they already possess sector-specific skills‛93. 
The same is true also for Zhas Otan. Many young people enter 
the organization mostly because they wish to pursue a career in 
the civil service. 
Even more than the Youth Congress, Zhas Otan can boast a 
direct link with the government structures. Through the 
program ‚Maladyozhnyi Kadrovyi rezerv‛ (Reserve of Young 
                                                 
93http://www.zhastar.kz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35&Itemid=40
&lang=en 
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Cadres), Zhas Otan selects talented young people for internships 
in various organizations94. 
This feature is very attractive for young people, as it is working 
in Zhas Otan in itself. Being part of the organizations is 
perceived as a way to start a bright career. In the words of the 
deputy director of the Almaty Zhas Otan branch: ‚It is useful. I 
am a political scientist and came here to get some experience, work with 
youth, with people. And then, it will not be difficult for me to work in 
the civil service or in some apparat. I think I have gathered relevant 
experience. I worked three years with Nur Otan in the raion office, and 
learned a lot. For young people this is very good, it is a position that 
gives good perspectives. *<+ Before me, here many guys worked, and 
now one works in the Central Apparatus, another studies at the 
President’s Academy, others work in good company, another is a 
journalists‛. 
Another Zhas Otan activist pointed out, ‚We receive many skills, 
we learn how to draft various reports *<+, we learn the art of 
personnel management. We also have the chance to meet various 
people, politicians, etc. We have a chance to show our skills and then it 
is easier for us to find a job. As a result [of this activity], our CV is 
better‛ (interview, Zhas Otan activist, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
94 The program is run by Zhas Otan and the Association of Bolashak Alumni. 
http://www.rezerv.kz/ru/node/11  
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Chapter 6. 
Nur Otan as a “post-Soviet party of power”: 
looking for signs of Russian influence95 
Striking similarities exist between the Russian and the 
Kazakhstani parties of power. Both United Russia and Nur Otan 
emerged as a result of a progressive consolidation of their party 
systems in monopolist sense, and followed similar steps in their 
evolution. Both rely on a vague, all encompassing ideology, and 
define themselves as the leader’s party96. Finally, both originated 
within the executive branches of their governments, and are 
extensively supported by ruling elites, which provide them with 
administrative resources and privileged access to state media.  
An interesting hypothesis is the one that sees Russia exerting its 
influence on the Kazakhstani party system evolution as a part of 
a process of more or less intentional and direct diffusion of non-
liberal democratic values.  
As a regional power, Russia has a great influence on Central Asia 
and had increasingly shown an interest in promoting regimes 
with similar values and sometimes even in hindering 
                                                 
95 This chapter largely draws on the conference paper ‚Was the party of power exported 
from Russia to Kazakhstan? The diffusion of authoritarian institutions’ and values from 
Russia to Central Asia‛, that I presented at the Panel ‚I regimi alternativi alla democrazia: 
Cina, Russia e Iran (1)‛; XXV Convegno SISP, Palermo 8-10 September 2011. An extended 
version of the paper is currently prepared for publication in a book edited by Dr. Roberto 
Di Quirico and Dr. Elena Baracani. 
96 United Russia’s founding values are vague ideas of modernization, patriotism and 
social conservatism that are sometimes summarized by the term ‚Putinism‛.  
Putin’s endorsement was a decisive factor in determining Unity’s success (Colton & 
McFaul, 2000), and this support continued when United Russia took over, constituting ‚a 
major resource for the party of power‛ (Gelman, 2006: 8).  During his presidency, 
Medvedev repeatedly addressed it as the ‚ruling party‛. It is possible to watch his 
address to United Russia in occasion of the Tenth Party Congress at 
http://rutube.ru/tracks/1219630.html?v=ea97dbd1514fea1e29dbe2b6042bea41 
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democratization processes in its neighbourhood (Kaestner, 2010). 
Hence, the question whether Russia has played some role in 
promoting or encouraging the formation of a similar party of 
power to be used as a tool of rule seems more than legitimate. 
 
6.1 The Parties of Power of Russia and Kazakhstan 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
monopoly of the Communist Party, both Russia and Kazakhstan 
experienced what has been described as the ‚swing of a 
pendulum‛ (Gelman, 2006: 546). After a phase of proliferation of 
small parties in the 1990s, their party systems consolidated 
around a dominant party of power, which monopolized the 
legislature as well as the political scene, and marginalized 
oppositions. 
A look to the Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (EPI) 
shows that the two countries experienced similar patterns of 
change, although on different levels. Table 6.1 reports values of 
this measure for a number of post-Soviet countries since 
independence97. For Russia and Kazakhstan the EPI assumes 
relatively high values in the 1990s (6.19 and 3.96, respectively). In 
the 2000s, instead, it drops dramatically, as a result of the 
emergence and increasing success of United Russia (founded in 
2001 as Unity) and Nur Otan (instituted, with the name of Otan, 
in 1999). Visualization is presented in Figure 6.1. 
                                                 
97 The index is calculated according to the formula N = 1/  𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  where p is the 
proportion of seats assigned to each party as a result of an election. See Laakso, M. and R. 
Taagepera (1979) and Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). Post Soviet countries were 
considered with the exception of the three Baltic republics (more similar to Central and 
Easter Europe), Belarus and Turkmenistan: the latter were excluded since their 
parliaments include almost totally non-partisan members. Calculations were performed 
for Parliamentary elections in the period 1993-2012. The EPI is illustrated as a continuous 
line only in order to give an indication of the trend followed by the index. This does not 
mean that the value has assumed intermediate values between electoral cycles. 
  
 
 
 
Table 6.1 Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties in selected former Soviet Union countries – 1993 - 2012 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Armenia   2.16  3.72   5.27    3.37    2.74 
Azerbaijan   2.57   2.46    2.84    2.08   
Kazakhstan  4.67 3.96  4.37    2.66   1    1.37 
Kyrgyzstan   1.34   2.15      1.55  4.9   
Moldova  2.62  3.43  1.85    2.31   
2.45 
(April) 
3.32 
(July) 
3.23   
Russian 
Federation 
6.19  5.21  5.5   3.34    1.92   2.8  
Tajikistan   2.3   2.77    1.47    1.31   
Uzbekistan  1.98  5.26   5.87    3.41 3.3  3.54   
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Even if in the 1990s in Kazakhstan there was not a situation of 
party-system ‚hyper-fragmentation‛, as it was in Russia (Hale, 
2006), there were indeed several political parties competing in 
elections; and, similarly to Russia, these parties were pushed to 
the margins of the political scene by the emergence of Nur Otan 
and by the progressive weakening of oppositions. In the words 
of another analyst, Kazakhstan ‚tried pluralism and abandoned 
it‛ (Brill Olcott, 2010: 87). 
In both cases the role of elites in party-building and supporting 
has been crucial: parties of power are top-down created and 
make an extensive use of so-called ‚administrative resources‛ in 
order to mobilize citizens for electoral ends as well as to perform 
their role of elite coordinators. This is important if we 
hypothesize, as we do here, a reciprocal influence between the 
two processes: if it is elites who play a crucial role in 
establishing, maintaining and dismissing parties of power, we 
have to look at them and at their discourse if we want to 
understand whether they are indeed conditioning each other in 
authoritarian parties-building. 
The evolution of the Kazakhstani party of power has been 
presented earlier (see chapter 4.3). 
In Russia, the Kremlin engaged in party building already in the 
early 1990s. The elites established the first potential parties of 
power in occasion of the 1993 elections. Two parties, Russia’s 
Choice and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, were created 
but they obtained a scarce success, gaining 15.5 percent and 6.7 
percent of the vote respectively and occupying 106 out of 450 
seats in the State Duma. Neither party was able to control the 
parliamentary agenda or to impose the will of the president on 
the Duma. Lacking legislative success, both parties rapidly lost 
membership and the support of the ruling elites. 
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Elites’ support, in fact, soon shifted to two other parties. For the 
Duma elections of 1995, the Kremlin backed the left-wing Bloc of 
Ivan Rybkin and the right-wing Our Home is Russia (Nash Dom 
– Rossiya, NDR). However, also these parties did not manage to 
establish a solid majority in the Duma. The former got only three 
seats; the latter, with 10.1 percent of the vote and 55 seats, was 
unable to oppose the major decisions of the Communist-
dominated legislature. The fate of NDR was similar to its 
predecessors: it lost heavily in the next parliamentary elections. 
The main reasons for this scant success were individuated in the 
lack of commitment of President Yeltsin (Colton & McFaul, 2000) 
and the scarce resources and expertise invested by the elites in 
these first party projects (Gelman, 2006). 
A different situation was the one of the major contenders in the 
1999 parliamentary elections, Unity (Edinstvo) and the ‚would-
be party of power‛ Fatherland–All Russia (Otechestvo – Vsya 
Rossiya, OVR), which represented the interests of regional 
governors (Colton & McFaul, 2000). Unity in particular received 
the support of the Kremlin and the open endorsement of 
Vladimir Putin (Colton & McFaul, 2000 and 2003). It received 
23.3 percent of the vote, while OVR got 13.3 percent, occupying 
80 and 69 seats respectively. With the further consolidation of 
the Russian elite around Vladimir Putin on the eve of the 2000 
presidential elections, the parties established a pro-government 
coalition in the Duma. The centrist coalition of four factions and 
groups (Unity, OVR, Russia’s Regions, and People’s Deputy) 
controlled a firm majority of 235 out of 450 Duma seats. United 
Russia originated in December 2001 as a result of the merger 
between Unity, OVR, and Russia’s Regions (Gelman, 2002).  
United Russia was the major winner of the 2003 parliamentary 
elections, primarily due to the strong endorsement from the 
president, Vladimir Putin. Together with latent coalition politics 
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with minor parties and independent candidates in single-
member districts this led to unexpected results: United Russia 
got only 37.8% in party list voting but in the State Duma received 
more than 2/3 of seats, and thus formed a ‚manufactured over-
majority‛ (Golosov, 2005: 108-119). 
Ruling elites continued to support the party of power also later, 
by implementing a series of reforms aimed at preserving the 
central position of the party of power monopoly on the Russian 
political scene. In 2005 the threshold to enter the parliament was 
increased from 5% to 7%, and the parties received strong 
incentives to merge rather than to form coalitions as electoral 
coalitions were prohibited (Hale, 2006). Registration of new 
parties became more difficult, requiring a higher number of 
members (from 10,000 to 50,000) and of regional branches (in 
two thirds rather than in half of the subjects of the Federation) 
(Gelman, 2008). 
Also the abolition of popularly elected regional governors 
enhanced the positions of the party of power, as reduced the 
influence of the powerful but divided regional elites in favour of 
the party of power (Gelman, 2006). 
United Russia obtained impressive results in the 2007 
Parliamentary elections: 64.30% and 315 seats. It also dominates 
in the regions, being present in 83 regions, and dominating in 81. 
In many cases it has the two thirds of seats. The somewhat 
disappointing results obtained in 2011 did not undermine the 
dominant position of United Russia in the Duma, although its 
majority is now limited to a bit more than half the seats (238 on 
450). 
In sum, the two parties share a similar evolutionary pattern, 
significantly influenced by executive elites through the use of 
‚institutional engineering‛ and ‚administrative resources‛, 
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including privileged access to state media (Gelman, 2008; Del 
Sordi, 2010). The timeline of this evolution is parallel: while less 
than successful experiments were carried on in the early 1990s, 
Otan and United Russia were founded respectively in 1999 and 
2001, and have dominated since, incorporating other forces and 
extending their mobilization basis. Actually, as it will be seen 
later, the element of timing further complicates the discussion 
about the presence of a Russian influence and makes it more 
difficult to argue that such a process is in place. 
 
 
6.2 Looking for signs of influence 
The presence of a party of power is among the most important 
elements of the ‚authoritarian toolkit‛ characterizing the Russian 
regime (Silitski, 2009). The term ‚party of power‛ has been used 
mainly to indicate a Russian phenomenon, the one of political 
parties founded by or connected with the Kremlin in the 1990s 
and 2000s, and only later spread to other cases in the post-Soviet 
space.  
Some of the Central Asian countries have parties of power, or at 
least attempted to build them: in Kyrgyzstan, the former 
president Bakiyev had tried to consolidate his power around the 
party Ak Zhol, although with scarce success (Koehler, 2008); in 
Uzbekistan, at some point a pro-presidential bloc of parties was 
built, which ‚modelled on Putin’s pro-presidential ‘Party of 
Power’ in Russia‛ (Collins, 2006: 261). As seen before, the 
Kazakhstani party Nur Otan shares striking similarities with its 
Russian counterpart, United Russia. 
Similarities, obviously, are not sufficient to suppose that the 
model of party of power has been exported from Russia to 
Central Asia. Domestic elements such as the structure of elites 
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and the institutional framework are extremely relevant in the 
process of party-building. On the other hand, seen its success in 
Russia, the ‘party of power’ could be an example of successful 
diffusion of the Russian mode of rule as well as of its founding 
values (Ambrosio, 2010). United Russia could have inspired, and 
in some cases even helped the establishment of a similar party in 
its neighbourhood.  
 
6.2.1 Cooperation 
A first sign that Russia could be exporting the party of power 
would be the presence of a close relation between United Russia 
and Nur Otan. Although it cannot be considered as a proof of 
influence, a close relation is a necessary channel for spreading 
techniques and ideas. 
A regular relation of cooperation facilitates reciprocal 
observation, as well as the exchange of information and 
experience. Through regular meetings and joint initiatives – not 
to mention specifically designed training programs – party 
members from both sides can easily learn about each other’s 
tactics and strategies. 
A tight cooperation exists between Nur Otan (and Otan, before 
2006) and United Russia. This relation is not exclusive, as both 
parties have established ties with other parties98. However, their 
relation is a privileged one, justified with considerations about 
the similar nature of the two countries, (post-Soviet and post-
Communist, oil-rich, multinational and the wealthiest among the 
                                                 
98 Since the mid-2000s, Otan has expanded its international relations, establishing contacts 
with governing parties in Malaysia, Singapore, China, Japan, Turkey. ‚Pravitel’stvo‛, 
Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 041, February 25, 2006; Vil’ianov A. ‚Politicheskie Partii‛, 
Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,  No. 271, December  26, 2006. United Russia also has regular 
meetings with colleagues from the Chinese Communist party and representatives of the 
Italian Popolo della Libertà. 
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CIS) and of the parties themselves (both parties of the majority, 
supported by the leader, with a pragmatic orientation)99. 
Official relations started in 2004, with high profile visits and the 
signature of a Memorandum of Cooperation, later renewed in 
2006 and 2009: the parties committed to cooperate in the areas of 
party-building, law-making and development of international 
relations, particularly at the regional level, and to organize 
regular meetings100. The parties have since cooperated closely on 
different matters, and have exchanged frequent visits101. 
Delegates from both parties participate regularly in each other’s 
congresses102. 
Also, party-men from both formations participate in electoral 
observation missions103: they generally offer positive evaluations 
of the electoral procedures, often in open contrast with accounts 
of Western monitoring missions. This is a particularly interesting 
aspect, because Russia has been allegedly supporting an 
alternative system of electoral monitoring, aimed at de-
legitimizing the system built around the OSCE and at 
establishing different standards, compatible with a specific 
conception of democracy (Fawn, 2006). 
                                                 
99 See for example: Zhumagulov B. ‚Umen'e s dolgom sochetaia‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 
No. 37, March 08, 2007. 
100 Makhin V. and Mikhailova M. ‚Memorandum Druzhbi‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 
133, June 15, 2004 and Kozintseva E. ‚Obshie Tseli i Tsennosti‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 
No. 056, March 11, 2006. 
101 Kozintseva E. ‚Lideri Mezhpartiinih Al’iansov‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 018, 
January 21, 2006. 
102 Baitelesov Zh. ‚Otan na forume Edinorossov‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 328, 
December 1, 2005; Nagornykh I., ‚Navstrechu s''ezdu vypustiat e'lektrovoz‛, Kommersant 
Daily, No. 222, November 28, 2006. 
103 Kozintseva E. ‚V rezhime nabliudeniia‛ Kazakhstanskaia pravda,  No. 189, December  
04, 2007.  Pugasov M. ‚Dlia obmena opytom‛, Kazakhstanskaia pravda,  No. 151, 
September  27, 2007. 
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Nur Otan and United Russia cooperate closely also within a 
number of international organizations. They are known to 
coordinate their positions within the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), as well as the parliamentary 
assemblies of the OSCE and the CIS.  
The cooperation on local level has been very active in the areas 
where the two countries share an extensive border, particularly 
involving the local party branches in Omsk, Uralsk and 
Astrakhan104. A close cooperation exists also between the youth 
branches of the parties. Nur Otan has been working with United 
Russia’s youth organizations since 2004, actually before the 
foundation of Zhas Otan105. 
Some initiatives seem more likely than others to propagate 
United Russia’s methods and techniques: United Russia has been 
involved in Nur Otan members’ education projects, providing 
trainers for their seminars106. This happens also at the highest 
level: edinorossy (United Russia party-men) are known to teach 
regularly at the Nur Otan Higher School of Party Education, 
particularly about how to deal with electorates in the regions 
(interview, Kharitonova, 2011). United Russia also contributes to 
the education of Nur Otan party activists in the regions, 
especially in the border area107.  
As said before, the presence of such a close cooperation is not a 
sufficient condition for stating that Russia exported the party of 
                                                 
104 Pugasov M. ‚Omskii marshrut Otana‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 229, October 14, 
2006; Korina L. ‚Krai Uralskii, krai edinii‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 139, June 22, 2004; 
Alibekova R. ‚Pod legkii' briz proshel kruiz‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 146, 
September 18, 2007 and Iliushin S. ‚Astrakhanskie ‘Edinorossy’ namereni aktivno 
sotrudnichat’ s vedushei partii Kazakhstana‛, Volga, No. 138, September 20, 2007. 
105 Shilov A. ‚Doroga v Artek‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 177, August 10, 2004. 
106 Maldybaev S. ‚Zovet na kursy shkola rosta‛, Kazakhstanskaia pravda,  No. 198, 
September  11, 2008. 
107 ‚Parlament‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 061, March 18, 2006. 
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power to Kazakhstan. Another aspect needs to be investigated, 
and regards the sphere of values at the basis of party-building 
choices. In the next two sections it will be seen whether ideas 
that are well-rooted in the Russian political discourse (such as 
‚sovereign democracy‛ and ‚managed democracy‛) are being 
diffused in its neighbourhood, and how these ideas are received 
and discussed in Kazakhstan. 
 
6.2.2 The diffusion of the “Russian model” 
The spread of ideas is best understood through the concept of 
diffusion. This takes the form of an indirect transmission of values 
and ideas, in the shape of norms other states may wish to 
comply in order to preserve or gain an international reputation 
(appropriateness) or in the form of a successful example to 
emulate (effectiveness) (Ambrosio, 2010). 
Appropriateness is a mechanism by which ‚the policy decisions 
of one government alter the conditions under which other 
governments base their decisions‛ (Elkins and Simmons, 2005:7 
in Ambrosio, 2010: 579). These choices contribute to the creation 
of a new environment, which will influence the other actors in 
their decisions relatively to the adoption of certain practices and 
policies. In this sense, the rise of authoritarian powers could 
‚create conditions in which the relative appropriateness of 
democracy and autocracy would shift more toward the latter‛ 
(Ambrosio, 2010: 380). 
Russian elites have indeed put an effort in elaborating a specific 
set of norms. The ‚Russian model‛ (Walker and Kelly, 2007: 2 in 
Ambrosio, 2010: 582) or ‚Putin model‛ (Jackson, 2010: 101) is 
proposing itself as an alternative to western liberal-democratic 
ideas. Russia has found itself leading a coalition of states 
contrary to the US intervention in Iraq, in 2003 and is giving in 
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every occasion a particularly restrictive interpretation to the 
concept of state sovereignty (Jackson, 2010). The Russian model 
was formalized through the adoption and popularization of the 
principle of ‚sovereign democracy‛, which was first outlined by 
Vladislav Surkov in 2006 in response to the events of Ukraine’s 
Orange evolution. The concept emphasizes Russia’s freedom 
from external influences, the centrality of a strong state, and of 
the Kremlin’s power, and the desire of Russia to regain its 
position as a world power. In the adoption of this term there was 
an attempt to legitimize Russia’s regime and its ‚unique and 
indigenous style of democracy‛ as chosen by the Russian nation 
in order to prevent a Ukraine-style revolution from happening in 
Moscow‛ (Shlapentokh, 2007 in Jackson, 2010: 107). The term 
remained essentially vague and in an occasion the President 
Medvedev has dismissed it108. Nevertheless, it has become 
widely popular in the media, in Russia and in the post-Soviet 
space, and it has possibly inspired political decisions and 
triggered justifications for the creation and maintenance of a 
dominant party system109. 
Effectiveness is closer to what in European integration studies is 
called ‚the power of example‛ (Forsberg, 2009). It refers to the 
mechanism through which the political and economic success of 
an authoritarian regime becomes apparent and stimulates a 
process of imitation from other countries, whose leaders hope to 
obtain similar results (Ambrosio, 2010). As Ambrosio notes, the 
models chosen are not always optimal: rather, their selection is 
                                                 
108 ‘Sovereign democracy’ was rejected by Medvedev, in an interview for the popular 
journal Ekspert (24 July 2006) as ‘a far from ideal term’. Medvedev noted that ‘when 
qualifying additions are made to the word ‚democracy‛ this leaves one with a strange 
after-taste. It suggests that what is actually meant is some other, non-traditional 
democracy.’ See Jackson 2010: 116. 
109 Recknagel C. ‚As Russia Claims Democracy, Is It Redefining the Word?‛ RFE/RL, 
December 27, 2010 
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_defining_democracy/2260775.html 
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done in line with interests and biases and with a country’s own 
values. This pairs with what Jackson calls ‚receptivity‛110. 
Through diffusion elites adopt external norms and introduce 
them in their political system: this is possible only if what is 
being advanced or promoted ‚fits into indigenous norms and 
practices in each particular state‛ (Jackson, 2010: 102). 
Several post-Soviet countries and especially the Central Asian 
states have shown great interest in implementing the package of 
organizations and measures - effectively named as ‚autocratic 
tools‛ by Silitski (2009) – which has successfully been used to 
maintain authoritarian stability in Russia. These include the 
creation of a dominant party of power and the use of 
administrative resources and institutional engineering in order 
to weaken oppositions. The learning process took place in 
particular after 2004, when the Putin’s regime consolidated and 
proved efficient in counterbalancing the influence of ‚colour 
revolutions‛ in the post-Soviet space. 
The ‚Russian model‛ and in particular the abovementioned 
concept of ‚sovereign democracy‛ are attractive models for the 
Central Asian neighbourhood. Their normative power is low, 
but they have an attractive non-western and anti-liberal-
democratic quality. Following them may appear appropriate, 
especially for weaker states in a regional space ever dominated 
by the Russian regional power. Moreover, it could look effective, 
because of the good results obtained by Russia in containing 
oppositions and reinforcing the Kremlin’s rule as a reaction to 
‚colour revolutions‛ (Finkel & Brudny, 2012), particularly 
                                                 
110 She takes the original definition from an article by Ikenberry and Kuchan. See 
Ikenberry, J. and C. Kupchan, ‚Socialization and hegemonic power‛. International 
Organization, 44 (3) 1990, 283–315. 
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through the use of the ‚party of power‛111. Finally, the diffusion 
of these values would be facilitated by geographical proximity 
and by the presence of a number of channels of communication, 
including military cooperation and a close collaboration within 
regional organizations (Allison, 2008; Jackson, 2010). Finally, the 
process is facilitated by the common use of the Russian language 
among elites and in the most important mass media (Jackson, 
2010). 
 
6.2.3 Russian-based values in the Kazakhstani public discourse  
If found, signs of the Kazakhstani elites discussing and adopting 
values close to the ‚Russian model‛ could indicate a process of 
diffusion of these ideas and, possibly, that elites were influenced 
by the Russian example when establishing their party of power. 
But how popular are these ideas and values? And how well are 
they received by local elites? In order to evaluate the degree of 
popularity of these concepts, a content analysis has been 
performed for a series of keywords, related with the Russian 
model, on a sample of national Kazakhstani newspapers (see 
Appendix Four for details). 
As far as the concept of ‚sovereign democracy‛ is concerned, in 
Kazakhstani media the term is rarely mentioned, and always in 
reference to the Russian system112. There seems to be little 
discussion also about terms like ‚Russian model‛ and ‚Putin 
model‛113. Kazakhstan seems to have received better the 
                                                 
111 Babaev M. ‚Kazakhstan: za chem obedeniat’ ‚partiu vlasti‛ posle vyborov‛, Rossiiskie 
vesti, October 18, 2006. 
112 A search for the term in the archives of four main national Kazakhstani newspapers 
since February 2006 (when the concept was first mentioned by Vladislav Surkov) has 
yealded 19 results only. 
113 Searches conducted on the same sample of newspaper for the period 1999 – 2011 have 
resulted in 12 and 1 results respectively. 
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discourse on ‚modernization‛ (modernizatsia), which is a theme 
particularly important for Medvedev. However, the focus – in 
both countries – has been so far on economic and technological 
innovation and not on political developments114. 
On the other hand, a lively public and academic debate is in 
place relatively to the term ‚managed democracy‛ (upravliaemaia 
demokratia), which is also used to refer to the Russian mode of 
rule115. At a closer look, though, it appears that in most of the 
cases the term is used in reference to a specific Kazakhstani 
mode of rule: the term often appears in connection with 
expressions like ‚our‛ (nasha), ‚our own‛ (sobstvennaia), 
‚Kazakhstani‛ (po-kazakhstanski and Kazakhstanskaia), 
‚Nazarbayev’s‛ (po-Nazarbayevski and Nazarbayevskaia). Only 
rarely a comparison between the two is presented, and it usually 
results in highlighting differences116. It is interesting to note that 
the content of the expression in Russian and Kazakhstani context 
is essentially the same. Probably, the recurrent terms indicating 
property might be a sign that Kazakhstani elites are trying to 
‚receive‛ this concept and to make it fit their local values.  
A sign that the countries are actually looking at each other is the 
attention, among Russian commentators, for the ‚Nazarbayev 
system‛. This model, which can be summarized in the phrase 
                                                 
114 There are several references (about 800) to the terms of ‚modernization‛ and 
‚innovation‛ in my sample of Kazakhstani newspapers since 2008 (year of election of 
President Medvedev, who immediately used the term as flag for his own agenda). In 
many cases they refer to economic and technological innovation. See for example: 
Kuriatov V. ‚Aktsent na integratsiiu i modernizatsiiu‛, Kazakhstanskaia pravda, No. 98, 
March 18, 2011. 
115 A search for the term in the same sample of Kazakhstani newspapers for the period 
1999-2011 has yealded 115 articles, many of which were interviews with historians and 
political scientists or reports from conferences. Some were also official speeches.  
116 See for example ‚Medvedev ne cheta Nazarbaevu‛ (Medvedev is not Nazarbayev’s 
double), Respublika, No 17, May 15, 2009. 
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‚first, the economy and then politics117‛, is often praised as an 
‚amazing combination of democratic principles and oriental 
traditions‛118. It is sometimes considered as an example for 
Russia, for its capacity to efficiently and quickly produce reforms 
in controversial areas, such as pensions and agriculture119. 
Particularly appreciated is the capacity shown by Nazarbayev in 
‚bringing order, achieving stability and economic growth‛120. 
Reciprocal commentaries are not always so flattering. In some 
cases there have been critical positions, expressed by 
Kazakhstani intellectuals towards the ‚Russian model‛. In 
occasion of the international conference on ‚Democracy and 
Security in Central Asia‛, held in March 2006, the political 
scientist and vice-president of Nur Otan Erlan Karin openly 
criticized the rigidity and strictness of the Kremlin model121. In 
another occasion it was a Russian political scientist, Aleksandr 
Sobyanin, to criticize Nur Otan for its being isolated from the 
people122. Rather than of distance, these reciprocal comments 
from high-level personalities may be the sign of elites constantly 
observing and evaluating the political process in the 
neighbouring country, and possibly learning from it.  
A discourse which seems deeply rooted in both countries is the 
one about security and fear of instability in the region123. Factors 
                                                 
117 Shulembaeva R. ‚Politaren priamie paralleli‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 124, August 
10, 2007. 
118 Baitelesov Zh. ‚Otan na forume Edinorossov‛, Kazakhstanskaia pravda, No. 328, 
December 1, 2005. 
119 Radzikhovskii L. (political scientist), ‚V favore e'voliutsii sistem‛, Kazakhstanskaia 
Pravda, No. 123, August 09, 2007 (originally published on the Rossiiskaia Gazeta).  
120 Solozobov I. ‚Kazakhstan kak politicheskaia mashina vremeni‛, Vremia Novostei',  No. 
131, July 26, 2007. 
121 Khetsuriani S. ‚Ili demokratiia, ili bezopasnost?‛, Pravo. E'konomika. Politika. Kul'tura, 
 No. 8, March  10, 2006. 
122 Sergeeva I. ‚Esli druzhit’, chto srazu domami?‛, Respublika No17, May 15 2009. 
123 Bit M. ‚Vyzov Vremeni‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda No. 163, June 6, 2003. 
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of such instability are Islamic extremism, drugs trafficking and 
especially political instability, in the shape of coups and ‚colour 
revolutions‛ 124. As mentioned, this ‚regional authoritarian 
learning‛ has been shown to strengthen of all five Central Asian 
regimes, (Jackson, 2010: 107). Also Nur Otan and United Russia 
are involved in the process of helping stabilization in 
neighbouring countries. Particularly relevant seems their role in 
promoting the formation of a party of power in Kyrgyzstan. In 
the period 2005-2010 there have been regular contacts between 
the presidential party Ak Zhol with United Russia and Nur 
Otan125. Despite the failure of the experiment, the two parties 
seem to be still interested in assisting party-building in 
Kyrgyzstan. Representative from Nur Otan and United Russia 
have participated in the founding congress of the Ar-Namys 
party, held in Bishkek in 2010126. 
A last factor to be considered, and which can possibly mitigate 
the role of a Russian influence on the Kazakhstani party 
building, is the influence of the so-called ‚Asian values‛ on 
Kazakhstani elite mentality and policy decisions. Central Asia is 
at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, and may be 
influenced by the examples and practices of China and India as 
well (Graevingholt et al., 2011). In particular, Kazakhstan has 
developed close economic and cultural ties with neighbouring 
China. At the same time, Nazarbayev has repeatedly voiced his 
admiration for the experience of some Asian countries, 
                                                 
124 Khetsuriani S. ‚Ili demokratiia, ili bezopasnost?‛, Pravo. E'konomika. Politika. Kul'tura, 
 No. 8, March  10, 2006. 
125 See Kozintseva E., ‚Rol' partii' v sovremennom mire‛, Kazakhstanskaia pravda,  No. 121, 
May  15, 2009 and Shulembaeva R. ‚Politaren priamye paralleli‛ Kazakhstanskaia 
pravda, No. 124, August  10, 2007. 
126 Evlashkov D., ‚Sledim za situatsiei'‛, Rossii'skaia gazeta, No. 216, September 24, 2010. 
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particularly Singapore, a country where ‚the presence of a strong 
party does not indicate the lack of democracy‛127. 
Indeed, it is not unusual to find references to the example of 
other Asian states among the sources of inspiration for the 
Kazakhstani ‚party of power‛ experiment. In particular, it is 
mentioned the experience of South-East Asia, where the presence 
of a strong party, along with a strong leadership, is allegedly the 
reason for a fast and significant economic growth and 
development. The dominant parties of Singapore (People’s 
Action Party) the ruling coalition of Malaysia (Barisan Nasional), 
the Indonesian party Golkar and the Japanese liberal-democratic 
party are often mentioned as models for Kazakhstan128. 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion: was the party of power exported from 
Russia to Kazakhstan? 
The parties of power of Russia and Kazakhstan share a number 
of common features, and a strikingly similar consolidation 
pattern. Given the position of Russia as regional power and the 
strength of its non-liberal democratic discourse about ‚sovereign 
democracy‛, it is legitimate to ask whether those values, as well 
as the Russian example in party-building had a role in 
influencing the Kazakhstani process. 
With this goal, this chapter investigated the existence of a 
relation of cooperation between Nur Otan and United Russia; 
looked at the channels of transmission of values related with 
                                                 
127 Significantly, Nazarbayev mentioned also Russia as a country with a strong party and 
‚no lack of democracy‛. Bukina Zh., Prianikov V. and Kononovich E. ‚Piat’ let s 
Otanom‛, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, No. 051, March 13, 2004. 
128 Novikov T. ‚SNG: Dostizhenie Balansa‛, Tribuna: RT, No. 26, July 7, 2006; Potapov A. 
‚Prezident ostavil svoi' sled na banknotakh i v istorii‛, Novaia Gazeta, No. 52, July 12, 
2007. 
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party-building and at how they could be attractive for 
Kazakhstan; and tried to assess the reception of these ideas in the 
Kazakhstani public discourse. 
The resulting picture is somehow ambivalent. First of all, the 
development and the evolution of the two political systems have 
happened exactly at the same time. This circumstance apparently 
rules out the possibility that Kazakhstan has adopted and 
supported an executive-based ruling party because this had 
proven to be successful in Russia. In both contexts ruling elites 
started their experiments with party building at the beginning of 
the 1990s, and established successful ones only at the end of the 
decade: United Russia was founded – as Unity – in 2001, and 
Otan in 1999. On the other hand, some party-supporting 
measures were actually taken earlier in Russia than in 
Kazakhstan: Proportional Representation, for instance, was 
adopted in 2005 in Russia and in 2007 in Kazakhstan. Also the 
merge of most of the pro-government forces into one large pro-
regime party occurred later in Kazakhstan – in 2006, while the 
similar merge from which United Russia originated was in 2001. 
However, it is uncertain how much this move was inspired by 
the Russian experience129. In fact, the reasons for this merge and 
for the creation of a super-party seem to be different: while in 
Russia it was necessary in order to accelerate the adoption of 
executive-proposed laws in the parliament (Gelman, 2006), in 
Kazakhstan the law making process was already smooth and 
fast, as noted by the Russian political scientist Mikhail 
                                                 
129 A local political commentator described the merge between Otan and Asar as 
connected but ‚not copied‛ from the similar move that happened in Russia a few years 
before (when United Russia was created): the reason is that in Kazakhstan there was no 
reason to reinforce the leader’s power. It was rather the consolidation of an already solid 
cooperation between the pro-government coalition and the presidential power. A strong 
party was needed in order to ‚mobilize the nation, in order to achieve the country’s 
competitiveness‛ and ‚modernization‛. Novikov T. ‚SNG: Dostizhenie Balansa‛, 
Tribuna: RT, No. 26, July 7, 2006. 
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Lysenko130. Instead, the decision to incorporate the other pro-
regime parties into Nur Otan was made in order to solve 
potentially de-stabilizing divisions within the pro-regime 
coalition (see Chapter 5). 
In general, it seems that the attention to the developments within 
each other’s political system is reciprocal, and that the elites and 
party leaderships are closely observing each other. 
In 2004, Liubov’ Sliska, member of United Russia’s Higher 
Council and Duma Speaker, described a meeting between the 
parties as an occasion for United Russia to ‚learn from the 
experience of its slightly older‛ equivalent131. Also, the Russian 
media and political commentators dedicated great attention to 
the 2007 constitutional reform and anticipated elections in 
Kazakhstan132. In particular, the impressive electoral result has 
been widely commented in the Russian media, and proposed as 
an alternative ‚experience‛ (opyt) when discussing United 
Russia’s electoral chances133. A Russian political scientist 
described Kazakhstan as a ‚time machine‛, allowing Russia to 
see in advance the results of certain political decisions, in this 
case a partial shift of power towards the parliament and the 
ruling party134. 
Local political analysts tend to support the view that the elites of 
Russia and Kazakhstan often look at each other and could be 
                                                 
130 Morzabaeva Zh. ‚Ot "bezbrezhnoi'" demokratii k avtoritarizmu‛, Respublika, No. 15, 
July 14, 2006. 
131 Bukina Zh., Prianikov V. and Kononovich E. ‚Piat’ let s Otanom‛, Kazakhstanskaia 
Pravda, No. 051, March 13, 2004. 
132 Babaev M. ‚Kazakhstan: za chem obedeniat’ ‚partiu vlasti‛ posle vyborov‛ Rossiiskie 
vesti October 18, 2006. 
133 An example is Latukhina K., ‚Dvukhpartii'naia vertikal'‛, Vedomosti, No. 192, October  
11, 2007. 
134 Solozobov I. ‚Kazakhstan kak politicheskaia mashina vremeni‛, Vremia Novostei',  No. 
131, July  26, 2007. 
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possibly inspired, but they also underline that the similarities in 
the party system ‚came as a result of a similar evolution, not just as a 
result of imitating somebody’s experience‛ (interview, Petrov, 2011). 
Although ‚they are certainly observing each other, but it is hard to say 
whether they are borrowing techniques. In any case, the logic of the 
development in both countries is the same. Whether Kazakhstan 
borrowed something from Russia or vice-versa, it does not matter; 
sooner or later they would have done the same‛ (interview, 
Nurmakov, 2011)135. 
As seen before, there is some evidence of United Russia using 
this connection in order to ‚teach‛ its Kazakhstani peers through 
trainings both at the central and the local levels. However, the 
extent and the effectiveness of these training programs are not 
clear. 
 The overview of the public discourse also produced ambivalent 
results. On the one hand, it is evident that the public opinion in 
both countries is constantly discussing and evaluating each 
others’ political developments and political ‚models‛, including 
the so-called ‚Nazarbayev’s system‛. This discussion happens 
on both sides, probably contributing to influence the decision-
making of Russian elite as well. 
A concept that seems to have been successfully exported from 
Russia to Kazakhstan is the one of ‚managed democracy‛ (while 
its almost synonymous ‚sovereign democracy‛ did not have 
success). It should be said that in the discourse there is always an 
attempt to distinguish a ‚Kazakhstani managed democracy‛ 
from other experiences, including the Russian one: however, this 
could be the sign of the elite still working on appropriating the 
concept and making it fit with indigenous values. Actually, 
                                                 
135 Similar opinions were expressed also by other interviewees, particularly by the 
members of the opposition party OSDP Azat. 
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according to the expert Satpayev, the elaboration of an 
alternative model of democracy could have been developed 
earlier in Kazakhstan. He notes that ‚even before Surkov, 
Nazarbayev emphasized that the country was non-democratic in 
western style but that it was democratic if adopting a different way, a 
third way, specific and relevant to the context‛ (interview, Satpayev, 
2011). 
Finally, it should be also added that the Russian model is not the 
only inspiration for the Kazakhstani leadership. In the 
Kazakhstani discourse there are constant references to the 
example of other Asian states, and in particular Singapore, 
among the sources of inspiration for the Kazakhstani ‚party of 
power‛ experiment. Also in this case, the Kazakhstani leadership 
seems to have appropriated the concepts. In particular, the 
president Nazarbayev has put the idea of ‚economy first‛ at the 
centre of his plans for the country. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the main findings of the dissertation will be 
summarized and discussed.  
The research questions posed at the beginning regarded: the 
nature and the consequences of the relation between Nur Otan 
and the executive elites from which it originated; and the role of 
the party of power in maintaining regime stability by performing 
a number of functions. A collateral question, stemming by the 
similarity and the close relations of Kazakhstan with 
neighbouring Russia regarded the possibility that the model of 
the ‚party of power‛ has been exported to the Central Asian 
state, together with specific ‚authoritarian values‛. 
In Chapter 3, the first question was further elaborated in a 
discussion on the dominant nature of Nur Otan. This discussion 
not only allows defining better the nature of Nur Otan, but 
contributes to a better understanding of dominant parties, 
confirming that such parties can differ substantially on the 
dimension of independence.  
While dominant in numbers and in the party system, the party of 
power of Kazakhstan has been found to be of little relevance 
when it comes to policy making, resource management and 
control on coercion systems.  
Also its perspectives as ‚collective heir‛ seem slight. Despite a 
Constitutional reform, which should start the transformation of 
the political system into a parliamentary republic, and the 
President’s declarations in this sense, the possibility that Nur 
Otan becomes the real titular of power in the near future is quite 
remote. The President still maintains the control of the political 
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system, including the party, in his own hands, and has not yet 
initiated the legislation reforms which would complete the 
transfer of power to the party. It is also unlikely that Nur Otan 
takes this chance on its own initiative, as its origins make it 
extremely dependent on the power elites around the President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev. 
This relation of dependence is explored in detail Chapter 4, 
which introduces a number of resources and privileges enjoyed 
by the party of power, although it does not significantly 
contribute to their creation.  
Two types of resources are found. One involves substantive 
resources, consisting of institutional and economic forms of 
support which were put forward with the explicit purpose of 
favouring the party.  
First, there is the creation of ad hoc institutional constraints, and 
their selective application. The rules of the game are constantly 
adjusted and changed in order to accommodate the necessities of 
the party of power, create an advantage for it and erecting access 
barriers for the most dangerous competitors. Among the 
leverages used there are the rules on party legislation, the 
electoral rule and administrative regulations. In particular, the 
adoption of a 7% threshold and of Proportional Representation 
in 2007 had the effect of pushing to the margins all of the 
opposition parties and resulted in a one-party parliament. The 
rules were slightly relaxed between 2008 and 2009: although the 
control is still very tight, the authorities tried to correct the 
situation, which was likely to have a negative impact on the 
country’s bid for the OSCE chairmanship. The new Mazhilis, 
elected in January 2012 is in fact composed by three parties. The 
authorities have not renounced to their control on the legislature, 
though: the two parties which got seats together with Nur Otan 
are strongly pro-regime.  
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A second resource at disposal of the party of power is the so-
called ‚administrative resource‛, which I examined in its form of 
privileged access to State media.  
The case of media was chosen both because of its relevance in the 
Kazakhstani context, and because of the possibility to measure 
effectively the differences between political parties, in particular 
by monitoring the printed press.  
In the analysis it was tried first of all to show that media assets 
are closely controlled by the state and by a group of media 
entrepreneurs who are very close to the President, including the 
powerful group headed by his daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva. 
Effective control on the media content is exerted also through 
legislation and by filling the media space with regime-approved 
contents, through the system of Social Procurement (gos-zakaz). 
The effect of these measures on the party of power is a relevant 
advantage in general visibility, especially during electoral 
campaigns, as shown by an analysis of the press specifically 
conducted for this study as well as by OSCE broadcasting media 
monitoring. 
The other category comprises less tangible resources, better 
understood as advantages that the party gets from its very 
position of power. It was shown how the success of Nur Otan is 
due mostly to the popularity it receives from being the 
‚President’s party‛, and from the general consensus enjoyed by 
the regime, especially in connection with its positive economic 
performance. Moreover, by maintaining a flexible ideological 
profile, especially on controversial issues like the nationalities 
policy, Nur Otan is able to present itself as an acceptable entity 
to most of the population.  
The other question investigated by this thesis regards, as said, 
the regime-sustaining role of the party of power Nur Otan. 
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Departing from hypotheses proposed by the literature on 
‚authoritarian institutions‛, I investigated the regime-supporting 
functions of Nur Otan in Chapter 5.  
First of all, this was done in diachronic perspective, trying to 
connect the two elements of the relation between the party and 
the ruling elites, on the one hand, and the role of Nur Otan in 
maintaining regime stability on the other hand. A series of 
watershed moments, which I call challenges, were individuated. 
These moments, I argue, served as trigger for elites’ party-related 
choices and, at the same time, serve as tests for the party regime-
supporting functions. A theoretical insight gained here is the 
possibility that executive-based parties perform different 
functions according to changing conditions of the political 
environment and to different necessities of the ruling elites.  
Secondly, party functions have been analyzed separately.  
Looking at the elite-coordination/management function, it was 
found that Nur Otan and the party system in general serve the 
regime by regulating the competition between elites, and making 
sure they stay in balance. The party system works as an arena, 
where political parties affiliated to various elite groupings fight 
with each other as sorts of avatars. Just like Nur Otan, which is 
only the reflection of the centre of political power in the electoral 
and legislative field, other parties reflect the influence and 
strength of other segments of the elite. And this is done not only 
to the benefit of international observers, or of the domestic 
electorate: by competing in the party arena, the elite groupings 
have a chance to try their chances in a controlled way, without 
openly challenging the leader. Actually, in this way they manage 
to get closer to the leader and to the system of privileges that is 
associated with the highest circle. 
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Another interesting function assigned by theory to authoritarian 
parties is the one of ‚monopolist of jobs‛ (Magaloni, 2007: 19). 
While the membership in Nur Otan seems to be irrelevant in 
one’s career advancements, the perception that the party works 
as a social elevator could be in itself consensus-generating, 
especially among young people. The idea that by joining Nur 
Otan or its youth branch Zhas Otan would be beneficial for one’s 
career seems widespread, and could serve the regime by making 
sure that bright young people join the pro-government camp 
rather than the opposition.  
The party also works as a mobilizing force in electoral 
campaigns. In particular, its stellar results could send a ‚message 
of invincibility‛ both to the oppositions and to segments of the 
elites who could be tempted to defect. Also, but this option is 
still open for further investigation: electoral results could be a 
test for the loyalty of local level party officials.  
Finally, some attention was given to the mobilizing functions of 
the youth branch, Zhas Otan. Together with other youth 
organizations, Zhas Otan was founded in the aftermaths of the 
‚colour revolutions‛, with the aim of maintaining a tighter 
control on youth and somehow to replicate, in reverse, the 
mobilization strategies used during those protests.  Zhas Otan 
and the other pro-government organizations fill the public space 
with non politicized and regime-approved initiatives; endowed 
with large resources, they crowd out or co-opt other 
organizations, limiting the possibilities for opposition 
organizations to appear and operate. 
The final chapter is devoted to the third, collateral research 
question, whether the party of power was exported to 
Kazakhstan from Russia. The commonalities shared by the two 
parties are indeed striking, and the influence of Russia as 
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regional power is a consolidated one, as well as the strength of 
its non-liberal democratic discourse about sovereign democracy. 
The possibility that the model of the party of power, as well as 
some values related to it, were transferred was investigated by 
looking at the cooperation between Nur Otan and United Russia 
and by detecting the presence of Russian-based values like 
sovereign democracy in the Kazakhstani public discourse. 
The resulting picture is somehow ambivalent. First of all, the 
development and the evolution of the two political systems have 
happened exactly at the same time. This circumstance apparently 
rules out the possibility that Kazakhstan has adopted and 
supported an executive-based ruling party because this had 
proven to be successful in Russia. 
At the same time, there is some evidence of United Russia using 
this connection in order to ‚teach‛ its Kazakhstani peers through 
trainings both at the central and the local levels. However, the 
extent and the effectiveness of these training programs are not 
clear. 
On the side of values, it emerged that the public opinion in both 
countries is constantly discussing and evaluating each others’ 
political developments and political ‚models‛, including the so-
called ‚Nazarbayev’s system‛. But, contrarily to what initially 
expected, this discussion happens on both sides, probably 
contributing to influence the decision-making of Russian elite as 
well. Even when values are transferred, they are appropriated by 
the Kazakhstani leadership, and integrated into the local 
discourse. 
Finally, the Russian model is not the only inspiration for the 
Kazakhstani leadership. In the Kazakhstani discourse there are 
constant references to the example of other Asian states, and in 
particular Singapore, among sources of inspiration.   
 177 
 
  
 178 
Appendix One:  
Interviews 
This appendix presents a full list of the interviews utilized for 
this dissertation. The bulk of these interviews were conducted 
during my fieldwork in Kazakhstan in October and November 
2011. A small number of expert interviews were conducted also 
in other occasions such as international conferences. Follow-up 
interviews with the same person are omitted. Information about 
current position is provided for all interviews, with the exception 
of a few, where details are omitted for ethical reasons. The 
interviews are presented in alphabetical order.  
 
All-parties-meeting participants (2011), Representatives of all 
registered political parties, October 28, Astana. 
Alibayev, Serikbai (2011). Chairman of the Astana branch of 
OSDP-Asat, October 29, Astana. 
Altynbekovna, Neila (2011), Head of the Statistics Department of 
the Almaty City Branch of Nur Otan. October 17, Almaty. 
Beshimov, Bakytbek (2011). Former Kyrgyz diplomat in 
Kazakhstan, Political Scientist. February, 8. Cambridge, MA.  
Bokayev, Sanzhar (2011). Deputy Chairman of the Almaty City 
Branch of Nur Otan, October 14, Almaty. 
Boni, Ugo (2011). First Secretary, Embassy of Italy, October 25, 
Astana. 
Botagarov, Aidar (2011). Coordinator for Media Projects, OSCE 
Centre, October 26, Astana. 
Buluktaev, Yuri (2011). Political Scientist, October 11, Almaty. 
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Chebotaryov, Andrei (2011). Political Analyst, October 19, 
Almaty. 
Gudkov, Lev (2011). Director of the Levada Centre, October 6, 
Moscow. 
Human Rights Expert (2011).  Anonymous, October 22, Astana. 
Kalsin, Iliador (2008). Legal expert of the Foundation Adil Soz, 
February 1, Almaty. 
Karin, Erlan (2011). Nur Otan Secretary for Strategic 
Development, October 21, Astana. 
Karpov, Sergey (2011). Communications Officer, UNESCO 
Cluster Office for Central Asia, October 13, Almaty. 
Kassenova, Nargis (2011). Political Scientist, Kimep, October 19, 
Almaty. 
Khalbekov, Arman (2011). Executive Secretary of the Almaty 
City Branch of Zhas Otan. October 13, Almaty. 
Kharitonova, Natalya (2011). Political Scientist, Moscow State 
University, October 3, Moscow.  
Kossanov, Arimzhan (2011). General Secretary of OSDP AZAT, 
October 18, Almaty. 
Leonard, Peter (2011). Journalist, October 19, Almaty. 
Mambetalin, Serikzhan (2011). Chairman of the Party 
Rukhaniyat, October 12, Almaty. 
Mednikova, Irina (2011). Journalist, NGO activist, October 12, 
Almaty. 
Nurmakov, Adil (2011). Journalist and Political Analyst,  October 
12, Almaty. 
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Nurtazina, Roza (2011). Political Scientist, Eurasian University, 
October 24, Astana. 
Offenbacher, Andrew (2011). Political Officer, OSCE Centre, 
October 26, Astana. 
Petrov, Nikolay (2011). Scholar in Residence, Carnegie 
Endowment, Moscow Centre, October 4, Moscow.  
Political Activist, opposition (2011). Anonymous, October 17, 
Almaty. 
Rakhymzhanov, Amyrkhan (2011). Director of the Astana 
Branch of Nur Otan, November 1, Astana. 
Rakimzhanov, Askhat (2011). OSDP AZAT, October 29, Astana.  
Sagimbaeva, Zhanar (2011). Senior Analyst at the European 
Development Bank, October 11, Almaty. 
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Appendix Two: 
Nur Otan’s Organizational Structure 
 
Overall in Kazakhstan there are 241 Nur Otan branches. The 16 
regional ones are in each province (oblast), while 225 are in 
smaller administrative unions, such as raions, counties and cities.  
Under these main branches, there 6,320 party basic organizations 
(pervychnye partinnye organizatsii, PPO), which can be formed 
starting from a minimum of three party members. Totally, there 
are 920,661 members.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Party Chairman 
Presidium of the Political Council 
Political Council 
Party Congress 
(includes representatives from all the  oblasts 
branches) 
 16 Local branches, one for each oblast and for 
the cities of national relevance (Almaty and 
Astana) 
Raion level branches 
PPOs 
Youth 
Branch 
(Zhas Otan) 
Figura A. 1 Nur Otan’s Organizational Structure Source: www.ndp-nurotan.kz/ 
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Appendix Three:  
Parliamentary Elections and Parliament composition in 
independent Kazakhstan  
 
In this appendix I present a series of tables showing the 
distribution of seats among parties, blocs or groups of 
independent candidates after each Kazakhstani Parliamentary 
election from since 1994.  
In 1994, elections were held for a unicameral legislature, the 
Supreme Council, composed of 177 seats, 40 of which were to be 
filled by candidates on a governmental list (gosspisok). The 1995 
Constitution instituted a new Parliament, formed by two 
chambers: the high chamber (Senate) is composed by 
representatives of the administrative regions (two for each 
oblast’) as well as of Almaty and Astana. The low chamber 
(Mazhilis) is elected directly. Until 2007, most of the deputies 
were elected in Single Member Districts, while a small 
percentage of seats (10%) was assigned with Proportional 
Representation on national basis. After the May 2007 
Constitutional reform, the Mazhilis passed from 77 to 108 
members, of which 98 to be elected with PR, while the other ten 
are elected by the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. The 
Senators’ number was increased from 39 to 47. Their election is 
indirect and renewed every three years. The President appoints 
15 Senators. The 2007 reform also instituted a 7% entry 
threshold. In 2009 the electoral law was emended, allowing also 
a second party to enter the Mazhilis, even if it did not overcome 
the 7% threshold136. 
                                                 
136 Seats distribution for 1994, 1995 and 1999 elections were taken from Brill Olcott (2002). 
For 2004, 2007 and 2012, data were taken from the website of the Central Electoral 
Commission of Kazakhstan. 
http://election.kz/portal/page?_pageid=73,473388&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL  
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Affiliation Seats 
Union of People’s Unity (SNEK, pro-
presidential) 
39 
Trade Union Federation 12 
People’s Congress (NKK) 13 
Socialist Party 14 
Peasants Union 4 
LAD Republican Movement 4 
Other 10 
Total 96 
 
Table A.1 Distribution of Parliamentary Seats as a Result of 1994 
Elections 
 
 
 
 
Affiliation Seats 
People’s Unity Party (PNEK, pro-
presidential) 
24 
Democratic Party (pro-presidential) 12 
Peasants Union 5 
Trade Union Federation 5 
Communist Party 2 
Independents (other) 19 
Total 67 
 
TableA.2 Distribution of Parliamentary Seats won as a Result of 1995 
Elections 
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Affiliation Seats 
Otan (pro-presidential) 24 
Civil Party (pro-presidential) 11 
Communist Party 3 
Agrarian Party (pro-presidential) 3 
Republican People’s Party 1 
People’s Cooperative Party 1 
Business 10 
Independents (government associated) 20 
Independents (other) 4 
Total 77 
 
Table A.3 Distribution of Seats won as a Result of 1999 Elections 
 
 
 
Affiliation Seats 
Otan (pro-presidential) 42 
Democratic Party Ak Zhol 1 
Asar (pro-presidential) 4 
Agrarian and Industrial Union of Workers 
Bloc 
(Civil Party and Agrarian Party, pro-
presidential) 
11 
Democratic Party  1 
Non-Partisans 18 
Total 77 
 
TableA. 4 Distribution of Parliamentary Seats won as a Result of 2004 
Elections 
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Affiliation Seats 
Nur Otan  98 
Total 98 
 
Table A.5 Distribution of Parliamentary Seats won as a Result of 2007 
Elections 
 
 
 
 
Affiliation Seats 
Nur Otan  83 
Democratic Party Ak Zhol 8 
People’s Communist Party of Kazakhstan 7 
Quota Elected by the People’s Assembly of 
Kazakhstan 
10 
Total 108 
 
Table A.6 Distribution of Parliamentary Seats won as a Result of 2012 
Elections 
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Appendix Four:  
The party of power in the media 
 
In order to complete the argument in Chapter 4 about the 
dominant position of the party of power in the media, here I 
present an analysis of the frequency of party mentions in the 
press. 
I performed a descriptive analysis on a sample of national 
Kazakhstani newspapers and magazines, using the publications 
available in the INTEGRUM databases137. They include some of 
the most important and widespread printed papers in Russian 
language, expressing different political orientations. 
Unfortunately, no publications in Kazakh language were 
available. This lack is significant only for the latest years, though, 
as the diffusion of bi-lingual and Kazakh-language papers is 
relatively recent. 
In fact, while television is tightly controlled by the State, among 
printed media there is more diversity and pluralism: some 
opposition papers openly criticize the government and others try 
to present a balanced view of political events. This makes the 
pervasive presence of the party Nur Otan even more significant.  
In Table 1 there is a list of the publications used in the analysis, 
with some information about their frequency, circulation and the 
period of their availability in the INTEGRUM databases. My goal 
is to show the difference between the coverage given to the party 
of power and other Kazakhstani political parties. In Table 2 a list 
of political parties is presented, including Russian name and 
abbreviation, used in the searches. 
 
                                                 
137 INTEGRUM offers a wide and easily searchable selection of printed media in Russian 
language. See: http://www.integrumworld.com/  
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Publication name Frequency Approximate Weekly 
Circulation  
Availability in  
Integrum 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda Five times a week 100.000 1992 - 2012 
Ekspress Kazakhstan Five times a week 100.000 2001 - 2012 
Vremya 
Weekly until 2007,                     
then four times a week 
240.000 2000 - 2012 
Megapolis Weekly until 2010, then daily 15.000 2005 - 2012 
Respublica Weekly 30.000 2008 - 2012 
Izvestia Kazakhstana Weekly 35.000 2004 - 2012 
Panorama  Weekly 20.000 1996 - 2012 
Ekspert Kazakhstan Weekly 10.000 2003 - 2012 
Table A.7 Publications information. Sources: INTEGRUM, papers’ official websites. 
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Name Russian Name and abbreviation Activity 
Nur Otan* Народно-Демократическая партия «Нур Отан» - НДП  Нур 
Отан 
2006 -  
Otan Республиканская партия Отан - РПП  Отан 1999 – 2006 
Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan** 
Коммунистическая партия Казахстана - КПК 1998 – 
People’s Communist Party Коммунистическая Народная партия Казахстана – КНПК 2004 -  
Party of Patriots Партия патриотов Казахстана - ППК 2000 -  
Rukhaniyat Партия «Руханият»  2003 - 
Adilet  Демократическая партия «Адилет» -  ДПК  Адилет 2004 - 
Azat*** Демократическая партия  «Азат» -  ДПК  Азат 2005 - 2009  
OSDP Общенациональная социал-демократическая партия -  ОСДП 2006 – 2009  
OSDP-Azat: Общенациональная социал-демократическая партия «Азат» - 
ОСДП  Азат 
 2009 -  
Alga**** Народная партия «Алга!» 2005 - 
Asar Республиканская партия «Асар» 2003 – 2006 
Republican Party of Республиканская Народная партия Казахстана -  РНПК 1998 – 2002 
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Kazakhstan 
DPK Ak Zhol Демократическая партия Казахстана «Ак жол» -  ДПК  Ак жол 2002 - 
Nagiz Ak Zhol Нагыз Ак жол 2005 – 2008 
Agrarian Party Аграрная партия Казахстана -  АПК 1999 -  
Civil Party Гражданская партия Казахстана - ГПК 1998 - 
Auyl Казахстанская социал-демократическая партия «Ауыл» - КСДП  
Ауыл 
2002 - 
Democratic Choice  Народная Партия «Демократический Выбор Казахстана» -  НП 
ДВК 
2004 – 2005 
People’s Cooperative Party Народно – кооперативная партия  Казахстана -  НКПК 1994 -  
 
Table A.8 Main Kazakhstani Political Parties with full denomination and years of activity 
 
* Otan shares part of its name with its successor Nur Otan and the party youth organization Zhas Otan, possibly generating 
false positive results in the search. I solved the problem considering the results for ‚Otan‛ only between 1999 and 2006, which 
is in the period of effective existence of the party (in 2006 it was dismissed to create Nur Otan). Doing this, also the problem of 
homonymy with Zhas Otan is solved, as the latter was founded only in 2008.  
** The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is currently suspended. The temporary suspension should end in October 2012. 
*** OSDP and Azat merged in 1999, to form OSDP Azat. Controls were necessary as Azat is also a common first name: I 
introduced a series of specifications in order to get only the cases where the object was the political party. 
**** Despite having never received registration, Alga is an active opposition party  
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Figure A.2 Otan/Nur Otan mentions compared with main opposition parties 
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Figure A.3 Otan/Nur Otan mentions compared with other pro-regime parties 
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The selected timeframe is 1999 – 2011, as Otan was established in 
1999. For a better visualization, I present results in two graphs: in 
Figure 1, the mentions of the party of power are presented in 
comparison with the main opposition parties, while Figure 2 
shows mentions in the media of the most important parties in the 
pro-regime camp. 
It should be noted that there are different numbers of 
publications available over years: 1999-2000 (two publications), 
2001 (three), 2002 (four), 2003 (five), 2004 (six) and 2005-2011 
(eight publications). This of course limits the validity of remarks 
made for the early 2000s, especially in comparative perspective 
with later periods.  
It is still possible to make a few considerations. Generally 
speaking, there seems to be a relative increase of attention on 
political parties in correspondence of campaigns for 
parliamentary elections (in 2004, 2007 and in 2011 - as the 
elections were held on January 15, 2012). This – quite natural – 
trend seems to be particularly relevant in 2004. Indeed the 
political scene in 2004 was quite fragmented and parliamentary 
elections were perceived as crucial. In 2004 we also see that the 
coverage of Otan was more balanced in comparison to other 
parties, although larger. This is partly due to the presence of 
other parties in the pro-presidential camp (Asar, the Civil Party 
and the Agrarian Party), which were quite independent and had 
their own access to mass media. This is true especially of Asar, 
the party founded and chaired by Dariga Nazarbayeva, 
president’s daughter and powerful media tycoon.  
Party of power’s mentions are much more frequent, in 
comparison to other parties. This is true especially since the 
formation of Nur Otan, confirming the impression that in the late 
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2000s the position of the party of power has progressively 
consolidated, not only in the political but also in the public 
discourse sphere. Moreover, since 2008 the media sphere 
includes also a number of publications owned by Nur Otan 
(including the Russian-language weekly Strana i Mir), which 
contribute to fill the media sphere with information about the 
party of power.  
In general, there is a trend towards an increase of mentions for 
the party of power, due to growing popularity and increasing 
control in the media sphere. An exception is 2010, when we can 
observe an interruption of this trend. Nur Otan received a 
smaller number of mentions (as well as other pro-regime parties) 
while values for opposition parties remained stable.  
A possible explanation for this is related with Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. I looked comparatively at 
mentions of the party of power and of the President in the same 
sample of printed media for the period 2009-2011, looking at 
each quarter. Interestingly, both President Nazarbayev and the 
Nur Otan had a lower media profile in the summer of 2010 (see 
Figure 3). It is possible that the events and analyses related with 
OSCE Chairmanship simply outnumbered coverage of everyday 
activities by the ruling party and the President. For example, a 
conference in Astana on Tolerance and Non-discrimination was 
held at the end of June 2010, while an informal Ministerial 
meeting and a seminar took place in Almaty in July 2010138. 
However, it is also possible that authorities have lowered the 
profile of the party of power in order to ‚look better‛ in front of 
the international observers. 
                                                 
138 A full list of activities, events and news related to the Kazakhstani OSCE 
Chairmanship of 2010 is available at: 
http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=
477&cntnt01returnid=211  
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Figure A.4 Comparison “Nur Otan” and of “Nazarbayev” mentions 2009-2012 (on quarter basis) 
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The advantage of the party of power on other parties should 
become more evident during electoral campaigns. Below, I 
present the results of comparative searches for the last four 
parliamentary electoral campaigns, since the establishment of 
Otan. The searches included only the parties officially registered 
for elections, and were performed from the day elections were 
announced until Election Day (Central Electoral Commission, 
2010). In case of repeated voting (in 1999 and in 2004), I did not 
extend the analysis to the second tour, because this was 
organized only for some seats assigned in Single Member 
Districts, while the definitive results for the party quota were 
available already after the first tour. The results show a situation 
progressively unbalanced in favor of the party of power. Of 
course, part of the advantage is due to the party’s position as 
ruling party: mentions regard its government activities as well as 
electoral propaganda. 
In 1999, the advantage of Otan in the printed media was already 
visible, though other parties, including the Communist Party 
(Otan’s main opponent) received significant shares of mentions 
in the press. On the one hand, the State control on the media 
scene was still limited. Also, it is possible that elites were not yet 
ready to ‚invest‛ in the new party formation. 
During the 2004 electoral campaign, the advantage of Otan 
became greater, reaching 38% of the total number of mentions of 
political parties. The other pro-regime parties (the Agrarian/Civil 
Party Bloc and Asar) received lower but still significant shares. 
By 2007 the consolidation around the party of power both in the 
political and in the media spheres was complete. Nur Otan 
received 45% of the coverage in this sample of printed media.  
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For the 2012 elections the elites supported also a second party, 
the pro-business formation Ak Zhol. In this sample of media, 
though, we can see that most of the attention was on the party of 
power, which got a 44%, share of coverage. 
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 Figure A.5 News coverage during the campaign for the Mazhilis elections  - 1999, 2004, 2007 and 2012 
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Appendix Five: 
Looking for Russian-based values in the Kazakhstani 
public discourse 
In order to look at whether and how values originating in Russia 
are received in Kazakhstan, a qualitative content analysis was 
performed on a sample of national Kazakhstani newspapers and 
magazines. 
 Qualitative content analysis is defined as ‚a research method for 
the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through 
the systematic classification process of coding and identifying 
themes or patterns‛ (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). In this case, 
it is particularly suitable to the question posited in the chapter, 
which is whether certain values, typical of the Russian pro-
regime discourse, are widespread also in Kazakhstan. 
The analysis is configured as a ‚conceptual analysis‛ (Carley, 
1990). After deciding to search for expressions, rather than single 
words, the keywords have been selected, and a series of 
variations has been individuated for each of them. Mostly, they 
are related to the core concepts of the Russian mode of rule, but 
some of them test the presence of other values, connected with 
the Chinese, Asian and Singapore examples (Table 3). I decided 
to code the concepts for frequency, rather than for existence, 
because I am interested in seeing how popular these concepts are 
in the Kazakhstani public discourse, and this would have not 
emerged clearly from detecting the single presence of these 
concepts in the printed media.  
The analysis has been combined with an analysis of the context 
where the single expressions were found, regarding the 
connotation assigned to the term, as well as more general 
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considerations. In Table only the number of resulting mentions is 
shown.  
A detailed discussion of findings is presented in Chapter 6. 
There, an accurate description of the context is attempted, as well 
as an interpretation of the findings and of their implications for 
the argumentation (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).  
The search has been conducted on a sample of Kazakhstani 
printed media, using the publications available in the 
INTEGRUM and Eastview databases139.  
These databases include some of the most important printed 
papers in Russian language. While the absence of publications in 
Kazakh is an evident lack, it does not represent a fundamental 
problem: Russian is still widely spoken among the political elite 
– who are the ones who ultimately make the decision of 
adopting (or not) these values. This fact could actually be an 
asset: the terms do not need to be translated, and can reach the 
receivers directly with their original message. 
 Information about the majority of the publications used in the 
analysis is available in the Appendix Three (Table 1). A few more 
publications were considered in this case: the weeklies SEZ and 
Pravo. Ekonomika. Politika. Kul’tura., which were available 
respectively for 2005 and for the period 2005-2006. 
The analyses have been conducted for the period from 1999 until 
December 2011, with the exception of searches on ‚sovereign 
democracy‛, which started in 2006, when the concept was first 
worded.
                                                 
139 Eastview and INTEGRUM offer a wide and easily searchable selection of printed 
media in Russian language, relative to Russia and the post-Soviet area. See: 
http://www.integrumworld.com/  and http://www.eastview.com/online.  
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Table A.9 Looking for external values in the Kazakhstani public discourse: keywords 
 
* The expression ‚managed democracy‛ was searched for also in combination with other terms:  ‚our‛ (nasha), ‚our own‛ 
(sobstvennaia), ‚Kazakhstani‛ (po-kazakhstanski and Kazakhstanskaia), ‚Nazarbayev’s‛ (po-Nazarbayevski and Nazarbayevskaia). 
This was done after a first search, which revealed that the expression was often associated with these terms.
Keyword Query Structure* Period of search Number of articles 
mentioning the term  
Sovereign democracy ‚суверенная демократия‛ 01.01.2006 – 01.01.2012 33 
Managed democracy ‚управляемая демократия‛ 01.01.1999 – 01.01.2012 147 
Russian model 
‚Российская модель‛**, 
‚Российский пример‛, 
‚Российский опыт‛ 
01.01.1999 – 01.01.2012 185 
Putin model 
‚Путинская модель‛, ‚модель 
Путина‛ 
01.01.1999 – 01.01.2012 1 
Chinese model 
‚Китайская модель‛, ‚Пекинская 
модель‛, 
‚Китайский пример‛ 
‚опыт Китая‛ 
01.01.1999 – 01.01.2012 36 
Asian model, Asian values 
‚Азиатские ценности‛ 
 
01.01.1999 – 01.01.2012 8 
Singapore model 
‚Модель Сингапур‛,  ‚опыт 
Сингапура‛, 
‚пример Сингапура‛ 
01.01.1999 – 01.01.2012 53 
‚Economy first‛ ‚сначалa экономика‚ 01.01.1999 – 01.01.2012 95 
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Appendix Six: Map of Kazakhstan 
Figure A.6 Map of Kazakhstan. Source: http://www.stantours.com/pics/kz_mn_map_bw_xl.gif  
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